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Foreword
Job creation continues to be a priority in economic policy because 
the wellbeing of families depends on the quantity and quality of jobs 
available. In 2004-2008, Latin America recorded its highest economic         
growth in 40 years, which has had a positive impact on job creation, 
in contrast to the minimal improvements in both job numbers and 
quality posted during periods of slow economic growth. Economic  
growth is not, however, the only factor that shapes these two aspects 
of employment. 
The three pillars of the institutional framework for labour, namely, 
the regulations governing individual and collective employment 
relations, unemployment protection and active labour-market policies, 
also play a key role inasmuch as they affect the dynamics and 
characteristics of labour supply, the quantity and quality of the jobs 
created, the efficiency of job-placement and contracting processes, and 
the conditions and prospects of the unemployed.  
The debate about labour institutions, in both academic and 
political circles, revolves not around their importance, which is not 
in doubt, but about how to optimize their design, and two main 
positions in this regard have emerged. On the one hand, there are       
those who maintain that the institutional framework should be based 
solely on market mechanisms as the use of other instruments distorts 
the workings of the labour market and diminishes its efficiency and 
hence its performance in terms of equity. On the other hand, there are       
those who claim that for the labour market to operate fairly and in a 
sustainable manner, mechanisms need to be set up to protect workers 
against the structural inequalities that exist between the stakeholders. 
ECLAC12
The discussion has become more heated as the forces of 
globalization exert increasing pressure on countries’ systemic 
competitiveness, forcing them to make adjustments to their labour 
institutions.  Several questions have been raised, including: whether 
the regulations on individual and collective employment relations 
enable companies to respond and adapt adequately to changes in the 
market; whether they promote long-term growth and competitiveness 
strategies and whether they favour a fair distribution of the results 
of economic growth and generate individual career development 
opportunities in the labour market. Policymakers also need to ask      
whether the mechanisms to protect workers against job losses are fair 
and effectively promote reinsertion into the labour market. Active  
labour-market policies need to be examined to determine if they help 
people who have particular problems finding a job become more 
employable. Finally, thought needs to be given to whether the three           
pillars of the institutional framework for labour today foster a steady 
increase in productivity and contribute to the smooth functioning of 
the labour market.
In the last few decades, efforts have been made to improve labour 
institutions in Latin America. The various reforms carried out reflect 
the different views held on the topic. In some cases, measures have      
aimed to increase the efficiency of labour institutions and stressed 
the importance of establishing more flexible labour markets. Other 
measures have been geared towards consolidating workers’ rights 
and protecting the more vulnerable sectors. Various instruments have    
also been combined to improve the efficiency and the equity of labour 
institutions at the same time.
Despite the progress made in some areas, the strengthening of 
labour institutions has not been properly integrated into a long-term 
development strategy or as part of a sustainable development project 
driven by the increasing incorporation of innovation and more highly 
skilled human resources. 
The debate on how to improve labour institutions is hampered 
by two flawed and interrelated visions: one is a short-term approach      
that focuses on immediate gains, such as those obtained from reducing 
labour costs, without considering the advantages of having a skilled 
workforce and labour relations that make it possible to steadily 
improve productivity as part of a competitive strategy for ensuring 
the country’s sustainable development over the long term; and the 
other is a zero-sum approach, in which labour relations are primarily 
conflictive and the potential benefits of cooperation between labour 
and employers are ignored. 
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It is in this context that the concept of flexicurity is analysed. 
The flexicurity model, which was first adopted in several European 
countries, spearheaded by Denmark, combines flexible labour 
markets with high levels of unemployment protection and active 
labour-market policies that ensure efficient reinsertion into the labour 
market and favourable conditions for workers. Moreover, flexicurity   
is implemented in tandem with an economic growth strategy that 
relies on the workforce becoming increasingly skilled. The model 
consequently has a large lifelong training component.  
Obviously, it will not be possible to adopt flexicurity in exactly 
the same way in Latin America as it was implemented in the European 
Union, where it has become the main axis of labour policy; however, 
the lessons learned by the European countries could prove useful to 
the region. These include the need to adapt labour institutions to a 
more dynamic and volatile socio-economic context, the importance of 
negotiating reforms so that the institutions are sustainable over time, 
and the advantages of having an overall vision of how the different 
components of the institutional framework for labour fit in with the 
country’s long-term development strategy. 
The socio-labour situation varies considerably across the region, 
and each country’s reality, as well as the idiosyncrasies of its processes 
for social and political dialogue, need to be carefully analysed when 
identifying priorities and policy instruments or specifying objectives 
for strategies to improve labour institutions.
This book is intended to contribute to this process. It summarizes   
the main outcomes of the project entitled “Labour Markets, 
Workers’ Protection and Lifelong Learning of the Labour Force in a 
Global Economy:  Latin American and Caribbean Experiences and 
Perspectives” undertaken by ECLAC with cooperation from the 
Government of Denmark. 
In the first chapter, Jürgen Weller summarizes the recent changes 
in the three pillars of the labour institutions of Latin America and 
analyses the challenges that improving those institutions entails. 
In the following chapter, Henning Jørgensen explains the features 
of the Danish flexicurity model and analyses its relevance for Latin 
America. Subsequently, Adrián Goldin, José Paulo Chahad, Mario        
Velásquez, Clemente Ruiz Durán and Jorge Toyama discuss the 
changes and challenges associated with flexicurity in the labour 
markets of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, respectively. In  
the last chapter, Víctor Tokman examines the informality that, to a 
greater or lesser extent, characterizes the region’s labour markets and 
represents one of the main structural obstacles to the implementation 
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of the flexicurity model in Latin America. This analysis culminates 
with an assessment of the options for formalizing the labour markets as 
a precondition for constructing more integrated and cohesive economies 
and societies in the region. Our hope is that these contributions will        
further the complex, but necessary, debate on this important issue.
Alicia Bárcena
Executive Secretary
Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean  (ECLAC)
15Regulation, Worker Protection and Active Labour-Market Policies in Latin America
Chapter I
The improvement of labour-market institutions 
in Latin America: progress and challenges1
Jürgen Weller
A.   The global economy and labour-market challenges
The changes that the global economy has experienced in recent years 
have generated new challenges for societies and economies all over the 
world. Growing trade in goods, services and information, heavy capital 
flows and massive international migration are producing what has been 
called a second wave of globalization. While benefiting from the positive 
aspects of market integration, the more open economies are faced 
with the cost of adapting continuously to a volatile and unpredictable 
economic environment. 
To take maximum advantage of the potential benefits, countries 
must try to improve their systemic competitiveness, but at the same 
time they need to establish efficient adjustment mechanisms and social 
1 This chapter is a revised version of the text published as ECLAC (2008b), which was 
prepared by the author under the direction of José Luis Machinea, then Executive 
Secretary of ECLAC. The author wishes to thank the following for their comments: 
Miguel del Cid, José Paulo Chahad, Adrián Goldin, Clemente Ruiz Durán, Andrés 
Marinakis, Juan Carlos Obando, Víctor Tokman, Jorge Toyama and Mario Velásquez. 
Nevertheless, he takes full responsibility for the contents of the chapter.
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security systems to protect those affected by these adjustments, in order 
to limit the costs inherent in a volatile environment and to distribute 
them as fairly as possible. 
In this context, firms are demanding flexibility in market 
regulations so that they can adapt promptly to shifts in demand, as well 
as a reduction in economic transaction costs (World Bank, 2007). Yet if 
they are to remain competitive over the long run, firms will also need 
to adopt strategies for increasing productivity. Here, the key elements 
are process and product innovation and a skilled labour force.
The changes noted above have had an enormous impact on 
labour markets. Factors such as technological change, which makes 
productive processes more flexible, the growing mobility of capital and 
technology, and the adoption of business strategies in response to the 
shifting context tend to diversify and polarize occupational patterns. 
Moreover, the integration of the economies of Asia and of countries of 
the former Soviet Union into the world market has in effect doubled 
the global labour force (Freeman 2005a). The labour force in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, in particular, faces competition both from 
skilled workers in highly industrialized countries and from less-skilled 
workers whose competitiveness is based on low wages. In this setting, 
workers are demanding more protection and greater opportunities 
for promotion and advancement. Because a great proportion of 
the Latin American and the Caribbean workforce is excluded from 
institutionalized labour relations, there is an additional demand to 
make labour-market institutions increasingly inclusive of this segment 
of the population. 
The ultimate purpose of labour-market institutions is to generate 
high-quality employment. If the institutions are to help to do that, the 
socio-economic changes under way require adjustments to the three 
pillars of the system of labour-market institutions: labour-market 
regulation, unemployment protection systems, and active labour-
market policies. In recent decades, many countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean have undertaken reforms in these three areas. However, 
many of these reforms have lacked mutual coherence and consistency 
over time, due primarily to the lack of an underlying consensus on 
how the overall apparatus of labour institutions should be revamped. 
Some European countries have responded to the challenge of 
adapting their labour-market institutions (challenges which, while 
similar, have to be faced in a very different socio-economic context 
in Latin America) by combining flexible labour regulation with solid 
mechanisms for protecting the unemployed, including both direct 
financial subsidies and active labour-market policies. This response is 
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based on the concept of “flexicurity”. For many reasons, experiences 
in other parts of the world offer little in the way of models for the 
changes that are needed in the Latin American and Caribbean 
region. Nevertheless, there are some lessons to be drawn from these 
experiences. They include the need to adapt labour institutions to a 
new, more dynamic and changeable economic and social context; 
the importance of negotiated adaptation to make sure that the new 
institutions are sustainable over time; the need for a comprehensive 
approach that treats the different components of these institutions as 
complementary; and the need to consider labour-market institutions 
within a long-term development strategy. 
This chapter offers an introduction to the main issues in the 
debate. After reviewing the recent performance of the region’s labour 
markets, it takes a historical look at its labour institutions. The following 
sections analyse recent changes in the three pillars of the institutional 
apparatus of labour: the regulation of individual and collective labour 
relations, protection against and during unemployment, and active 
labour market policies. The main characteristics of the flexicurity 
approach are then examined, an approach which seeks to develop a 
response to the new challenges for labour. The last two sections of the 
chapter discuss the relevance of this approach to Latin America and the 
Caribbean and propose some strategic considerations for improving 
labour institutions in the countries of the region.
B.   Labour markets in Latin America and the Caribbean:  
      current situation and trends
Historically, demographic growth has exerted heavy pressure on 
Latin American and Caribbean labour markets, with larger age 
cohorts seeking work year by year. Yet the demographic transition 
of recent decades has tended to mitigate this pressure and, indeed, 
in recent years, has helped to reduce it. While the region’s working-
age population (defined as all persons aged 15 years and older) was 
growing annually by 2.9% in the early 1970s, this indicator is expected 
to drop to 1.8% for the five-year period 2005-2010. In the decade 2000-
2010, the increase in the working age population will have declined 
even in absolute terms, from a maximum of 37.7 million in 2000-2005 
to a projected 37.0 million in 2006-2010 and this downward trend is 
expected to continue into the future (ECLAC, 2004a).
This tendency is even more pronounced in urban areas. Strong 
migratory flows caused the urban working-age population to grow by 
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4.2% a year in the first half of the 1970s; 30 years later, the rate stood at 
2.4% and, according to projections, will fall to 2.1% in 2005-2010.
Alongside these demographic trends, growth in the labour force 
is also influenced by changes in participation rates (the percentage 
of the working age population that is actually in the labour market). 
The following tendencies have had important medium and long-
term effects:
- In recent decades there has been a steep increase in the female 
participation rate, although it is still well below that for men.
- The fact that young men remain longer in the education system 
has tended to slow the increase in the male participation rate. While in 
many countries young women have achieved higher education levels 
than men, this has not slowed the female participation rate, which is 
lower than that for men: what has declined is the percentage of women 
engaged in domestic work.
- Workforce participation tends to drop when people reach 
retirement age, especially if there are broad social protection systems 
in place. The increase in the number of persons older than 65 years 
tends to dampen labour participation rates, especially in urban areas.
Because it was the first of these tendencies that dominated 
in most countries, the overall participation rate has risen, despite 
short-term fluctuations in the supply of labour in reaction to the 
macroeconomic situation.2
Notwithstanding the reduced labour supply pressures resulting 
from demographic trends, unemployment increased during the 
1990s and the beginnings of this decade. As figure I.1 shows, job 
generation was insufficient to offset the increase in the labour force: 
as a consequence unemployment, which appears in the figure as the 
difference between the participation rate and the employment rate, 
rose throughout this period. This trend was especially marked after 
1995, when successive economic crises had an extraordinary impact 
on unemployment, which remained at historically high levels because 
of the lack of sustained economic growth. The region’s unemployment 
began to decline only in 2004, thanks primarily to an upsurge in job 
creation —the employment rate rose from 52.6% in 2003 to 54.7% in 
2007— and by 2007 the region’s jobless rate dropped to 8.0%, from a 
peak of 11.0% in 2002-2003 (ECLAC 2007a).
2 The labour supply response to the business cycle varies among countries: see Machinea, 
Kacef and Weller (2007).
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Figure I.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (16 COUNTRIES): LABOUR PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT TRENDS, 1990-2007
(Weighted average rates)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) based on official 
country data.
The high and persistent level of open unemployment recorded after 
1995 was in fact without precedent in the region, for while previous 
economic crises sparked a jump in unemployment, this always dropped 
back fairly quickly, even at times of weak economic growth, as in the 
1980s. In those circumstances, open unemployment was followed by a 
period when jobs were more widely available in the low-productivity 
sector, but this process was not so apparent after 1995.3
More recently, employment trends in low-, medium- and high-
productivity sectors have varied. Between 1990 and 2002, the share of 
employment in the medium- and high-productivity sectors increased 
slightly (from 58.9% to 59.6%). This increase was not generalized, 
however, and in 12 of 17 countries the share of these sectors declined, 
while that of the low-productivity sector rose (ECLAC, 2007d, pp. 
133-134).4 Between 2002 and 2005, the composition of employment 
3 The low-productivity sector is measured on the basis of household surveys, and 
covers employers and wage-workers in microenterprises, domestic service and self-
employed workers with no professional or technical qualifications.
4 Brazil was one of the countries in which the low-productivity sector’s share declined, 
which explains much of the decline in the weighted regional average.
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improved: the proportion of the medium- and high-productivity 
sectors increased in 8 of 15 countries, rising from 59.6% to 62.6% as a 
weighted regional average.
Another important factor has been heavy outward migration from 
the region. In addition to the long-standing emigration of Mexican, 
Central American and Caribbean workers to the United States, there 
has been a sharp increase in emigration outside the region because of 
severe economic crises. Partly because of differences in welfare levels 
between neighbouring countries, these crises have also sparked intra-
regional migrations. According to ECLAC estimates, 11 countries in the 
region have net annual migration rates of two persons per thousand 
or more.5
A further labour-market problem is the declining quality of 
employment. A major component of this phenomenon is the reduced 
coverage of social security programmes, reflecting more precarious 
employment conditions. The proportion of employed people 
contributing to social security systems dropped from 63.3% in 1990 
to 55.5% in 2002, increasing slightly in subsequent years to 56.7% in 
2005 (ECLAC 2007d, p. 136). It should be noted that this reduction 
in protection levels also affected those in wage employment, among 
whom the percentage of contributors declined from 72.4% in 1990 to 
68.2% in 2005. Another indicator of the deterioration in job quality in 
the 1990s was the significant proportion of wage earners who had no 
formal contract, or only a short-term contract (ECLAC, 2007d, p. 135), 
possibly reflecting the increase in outsourcing. Generally speaking, 
employment has become increasingly precarious.
Within the region, the trend in average real wages in the formal 
sector has varied, depending on the method of calculation used. The 
index based on median annual rates of increase shows that wages 
rose by 30% over the period 1990-2007 (1.5% a year), more than 
reversing the 11% decline observed in the 1980s. By contrast, using an 
index that represents the weighted average rate of increase in wages, 
the cumulative increase over the last 17 years was barely 12%, or an 
average annual growth of 0.6%. From this perspective, wage increases 
lagged slightly behind output per worker, which grew by around 0.8% 
annually between 1990 and 2006.
Figure I.2 shows that, after a drastic drop in average labour 
productivity in the 1980s, output per worker started to pick up gradually 
until 1997, although it did not regain its 1980 level. This pattern can be 
5 Those countries are, in descending order: Guyana, Suriname, Saint Lucia, Jamaica, 
Guatemala, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, and Peru 
(ECLAC 2004a).
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attributed to a significant increase in productivity in the primary and 
secondary sectors, in the context of freer trade. Average productivity 
in the tertiary sector (which is more difficult to measure) appears to 
have increased only in certain years, and to have retreated towards the 
end of the “tequila crisis”, with the expansion of the informal urban 
economy that characterizes many branches of the tertiary sector.
Figure I.2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS, 1980-2006
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on official 
country data.
Between 1997 and 2003, average labour productivity stagnated. 
Only in the primary sector was there an increase in labour productivity, 
due primarily to a standstill or reduction in the small farmer population, 
the modernization of capital-intensive commercial agriculture, 
and the expansion of mining. Since 2004, with the improvement in 
macroeconomic conditions, all sectors have seen a rise in productivity, 
although in 2006 productivity had yet to regain its 1980 level.
In fact, the problems that Latin America and the Caribbean countries 
have encountered in boosting their productivity and, hence, their 
competitiveness and economic growth, are key factors for explaining the 
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scant improvement of labour conditions in the region. This weakness is 
also reflected in the sharp drop in total factor productivity that many 
countries have suffered in recent decades, although some performed 
better in the 1990s (ECLAC, 2004c, chapter V).
Lower labour productivity translates into a high incidence of poverty 
among employed workers. Naturally, poverty is less prevalent among the 
working population than in the population as a whole, yet it is noteworthy 
that 27% of urban workers and 48% of rural workers earn too little to raise 
their per capita household incomes above the poverty line.6
Lastly, labour-market trends do not affect all groups equally. The 
causes of this inequality lie in factors outside the labour market, such as 
unequal education opportunities, problems relating to labour-market 
institutions, and mechanisms of discrimination or bias in favour of 
certain segments of the labour force. Various indicators, such as a rising 
unemployment rate, or longer job-seeking periods, difficulties in gaining 
access to certain jobs, pay differentials for the same type of work, and the 
wide and growing wage gaps between sectors, demonstrate the need for 
specific measures to promote employment opportunities for the worst 
affected groups. Those groups include, in particular, women and young 
people, especially those with little schooling, and ethnic minorities. At 
the same time, inequality is ingrained in the structural heterogeneity of 
the region, which is manifested in great productivity differences and in 
the concentration of poor workers in the low-productivity sector.
As noted earlier, the economic momentum recorded in the region 
since 2004, with annual growth rates of 5.5% between 2004 and 2007, 
helped to boost labour performance. The following are some of the most 
noteworthy developments observed during this period:7
- The employment rate rose steadily, and in 2007 it was 1.5 
percentage points above the average for the 1990s; 
- The unemployment rate fell by three percentage points between 
2003 and 2007 to stand at 8.0%, the level recorded in the early 1990s;
- Job creation was strongest in wage-paying employment, 
reflecting robust labour demand and a growth-employment elasticity of 
around 0.7 between 2004 and 2007;
- Formal employment expanded as measured both by the structure 
of the labour market and by enrolment in social security systems and 
contributions to those systems;
6 Simple average of 18 countries for urban workers and 15 countries for rural workers, 
based on data taken from ECLAC (2007d).
7 See ECLAC (2007a, 2007c, 2007d) and Machinea, Kacef and Weller (2007).
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- More unstable contractual relationships also increased; 
- The impact of higher labour demand was felt primarily in job 
creation, while wages in the formal sector increased only slightly in 
most countries;
- Labour productivity improved after a period of stagnation that 
lasted for about 10 years from the mid-1990s; 
- Poverty levels declined, thanks to renewed social policies, higher 
employment levels, demographic changes that reduced dependency 
ratios and, to a lesser degree, higher wages.
In summary, the relatively high economic growth of recent years, 
supported by a very favourable external environment, has had a positive 
impact on labour performance. Yet unemployment and underemployment 
rates in the region remain high, and many people are unable to escape 
from poverty even if they have jobs. Despite the relatively solid labour 
performance of recent years, then, the region cannot afford to overlook 
questions about whether the existing labour institutions:
• foster the creation of high-quality jobs or are an obstacle to better 
performance;
• contribute to the systemic competitiveness of Latin American 
and Caribbean countries;
• promote the efficient functioning of labour markets;
• protect and strengthen the weakest players in a market with 
structural inequalities among participants; and
• foster the inclusion of those working in the informal and low-
productivity sectors.
C.   Labour-market institutions
Labour-market institutions are mechanisms with differing degrees 
of formality that establish the rules of behaviour for participants in 
the labour market. Examples of such institutions include legislation 
governing individual and collective labour relations, active labour-
market policies, unemployment protection systems, and also types of 
conduct that invite informal sanction. The ultimate goal of labour-market 
institutions is to generate high-quality employment. They should also 
contribute to sustainable, long-term socio-economic development and 
help to integrate segments of the workforce not covered by protection 
mechanisms. To achieve these goals, institutions must meet two 
objectives: they must ensure an efficiently functioning labour market, 
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i.e., the optimal allocation of resources, and they must guarantee 
protection and capacity-building for the weakest players in a market 
characterized by structural inequalities among participants. In this 
way, properly designed labour institutions stimulate economic growth, 
competitiveness, employment, and social cohesion.
Betcherman, Luinstra and Ogawa (2001) note that three types of 
mechanisms are involved in regulating the labour market: market-
based,8 statutory and collective voice. Table I.1 offers an overview of the 
possible advantages and risk of these three mechanisms.
Table I.1
 POTENTIAL STRENGTHS AND RISKS OF MARKET-BASED, STATUTORY,                                        
AND COLLECTIVE VOICE REGULATION










Can address equity concerns 




Collective voice Can promote long-term investments Provides self-monitoring Time-consuming Insider-outsider differences 
Source:   G. Betcherman, A. Luinstra and Makoto Ogawa, “Labor market regulation: international experience 
in promoting employment and social protection”, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series, Nº 128, 
Washington, D.C., World Bank,  2001, page 9. 
When these objectives come into conflict, it is up to labour policy 
to find the appropriate balance between the available mechanisms 
and instruments. Designing labour institutions is not a zero-sum 
game, however, and the challenge is to identify possible ways to fulfil 
simultaneously a variety of objectives. One possible option is provided 
by instruments for increasing labour productivity, which improve 
economic competitiveness while also increasing the potential to 
improve employment conditions. There is no single best way to strike 
those balances and the response will always depend on the temporal 
and spatial context. On one hand, shifting conditions in other markets 
may spark modifications in labour-market institutions. On the other 
hand, labour institutions are the result of historic processes specific to 
each country. This means that, while a given institutional arrangement 
8 It may be argued that, insofar as it is a “social institution”, by definition, 
the labour market is never governed by neutral market mechanisms, but is 
always influenced by power relations and ethical aspects, among other factors 
(Standing, 1999). The differentiation between types of labour-market regulation 
is conceptually relevant, however.
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may be broadly accepted in one country because of its social history, 
and may contribute to achieving objectives there, in another society 
that same arrangement may be controversial and its implementation 
may upset the functioning of other institutions.
In the context of Latin America’s “inward-oriented” development, 
the labour institutions created were similar to those in more industrialized 
countries.9 The intent was to establish a comprehensive framework that 
would take account of the sharp increase in wage employment in the 
industrial and tertiary sectors and respond to the demands of emerging 
social sectors. As happened in more developed nations, Latin American 
and Caribbean countries created institutions to regulate labour 
relationships, both directly through the State and through collective 
bargaining. Yet there are a number of features that distinguish Latin 
American experience from that in industrialized countries:
- The coverage of labour institutions was confined to a much 
smaller sector of the labour force;
- Within the sector with formal coverage, there was less observance 
of existing rules; 
- In many countries, relations between the principal socioeconomic 
agents (public sector, employers, unions) were determined by a 
populist State that proposed a social covenant under its leadership. 
In this context, the unions came to depend heavily on certain political 
forces or the State, favouring political over labour negotiations, and 
statutory regulation over arrangements negotiated between employers 
and unions;
- In some cases, social and political instability sparked a cycle 
in which, at some point, integrative institutions were replaced by 
authoritarian regulations that dismantled or undermined union 
organization, after which those institutions were re-established; 
- In countries with a weak productive base and exclusionary social 
and political systems, the predominant form of collective labour relations 
was authoritarian and repressive, while individual labour relations were 
frequently geared to protection of workers, even though the coverage of 
labour institutions was narrower than in more developed countries.
9 The two principal regulatory mechanisms in the industrialized countries were labour 
and social legislation, and collective bargaining. In the context of a broad national 
covenant, whether tacit or explicit, between firms, workers and the State, these 
regulations improved working conditions (with higher real wages, shorter working 
hours, insurance against unemployment, sickness and disability, and regulation of 
workplace safety and hygiene, among other improvements), and they contributed to 
increasing labour productivity (through training and organization of work).
ECLAC26
It is reasonable to conclude that, while the basic features of labour 
institutions in more industrialized countries were repeated in Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, in the latter, they encompassed a 
much smaller portion of the productive, social and political structure. 
Moreover, large segments of the population, the weight of which 
varied from one country to another, remained excluded from these 
processes and benefited only indirectly from the progress that was 
made (for example, social policies and trickle-down income effects), or 
they suffered economic dislocation and social marginalization. Thus, 
labour institutions generally failed to achieve the stability typical of 
social covenants in industrialized countries and did not produce the 
desired social cohesion. It may be noted that the situation was slightly 
different in Caribbean countries, where labour institutions followed 
Anglo-Saxon models, meaning that there was less State intervention 
in labour-market regulation.
In economies that were much more closed than those of highly 
industrialized countries, some elements of Latin American economic 
regulation had an adverse impact on economic efficiency.10 Yet during 
the 1970s and much of the 1980s, most analysts were convinced that 
Latin American labour markets were functioning reasonably well 
(Squire, 1981; Gregory, 1986). 
Nevertheless, the technical and economic changes that have 
occurred at the global, regional and national levels in recent decades 
have altered the functioning of other markets, and have exerted 
renewed pressure on the labour market. In particular:
- market opening increased the competitive pressure on national 
economies and on firms, obliging them to make better use of the factors 
of production and to strive for steadily rising productivity; and
- recent technological progress has allowed production processes 
to adapt more rapidly, and has forced firms to make greater adjustments 
to shifting patterns of demand. Elements such as quality, innovation, 
diversity and creativity have gained importance in comparison with 
the standardized, large-scale production lines that characterized the 
Taylorist system.11 
10 For example, wage increases and high earnings expectations tended to be passed on in 
the form of higher prices.
11 Because technological change is less generalized in Latin America and the Caribbean 
than in the more industrialized countries, these factors are less widespread in the region. 
In any case, they are becoming more important as Latin America and the Caribbean 
countries attempt to bolster their productive structure through technological change, 
innovations, and upgrading of the labour force.
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As a consequence, both the production structure and labour 
demand have become more heterogeneous and require swifter 
adjustment. When it comes to the labour supply, a more heterogeneous 
workforce (of which women form a growing proportion and in which 
young people have specific preferences with respect to working 
conditions) requires labour relations that are different from those that 
predominated in earlier stages, designed to fit the “typical worker”, 
i.e., the adult male (Cortázar 2004). This greater heterogeneity of 
both supply and demand implies less direct State intervention, which 
would now be limited to establishing a floor for labour rights and 
mechanisms for protecting specific groups. Broadly speaking, labour 
relations are having to be negotiated between firms and workers, and 
at different levels, for example within a specific branch of activity and, 
as a complement, within the firm. In short, while there is no single 
regulatory system that can best fulfil these objectives, more adaptable 
internal and external labour markets could play an important role in 
making the productive process more flexible.
In this setting of more volatile markets, workers tend to demand 
more stability and protection. The traditional response of labour 
legislation to these demands has been to discourage layoffs through 
a system of compensation for dismissal “without just cause”, in an 
effort to avoid high turnover rates. In the current context, where 
economic volatility in itself tends to reduce employment stability, the 
focus should be on another kind of stability, relating in particularly to 
incomes (ILO 2004a). It must also be recalled that (to differing degrees 
among countries) a high proportion of the workforce is not covered by 
labour institutions, a fact which, in structural terms, tends to weaken 
social cohesion. Consequently, further attention needs to be paid to 
two instruments: systems for protecting the unemployed and active 
labour-market policies that will help the unemployed rejoin the labour 
market promptly and improve the employability of those excluded 
from labour institutions.
Lastly, labour-market institutions must be appreciated in the 
context of a long-term development strategy. The question is this: 
what is the basis for building systemic competitiveness in Latin 
American and Caribbean countries? If the answer is that growth 
and development must increasingly be based on innovation and 
knowledge, on the production of higher-value-added goods, and 
on rising productivity (ECLAC 2004b), then it is obvious that labour 
institutions must be such as to promote the accumulation of human 
capital and to foster labour relations and business organization 
schemes that will stimulate cooperation, at the level of the firm, the 
sector, and the economy as a whole.
ECLAC28
D.    Labour-market regulation
The profound crisis that marked the 1980s, and caused it to be known as 
“the lost decade”, had severe repercussions (de facto more than de jure) 
on labour-market regulation. As the informal economy spread, the scope 
for enforcing formal regulations shrank even further and, in many cases, 
rising inflation inevitably caused real wages to fall since labour unions 
were severely weakened and minimum wage policies were subordinated 
to anti-inflation strategies.
The situation prompted proposals for structural reforms, which were 
subsequently compiled into the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 
1990), the basic idea of which was that less market regulation would 
generate higher rates of economic growth, while macroeconomic policy 
would be designed to avoid the imbalances that hampered the efficient 
allocation of resources. Among other things, this consensus championed 
freer trade in goods and services and the opening of the financial account, 
the privatization of public enterprises, less government intervention in 
financial and other markets, and measures to control fiscal deficits.
Labour reforms had little place in this framework, probably because 
it was expected that other reforms would have a more significant effect 
on economic growth and the labour market, particularly if existing 
labour-market institutions functioned properly. Moreover, the risk that 
wide-ranging labour-market reforms would spark social conflict may 
have been another dissuasive consideration.
Consequently, during the 1980s only a few countries —Chile in 
particular, and Panama to a lesser extent— took any significant steps 
to make labour relations more flexible. In other countries, for example 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, priority was given to re-establishing 
collective labour rights, which had been suppressed by military 
dictatorships, and to expanding individual labour rights. Brazil took the 
lead in this regard, through a constitutional reform (Chahad, 2009).
In part because of the disappointing results of the “first generation” 
reforms, a series of supplementary reforms were proposed in the 1990s, 
including labour reforms (IDB, 1997). In the 1990s, many countries 
reformed their labour legislation, in most cases in order to bring greater 
flexibility to specific aspects of the labour market, with the emphasis on 
expanding the available range of contractual arrangements. The intent 
was to supplement contracts of indeterminate duration with a series of 
fixed-term contracts, to expand the use of probationary periods, and to 
facilitate subcontracting. The second tendency was to make it cheaper 
to lay off workers: chief among these measures were a broadening 
of the definition of dismissal “for just cause” and the introduction of 
unemployment protection systems based on individual accounts. Other 
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flexibility-oriented reforms included the de-indexing of wages, more 
flexible working hours, and a reduction in non-wage labour costs.
Detailed ILO studies (Vega Ruiz, 2005) have found that the deepest 
reforms following 1990 took place in Argentina and Peru. Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Panama also introduced changes to key labour 
institutions, while efforts to achieve greater flexibility were of lesser scope 
in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua. Other countries, including Mexico, made no 
significant changes to their labour legislation (Ruiz Durán, 2009).
Notably, these legal changes did not represent a general move 
towards greater flexibility, either at the regional level or within the 
model adopted by individual countries. A number of countries extended 
vacation periods and adopted laws to improve protection for specific 
groups. For example, measures were taken to protect working mothers 
and to eradicate the worst forms of child labour. In addition, legal changes 
made during the first half of the 1990s helped to strengthen labour unions 
in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica, while these were weakened in 
Argentina and Peru. In Chile, some of the deregulation measures from 
the 1980s were reversed. 
In the present decade, Chile and Peru, among other countries, 
have introduced new, “atypical” labour contracts. Chile, for example, 
developed contracts covering part-time work, the promotion of youth 
employment, and teleworking  (Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, 
2003), while Peru designed new, atypical contracts to encourage youth 
employment, especially in conjunction with various training instruments 
(Toyama, 2009).12  In a switch from the prevailing trend of the 1990s, other 
countries restricted the use of atypical contracts. Following the Spanish 
model, in the late 1990s, Argentina replaced the strategy of making 
contractual relationships more flexible via atypical contracts, nullifying 
some of those arrangements through amendments to standard contracts 
(Tokman 2007a).
Since 2000, generally speaking, there have been no further wide-
ranging reforms for greater flexibility, and such measures as have been 
adopted have focused on small businesses and micro-enterprise, or 
on specific sectors, such as agricultural exports in Peru. On the other 
hand, some of the more recent reforms have stressed the overhaul of 
collective labour relations in order to bring them into line with ILO 
standards and to strengthen collective bargaining (Vega Ruiz, 2005). 
The spectrum of issues covered by collective bargaining has also 
12 Nicaragua and Paraguay also saw the emergence of new types of contracts to help young 
people secure their first formal job (Vega Ruiz, 2005, p. 30). Peru also tried to encourage 
the hiring of persons aged 45 years and older.
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broadened somewhat in a number of countries (Vega Ruiz, 2005, p. 
13), by embracing new groups such as seasonal workers (Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare, 2003, p. 97). Broadly, these reforms have 
improved the conditions for union organization and in some cases 
have stopped or slowed the decline in unionization. 
Furthermore, a number of countries have reformed labour relations 
to provide better protection for individual workers. For example, Chile 
has reduced the number of hours in the working week and increased 
compensation for dismissal without just cause (Ministry of Labour and 
Social Welfare 2003). Argentina has also increased compensation, especially 
for workers with little seniority (Goldin 2009). Some countries have placed 
restrictions on overtime, or raised overtime pay rates (Vega Ruiz 2005, p. 
45). In some cases, such as Chile, Colombia and Peru, the abuses detected 
in personnel subcontracting has led to limits on the use of this contractual 
instrument (Toyama, 2009 and Puyo Posada 2007). In Argentina and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, temporary measures have been taken to 
prevent the layoff of workers during an economic crisis.
Given the disparity between existing legislation and levels of 
compliance, several countries13 have significantly bolstered the resources 
available for labour inspections. One obstacle to the proper functioning 
of labour institutions is the ineffectiveness of the labour tribunals, 
as reflected in the length of proceedings. A number of countries have 
introduced reforms to improve this aspect of labour institutions (Vega 
Ruiz, 2005, p. 25; Bensusán, 2006).14
Although it has not been the dominant trend, labour reforms in 
some countries have resulted from a process of social dialogue.15 The 
most wide-ranging reforms have generally been implemented under 
exceptional circumstances that precluded adequate participation by 
the parties. This has rendered such reforms unsustainable, and they 
have subsequently been amended, sometimes in the opposite direction. 
International commitments today play an increasingly important role 
in the debate. Those commitments include the ILO conventions as well 
as proposals relating to labour legislation and its enforcement that 
have emerged in the course of trade negotiations, especially with the 
13 Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, among others; see the consulting reports.
14 It has been argued that in some countries labour tribunal jurisprudence has had an important 
impact on the functioning of labour institutions, particularly as a result of inconsistencies 
between constitutional rights and legal provisions (Ermida, 2007; Toyama, 2009).
15 For example, in El Salvador and the Dominican Republic tripartite pacts were negotiated 
(Vega Ruiz, 2005, p. 21). Other countries also undertook exercises in social dialogue, of 
varying thematic coverage and final scope.
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United States. While the emphasis in the first free trade treaties between 
the United States and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean was 
on the enforcement of national legislation, in recent years some countries, 
including Colombia and Peru, have made commitments to amend their 
laws in order to promote the adoption of the respective treaties.
Generally speaking, the main changes have been to individual 
labour rights, while collective bargaining rights have been weakened 
for various reasons, including the following (Weller, 2000; Cardoso and 
Gindin, 2008):
- The productive structure has been reorganized, increasing the 
weight of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and making 
union organization more difficult (particularly in many tertiary fields), 
as well as increasing the role of occupations that do not fit the traditional 
pattern of union affiliation (professional, technical, administrative and 
other careers);
- Economic reforms, especially trade liberalization and privatization, 
weakened union bargaining power by increasing competitive pressure 
on highly unionized sectors;
- Technological change has reduced the tendency of large groups 
of workers to gravitate towards homogeneous occupations;
- The union movement has faced repression, especially under 
military dictatorships and during the economic crisis of the 1980s; 
- Legislative changes have restricted the scope of union action; 
- Some unions have lost legitimacy because of close ties to political 
parties, or because of non-transparent practices; 
- The tendency of unions to look to the State, rather than employers, 
to address their demands is out of touch with the new development 
modality; and
- Employment in the public sector, where unionization rates were 
often high, has declined or been contained.
As noted above, some countries have taken steps since the 1990s 
to strengthen collective bargaining, but their intent was not necessarily 
to negotiate flexibility as a strategic component of institutional reform. 
In conclusion, labour regulation has undergone various changes 
in recent decades. First, during the 1980s and part of the 1990s, the 
employment structure became more informal and the coverage of 
formal labour institutions narrowed. This reflected not only the growth 
of the informal sector (comprising primarily micro-enterprises and 
unskilled own-account workers) but also “moonlighting”, and a growing 
ECLAC32
tendency towards “delabourization”, i.e., concealing the relationship of 
dependency between worker and employer by giving it the gloss of a 
business relationship (Morgado, 1999; Goldin 2008a). Second, during the 
1990s, and even earlier in some cases, labour reforms were clearly (but 
not exclusively) aimed at achieving greater flexibility. While deep reforms 
were implemented in some countries (Argentina, Peru and Chile in the 
late 1970s and throughout the 1980s), in other countries the changes were 
much more gradual and often lacked a clear strategic direction. Third, 
during the present decade, efforts to make labour relations more flexible 
have been more modest in scope, and in some countries the main thrust has 
been to provide greater protection for workers in both their individual and 
their collective labour relations.16 Countries that had introduced greater 
flexibility, such as Argentina, Chile17 and Peru, in some cases within an 
“exceptional” institutional context, have recently amended those reforms 
and have refocused attention on certain aspects of protection.
E.    Unemployment protection 
The traditional approach to worker protection starts from the assumption 
that workers’ incomes, and the welfare of their families, depend on their 
job. On this basis, the principal risk to workers’ well-being is the loss 
of employment, not only because unemployment means no income, but 
also because any subsequent job they find is likely to be of lower quality 
(Herrera and Hidalgo 2003).
The traditional instrument for reducing the risk of unemployment 
has been to make employers pay compensation to workers dismissed 
“without just cause”, in order to discourage firings and layoffs.18 Because 
the amount of this severance payment rises with the length of time on the 
job, this protection tends to be greater for older workers, although there 
are generally ceilings on the total amount a worker can receive.
There are large differences between countries in the amount of 
compensation and its ceiling, in the definition of fair and unfair dismissal, 
and in the prospect that a dismissed worker will find another job. While 
there is general agreement that bad behaviour on the part of the worker, 
such as absenteeism, justifies dismissal without compensation, there is 
less consensus regarding layoffs made to suit the firm’s needs. While 
some countries tolerate this rationale for dismissal (with appropriate 
16 This coincided with the international debate from which there emerged a greater degree 
of caution with respect to radical deregulation measures (Freeman 2005b).
17 Chile began this gradual process in the 1990s.
18 The employer is usually also required to give advance notice of layoff, or to pay the 
corresponding wages in lieu of notice.
33Regulation, Worker Protection and Active Labour-Market Policies in Latin America
compensation), in Peru it is valid only for mass layoffs, and in some 
countries it is not accepted at all.19
The severance payment tool has been criticized for discouraging 
labour mobility and hindering productivity growth by preventing workers 
from moving out of low-into high-productivity activities. It is also seen as 
stabilizing employment for older workers and impeding access by excluded 
groups, particularly youth and women, to productive employment.
Beyond severance payments as a mechanism for protecting workers 
from unfair dismissal, some countries have introduced other instruments 
(generally as a supplement to layoff compensation) to provide income 
support for the unemployed while they are looking for a new job. One 
approach is to have employers make regular deposits, defined by law, into 
individual worker accounts.20 In the event of dismissal or (sometimes) 
resignation, the worker will then have built up a capital sum plus interest. 
In terms of compensation, these accounts have the advantage of offering 
greater security, since the deposits are made regularly and payout in case 
of unemployment does not depend on the employer’s financial situation. 
In some cases, this instrument can lift the restriction on voluntary mobility 
by giving the worker access to savings regardless of the reason for the 
termination of the contractual relationship. A certain portion of these 
funds has on occasion been used for purposes other than protecting the 
unemployed worker, however, which undermines their original function.
Some countries have unemployment insurance systems funded 
by contributions from employers and (in most cases) from workers.21 
Sometimes the State may also contribute. Insurance of this kind provides 
a subsidy to the laid-off worker up to a specified maximum period 
of time (and sometimes after a waiting period), the amount of which 
depends on the contributions paid in. Generally, workers become eligible 
for insurance benefits only after making a certain minimum amount of 
contributions, and only if they are available to accept a new job.
In a few countries, for example Brazil and Ecuador, unemployment 
insurance coexists with individual accounts. Chile’s unemployment 
insurance represents the most recent experience: it combines individual 
accounts (funded by employer and worker contributions and accessible 
if the worker is laid off or resigns) with an unemployment fund (fondo 
solidario) to which firms and the State contribute. The fund guarantees 
19 There are other provisions that make layoffs difficult, such as the Bustos law in Chile, 
which prohibits dismissals until social security contributions are paid (Velásquez, 2009).
20 For example, in Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama 
and  Peru (Velásquez, 2005).
21 For example, Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and 
Uruguay (Velásquez, 2005).
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payment of a minimum amount to laid-off workers who have exhausted 
all the money available in their individual accounts before the end of the 
statutory period (up to five months, depending on time in the job). If a 
worker is laid off, the severance payment will be reduced by the amount 
of previous employer contributions to his individual account. It should 
be noted that some aspects of this insurance are being reviewed, as the 
conditions for accessing the funds have been found to be too restrictive.
Certain aspects of the region’s social security systems have traditionally 
been tightly linked to holding a formal job. Few countries have specific 
provisions for the unemployed, and the benefits are very limited:
- In Argentina, an unemployed worker is covered by health 
insurance for as long as he or she receives unemployment insurance 
benefits or, in the case of a laid-off worker who has no unemployment 
insurance, for up to three months, through the social welfare system.
- In Chile, beneficiaries of the solidary component of unemployment 
insurance receive health insurance cover.
- In Peru, voluntary insurance is being introduced to ensure 
continuity in contributions to the national pension system during periods 
of unemployment.
Generally speaking, the unemployed have access to the universal 
health system or, depending on the features of a country’s system, to its 
non-contributory component. This coverage is usually of lower quality, 
and does not include everyone outside the contributory health system.22 
The various instruments of unemployment protection have some 
shortcomings in common, and others more specific ones. The main 
problem is that their coverage is restricted because they are closely 
linked to formal employment systems. In fact, some instruments are 
valid only for private wage earners with formal, indefinite contracts. 
Unemployment insurance coverage tends to be low in countries where the 
informal economy is large and the turnover rate is high, with a growing 
proportion of fixed-term contracts.23 In reality, only a small proportion 
of workers laid off “without just cause” will receive severance payment, 
even though they are entitled to it.
22 See Mesa-Lego (2005) for an analysis of health systems in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, recent reforms, and their impact.
23 In Chile, all workers with fixed-term contracts are in principle covered by unemployment 
insurance but, in this case, high turnover means that only a limited proportion of 
unemployed persons enrolled in the insurance system actually benefit from it, especially 
in the case of the system’s solidary component. In Argentina, there is also a special regime 
for seasonal workers.
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Given the low average level of wages, the different models have two 
alternatives: to try to provide the unemployed with income levels not 
too far below their previous wage, which would pose serious financing 
problems, or to try to contain the cost of the system by limiting benefits 
to amounts that fall short of family subsistence needs. The severance 
payment system may well be attractive to workers because, depending 
on their seniority, they could receive a lot of money if they are laid-
off, even if it is only a one-time payment. This could hinder voluntary 
mobility for formal workers.
Given the shortcomings of the instruments reviewed above, 
Latin American and Caribbean countries have frequently resorted to 
substitutive mechanisms, especially at times of economic crisis, such as 
emergency job creation programmes in the public sector, as described in 
the following section.
F.    Active labour-market policies 
Active labour-market policies consist of interventions in the labour 
market designed to combat unemployment and raise workers’ incomes. 
The main instruments are programmes for direct or indirect job creation, 
occupational training, employment services (mainly intermediation) and 
encouragement of self-employment and micro-enterprises. Beginning 
in the 1990s, these policies underwent significant changes in reaction 
to the critical labour situation in many countries. They tend to be less 
controversial than labour reforms, as they do not affect the interests of the 
main stakeholders in the labour market and can have a positive effect on 
the functioning of that market, for example by encouraging productivity 
and reducing transaction costs. Another factor to bear in mind is that 
these policies, whose efficiency is thrown into question by the uneven 
results of evaluations (Weller, 2004), must be financed from government 
revenues. The following is a brief analysis of the most significant changes 
to these policies in the region in recent times.24
1.    Direct and indirect generation of wage employment
Direct job creation programmes are normally launched in response 
to an emergency situation when there are no broadly available 
unemployment protection systems. This generally occurs at times of 
sharp contraction in labour demand, sparked by an economic crisis, 
natural disaster or seasonal factors. These programmes offer temporary 
24 See Samaniego (2004) and Velásquez (2005), and the respective chapters in this volume 
and the non-abridged versions of Chahad (2009); Goldin (2008b); Ruiz-Durán (2009); 
Toyama (2009) and Velásquez (2009).
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jobs at a rate of pay close to the minimum wage, where low pay serves 
as a self-selection mechanism and where the stress is on generating 
employment so that members of poor families can generate incomes, 
a possibility often confined to the head of the household. While the 
design and implementation of such programmes have traditionally 
been the responsibility of government agencies, non-governmental 
institutions have also been permitted to offer and execute this type 
of scheme in some countries since the 1990s. The activities involved 
are generally labour-intensive, such as cleaning, construction and 
maintenance of physical infrastructure. A frequent secondary objective 
of these programmes is to improve living conditions in areas with 
high poverty indices.
One of the weaknesses of direct job creation programmes is that 
they do little to help workers get back into the labour market, because 
they do not generate skills or know-how recognized by the market. 
Moreover —and this relates to the previous point— even when the 
emergency is over, it is often difficult to roll back schemes of this 
kind because many of the beneficiaries will have few alternatives 
for employment. This generates political pressure to maintain them. 
Another frequent criticism points to the unequal distribution of 
funding because of political factors or because of differing management 
capacities among participating institutions. To deal with all these issues 
Argentina, for example, has introduced measures such as economic 
incentives for job-seekers to enrol in training programmes.
Another alternative is indirect job creation through incentives for 
private businesses to hire workers. The incentive is typically a subsidy 
to reduce non-wage labour costs or to cover a portion of worker pay, 
always for a limited period of time and with the expectation that the 
contractual relationship will survive after the subsidy ends. In Chile, to 
improve the chances of such survival and of future job opportunities, 
a training grant has been added to the scheme. In some cases, the 
subsidies vary according to the size of the firm.
Yet there are doubts about the efficiency of these instruments, 
relating for example to possible “dead weight” effects (hiring 
people who would have been hired anyway) and the displacement 
of existing workers by persons under subsidized contact. One 
important element here is the close linkage between the programme 
and the economic cycle: in the upswing, the “dead weight” effect 
could prevail, while in the downswing the programme’s efficiency 
could be eroded by the substitution effect, or simply nullified 
because firms, seeing no need for further hiring with its attendant 
costs, will not take up the incentives.
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While this instrument has been little used in the region, countries 
including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Panama have recently applied 
it in the context of first job programmes, where it serves not so much to 
facilitate employment during an economic downturn as to overcome 
the structural barriers facing young labour-market entrants.
2.    Training
Among the labour-market policies that have seen the biggest 
changes in recent years is the policy on training. One of the reasons 
for attempting to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and fairness 
of training systems is the recognition that a qualified workforce is 
needed to enhance the systemic competitiveness of Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. At the same time, the acquisition of 
useful knowledge and skills is recognized as a key component of 
employability, especially for people with little schooling. Training is a 
factor of equal interest to all parties, for its positive impact can be seen 
both in productivity and in labour stability, as it enables workers to 
climb the occupational ladder and to earn higher wages.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the countries of the region set up 
vocational training systems to promote industrialization and the 
expansion of formal commerce and services. Despite some subsequent 
amendments, concerns over their functioning began to emerge in the 
1980s. The high costs of those systems, the rigidity in the training 
offered and the limits on beneficiary groups gave rise to new 
approaches to training. The main changes introduced to address these 
problems were as follows:
- Diversification of training providers, with greater reliance 
on private institutions. In the public sector, the functions of delivery 
and regulation were institutionally separated and programmes 
were decentralized, leading to greater participation by local entities 
(provinces and municipalities).
- Interest in the certification of skills, sparked by a greater 
variety in the range of training offered and the recognition of informal 
learning (Schkolnik, Araos and Machado, 2005).
- Attempts to make training more demand-oriented through 
greater involvement of private enterprise and, in some cases, trade 
unions, in identifying unmet needs.
- Diversification of target groups. On the one hand, there was 
a move from one-time training to continuous training for personnel 
who were of strategic importance for the firm’s competitiveness. On 
the other hand, training programmes were developed to encourage 
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reintegration of the unemployed and special schemes were designed 
for groups with specific employability problems (youth and women 
with low education levels) or those working in low-productivity, 
low-income activities (specific occupations, own-account workers, 
micro-entrepreneurs).
- New instruments for the public funding of training, in 
particular tax incentives.
Despite these recent changes, training systems still fall short of 
the required effectiveness, efficiency and fairness. The following are 
some of the indicators that back up this assertion:
- Training systems are not conceived as part of a long-term 
development strategy focused on continuous improvements in 
systemic competitiveness. If they were, they would serve a key 
function in raising labour productivity.
- The coverage of training systems is generally limited, both 
in terms of training for first-time jobseekers and in terms of ongoing 
training or retraining for economically active persons.
- Evaluations of the impact of training on labour-market 
integration reveal mixed results.
- Many firms face problems in finding suitable personnel, 
particularly more skilled persons.
- It is common to see persons who are underemployed in terms 
of their education and skills. This exerts downward pressure on the 
labour supply.
- In several countries, training expenditure has declined or 
programme coverage has retreated, reflecting management difficulties 
and problems in matching supply and demand.25
- A contributing factor here may be that, while the importance 
of demand-driven training is recognized, it is not always easy to 
determine the exact nature of future demand and to adjust training 
curricula accordingly. There is seldom any capacity for prospective 
analysis in this respect.
- The use of incentives is often unequal: they tend to be 
used more by large firms than by small ones, and their benefits 
flow to higher-ranking or administrative personnel rather than to 
production workers.
25 See, for example, Chahad (2009), Toyama (2009) and Velásquez (2009).
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3.    Employment services
The main purposes of employment services are: to provide general 
information on the labour market, to intermediate by publicizing 
information on vacancies and jobseekers, and to help prepare labour-
market entry strategies. Employment services do not in themselves 
create work, but rather facilitate entry into the labour market, thereby 
helping to reduce unemployment and enhance productivity.
Latin American and Caribbean countries have made significant 
efforts to decentralize the delivery of employment services and 
to expand their coverage by incorporating new technologies, in an 
attempt to make these services more effective and reduce their cost 
(Mazza 2003). Various forms of public-private partnership have also 
been established (sometimes involving NGOs and labour unions) to 
replace the former, exclusively public structure, and offer services 
to portions of the informal sector (micro-enterprises), so that 
intermediation is no longer confined exclusively to the formal sector. 
To take full advantage of their potential, intermediation services 
are now being integrated with active and, where they exist, passive 
labour-market policies. In some countries, employment services are 
also used to deal with international migration.
Employment services are only one of many instruments available 
for matching labour supply and demand. Another instrument 
is the individual job search through direct inquiries, newspaper 
advertisements and, increasingly, the Internet. Despite the progress 
described, which has certainly made employment services more 
efficient, a great proportion of job placements are still arranged 
through personal contact and recommendations, and this tends to 
undermine the efficiency of matching and to reinforce segmentation 
in the labour market. This is because workers with more highly 
developed networks of contacts (social capital) have an advantage, 
implying a bias in favour of persons from middle- and upper-income 
households. Consequently, those most likely to turn to employment 
services are people with special employability problems, whether 
because of their low qualification levels, their inexperience, or their 
lack of social capital: this poses a special challenge to the services and 
makes it more difficult to measure and evaluate results.
4.    Support for self-employment and micro-enterprise
Given the failures of labour demand and the consequent weak 
generation of wage employment, many countries have taken steps 
to encourage people to work independently, either as own-account 
workers or as micro-entrepreneurs. Those measures are designed to 
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help create new businesses, but they also support existing ones, with a 
view to enhancing their productivity and output by increasing wages 
and generating new positions.
To this end, programmes have been established with training and 
financing as their chief components, along with technical assistance and 
support for networking. Another policy is to facilitate or reduce the cost of 
registering microenterprises, to encourage them to formalize their status. 
As with training, there are two different but complementary 
approaches here. From the enterprise development perspective, small-
scale businesses are seen as needing special support to integrate them more 
effectively into the productive structure. From the social development 
perspective, the emphasis is on analysing the employment problems facing 
broad sectors of the population in need of alternative income sources. 
These contrasting perspectives make for great differences between the 
programmes’ target groups, their methods and their instruments.
Wherever in the world they are created, micro-enterprise start-ups 
often fail. This poses a special problem for programmes designed to 
encourage such initiatives. When it comes to nurturing existing small 
businesses and micro-enterprises, more information is available for 
assessing their viability and new plans. On the other hand, new initiatives for 
independent work are unlikely to offer large-scale production alternatives 
at times when few wage jobs are being created, for an adverse economic 
setting not only affects labour demand as a whole but also diminishes 
business opportunities for new initiatives, because of low aggregate 
demand. Independent employment opportunities that emerge in times of 
low economic growth must be considered, above all, as survival jobs.
G.    Flexicurity and lifelong learning
The three elements discussed in the previous sections —labour-market 
regulation, protection for the unemployed, and active labour-market 
policies— also enter into the debate on reforming labour-market 
institutions in the European Union. Facing relatively high unemployment 
levels and other labour problems, the European Union has designed a 
strategy to improve labour performance, and the European Commission 
has recommended that member countries afford special emphasis to 
combining flexible labour markets with high levels of social security for 
the unemployed (European Commission 2007).
Denmark’s experience is an important point of reference for the 
European debate. After a lengthy historical process, the 1990s saw the 
establishment of a combination of policies that has been described as the 
“flexicurity” model. This model is characterized by a “golden triangle” 
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(Madsen, 2006; Jørgensen, 2009) that consists of regulations for a flexible 
labour market, an unemployment protection system with generous 
benefits, and active labour-market policies to facilitate prompt and 
productive reemployment of those who lose their jobs (see figure I.3).26
Figure I.3
THE “GOLDEN TRIANGLE” OF THE FLEXICURITY MODEL
Source: Per Kongshøj Madsen, “Flexicurity – a new perspective on labour markets and welfare states in 
Europe”, document presented at the seminar on flexicurity, Directorate-General for Employment, European 
Commission, Brussels, 18 May 2006.
1.    Flexible labour market
Flexibility in the labour market refers to the high mobility of 
workers, fostered by the ease with which firms can hire and fire staff, 
and also to the options available to these workers in a dynamic labour 
market. The legislation also offers ample room for collective bargaining, 
which is regarded as an efficient and flexible instrument of labour 
26 While these three components already existed, they underwent major reforms in the 
1990s. The model has been further adjusted during the present decade, and there is 
debate today as to how far the most recent changes might affect the key elements of the 
model (Jørgensen, 2009).









regulation (Trade Unions Confederation/Employers’ Confederation/
Ministry of Employment of Denmark 2007).
Another important aspect of flexibility is the existence of a broad 
network of public institutions that provide care for children, older 
adults and the sick, and in this way make it easier for women to 
enter the labour market. While in many societies the gender division 
of labour assigns women the responsibility for these tasks, in this 
scheme that responsibility falls to society as a whole, and women 
who want to join the labour market face fewer obstacles in doing so. 
Consequently, the female participation rate in Denmark is one of the 
highest in the world.
2.    Social security
The social security system provides a high level of income protection 
for the unemployed. Financed primarily from taxes, it encourages 
high turnover rates, especially among low-income groups. While the 
entitlement period for benefits has been shortened in recent years, it 
remains fairly long, at four years.
The unemployment protection system predates the introduction of 
flexicurity and incorporates the traditional model of the welfare state 
that prevailed throughout the twentieth century. In that tradition, it is 
regarded not only as a component of the “golden triangle” of flexicurity, 
but also as a key mechanism for achieving the welfare and fairness 
goals set by Danish society. All of this is based on the premise that 
society is prepared to assume the economic costs involved. This basis 
of protection, and Danish society’s steadfast commitment to it despite 
the change of context, may be regarded as key elements for the social 
viability of flexicurity.
The system for protecting the incomes of the unemployed may 
be said to improve the functioning of the labour market, for it gives 
the unemployed the opportunity to seek a new job free of short-term 
pressures, and it tends to improve the matching of supply and demand 
(Acemoglu and Shimer 1999). As a result, income losses may in fact be 
lower than they would generally be when a change of employment is 
caused by a layoff.
3.    Active labour-market policies
Passive labour-market policies, particularly unemployment insurance, 
are closely linked to active policies that offer various instruments of support 
to people unable to find a new job immediately. Among these are the 
intermediation system and, above all, the retraining system for workers who 
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have few prospects of returning to their former occupation or who lack the 
know-how and skills to find long-term productive employment.
Active labour-market policies are based on the premise that 
opportunities and obligations go hand in hand. It will be recalled that 
the training activities identified for an unemployed person are not 
merely an option: under certain circumstances, the person is obliged to 
take training in order to remain eligible for benefits. To some extent, the 
same is true with intermediation, since there is an obligation to accept 
the vacancies identified by the placement service.
The close connection between passive and active policies makes 
matching more efficient. The reason most often given for the drop in 
income upon entry to a new job following a layoff is that a portion of 
the worker’s human capital is no longer useful because it was relevant 
specifically to the firm for which he or she previously worked. Retraining 
can counter this effect, if only partially, by enabling the accumulation 
of human capital, whether general or case-specific. This not only 
mitigates the income loss of the worker, but also helps to enhance the 
productivity of the firm hiring that person and, consequently, that of 
the economy as a whole.
There are two essential elements in the functioning of the institutions 
described as the “golden triangle”.
First, they are closely linked to a long-term competitiveness strategy 
whose main pillars are innovation and human capital accumulation.
Danish society recognizes that, in the current context of 
globalization and market integration, the country’s competitiveness, 
economic growth and social welfare will depend on the development 
and production of knowledge-intensive goods and services. In 
this context, education and training play a key role, for continuous 
innovation in processes and products requires highly skilled people, 
and high-quality production is based on high levels of education 
and training in all areas of the productive process. This poses a great 
challenge to all stakeholders, especially to people with little schooling, 
who could find themselves excluded if they do not upgrade their skills 
to current requirements.
In this context, the lifelong learning system constitutes a key 
component, beyond the education system itself and the training of 
children and youth (from preschool through to universities that are 
globally competitive). At a time when markets are undergoing continuous 
adjustment, it is not enough to acquire knowledge and skills that are 
useful only once, at the beginning of the working career. In order to 
achieve continuous productive integration, knowledge and skills must 
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be frequently upgraded and expanded. With this in mind, Denmark has 
opted to improve the recognition of skills acquired outside the formal 
education and training system; to encourage the demand for training by 
helping to define the skills required, above all in small and medium-sized 
enterprises where a mix of training in basic and specific skills is needed; 
to design short courses at new levels, for example at the university level; 
and to diversify the range of training offered through a more differentiated 
system of fees (Government of Denmark 2006). In this respect, the “golden 
triangle” is being expanded with an additional component, which is 
continuous upgrading of the labour force. This requires a broader vision 
of the training system than merely helping the unemployed to find new 
jobs, and makes it part of a long-term competitiveness strategy.
Figure I.4
THE EXPANDED GOLDEN TRIANGLE
Source:  Prepared by the author, on the basis of Per Kongshøj Madsen, “Flexicurity – a new perspective on 
labour markets and welfare states in Europe”, document presented at the seminar on flexicurity, Directorate-
General for Employment of the European Commission, Brussels, 18 May 2006, and Henning Jørgensen, 
“Flexible labour markets, workers´ protection and ‘the security of the wings’: A Danish “flexicurity” solution 
to the unemployment and social problems in globalized economies?”, 2009, forthcoming.
The intent is, first, to foster productivity by having a labour force 
that can adapt readily to the new demands of the labour market; second, 
to facilitate the functional labour flexibility that firms operating in 
an open economy must have so that they can assign their workers to 
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various tasks as the productive process demands; third, to raise working 
incomes, which would benefit from this higher productivity; and fourth, 
to facilitate productive employment for persons with relatively low 
education levels.
The second key elements in the functioning of the labour institutions 
known as the “golden triangle” is social dialogue as a mechanism not 
only for the design and application of institutionalized flexicurity but 
also as an instrument for continuous adaptation and progress.
The Danish flexicurity model has its origins in a long history of 
social dialogue based on the recognition of differing but legitimate 
interests and on negotiation as the principal instrument for achieving 
sustainable results over the long term. Consequently, legal regulation 
is relatively limited and leaves considerable room for employers and 
unions to negotiate major aspects of how the labour market functions. 
This negotiation takes place at both the centralized and decentralized 
levels (Jørgensen, 2009).
The functioning of the system, which confers considerable decision-
making powers to these organized social partners, clearly depends on a 
high degree of organization and representation. Only in this way will the 
negotiated outcomes win wide acceptance and general legitimacy, and 
only in this way can the exclusion of broad sectors of the unorganized 
population be avoided.
Empirical findings show that the Danish model has a positive 
impact on various labour-market variables such as participation rates 
and unemployment. Denmark’s results clearly outrank the average 
for the OECD countries (Jørgensen, 2009). Beyond this “objective” 
performance, it has been noted that the Danes —like other societies 
with a similar institutional structure— enjoy greater employment 
security than exists in countries with similar protection systems but 
with more rigid labour regulations; or in those that have rigid labour 
regulations and weak protection systems; or in those that have flexible 
labour regulations but weak protection systems (ILO 2004b). This is due 
to the combination of high benefits during periods of unemployment 
and a rapid return to work.
Yet any model can be improved, and mechanisms for analysis and 
constant adjustment are needed to make the available instruments work 
better. In this respect, the debate over the Danish model has identified 
the following challenges: 
- The model implies heavy fiscal outlays that contribute to the 
high tax burden. Is it feasible to reduce that burden without upsetting 
the system?
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- Generous unemployment benefits usually pose the issue of moral 
hazard (disincentives to work, abuse of the protection system). How can 
that hazard be controlled?
- As in other economies, some specific groups such as the 
unskilled, young people who have not completed their studies, older 
people and immigrants, face greater problems in finding productive 
employment in the labour market. How can the system be tweaked to 
give these groups additional support and incentives that will enhance 
their employment possibilities?
- How would the model function if unionization rates declined?
As noted above, the features of the Danish model depend a great deal 
on the fact that its roots lie in the country’s history. This means that it cannot 
readily be transferred with all its features to other countries. The European 
Commission has concluded that, while the national strategies of member 
countries must consider the components of flexicurity, the political strategy 
for moving in that direction, as well as the final design, would have to be 
adapted to the specific circumstances of each country. Depending on those 
circumstances, each country would have to opt for specific routes towards 
its own model of flexicurity, and these would have to be designed with due 
regard to the main bottlenecks identified in that country.
H.   Flexicurity and the challenges facing    
       the Latin America and the Caribbean region    
The transformations in economies and labour markets, the need to protect 
workers, and the need to foster productivity, systemic competitiveness and 
social integration for workers, all underscore the importance of analysing, 
improving and integrating the workings of the three labour-market 
institutions reviewed above: labour-market regulation, unemployment 
security systems, and active labour-market policies.
The Danish flexicurity model is an interesting approach to integrating 
these components, especially because of the process by which it was 
created, rooted in socioeconomic and political elements that are peculiar 
to Danish society and that are adapted to the current context. It thus 
appears sustainable over time, with an adaptation capacity generated by 
broad social consensus on the basic features of the model.
In a flexicurity approach, how would the different components of 
labour institutions impact on their dual purpose of ensuring that the 
labour-market functions efficiently, on the one hand, and protecting and 
empowering the weakest market participants, on the other? As shown 
in table I.2, flexibility can make resource allocation much more efficient, 
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although taken to extremes it can hamper long-term growth, which 
requires productivity-boosting strategies to be linked to some degree of 
employment stability. Moreover, a large degree of flexibility in itself tends 
to undermine equity, by increasing job instability and hence uncertainty. 
The least skilled are often the most affected by greater instability, since, 
being easier to replace, they are usually laid off before more skilled 
workers. On the other hand, greater flexibility can benefit certain segments 
of the workforce (women and young people), whose labour-market entry 
is impeded by regulations that favour employment stability (the insider-
outsider problem).
 
Aspect of flexicurity Efficient impacts Equity impacts
Flexibility + + (-) - / (+) 
Social security (unemployment) + + +
Active labour-market policies + + +
Source:   Prepared by the author.
+   Positive impact
++ Highly positive impact
-   Negative impact
In brachets: Secondary effect
Passive labour-market policies (unemployment insurance and other 
instruments) have a strong impact on equity by offsetting the income 
losses of those who usually have no other significant source of income,27 
but they also help to make the labour market more efficient by reducing 
pressure to find a new job immediately and thus facilitating a better 
match between supply and demand. Lastly, active labour-market policies 
(especially intermediation and training) can improve labour-market 
efficiency, although the experience as regards their effectiveness has been 
mixed, which poses major challenges for the design of the corresponding 
programmes (Auer, Efendioğlu and Leschke, 2005). This also goes for 
their impact on equity, which can be highly favourable.
Although labour institutions based on the flexicurity approach have 
the potential to improve both efficiency and equity substantially, certain 
characteristics of Latin American and Caribbean societies and economies 
are likely to frustrate any attempt to “copy” the Danish model:
- The countries of the region have an informal sector that varies 
in scope from one society to another but accounts for a significant 
proportion of the labour market. Despite recent measures, formal 
labour-market regulation is of very limited relevance for workers in 
27 In Latin America, however, only persons with continuous service of some duration in 
formal-sector employment have access to this type of mechanism and this does not 
usually apply to the poorest strata. 
Table I.2
POSSIBLE EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IMPACTS OF THE DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF 
LABOUR INSTITUTIONS BASED ON FLEXICURITY
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the informal sector, since they are not covered by protection systems 
or included in active labour-market policies. For these workers, the 
labour market is very flexible indeed, and as they have no tools to 
protect themselves from the harmful consequences of that flexibility, 
they tend not to remain unemployed for lengthy periods when they lose 
their job or source of income. Consequently, in this case the indicators of 
labour-market integration problems are underemployment, stagnating 
productivity, and the absence of social and labour protection, rather than 
unemployment. The instruments of the flexicurity model do not fit with 
this reality. The instruments of the flexicurity model do not fit with this 
reality. Yet informality is a heterogeneous and dynamic phenomenon, 
and there are options for formalization in each of the three components 
of labour institutions.
- The flexicurity model is costly in terms of public expenditure, 
both because of the protection component and because of labour-
market policies. While the situation varies greatly, Latin American and 
Caribbean countries generally lack the resources to prepare programmes 
and policies with similar coverage and per capita outlays.28 
- The design and continuous adjustment of the flexicurity model 
require ongoing social dialogue among the main stakeholders, who must 
recognize each other as legitimate interlocutors. The history of many 
Latin American and Caribbean countries is not only marked by conflict, 
but in many cases the opposing parties have viewed this conflict as 
not amenable to negotiated solution, which has often led to violence.29 
Moreover, governments have not always allowed or encouraged the 
various stakeholders to organize themselves and adopt independent 
positions. This remains true today, and it impedes the search for 
negotiated solutions, despite the widespread prevalence of democratic 
political systems.30 
28 The average tax burden in Latin America is 18% of GDP, compared with 40% in the 
European Union (15 countries). As Berg and Salerno (2008) note, however, many 
countries that have broad unemployment insurance today began developing it at a time 
when they had per capita incomes similar to or even lower than many Latin American 
countries do today. 
29 The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 (World Economic Forum, 2008), among 
other sources, sets out the opinions of corporate executives interviewed about labour 
relations in their respective countries, where 1 represents relations that are broadly 
confrontational and 7 denotes usually cooperative relations. Denmark headed the 
ranking of 134 countries with a mark of 6.2. The 17 Latin American countries covered 
by the survey showed an average of 4.3, but with large differences varying from 5.6 
in Costa Rica to 3.1 in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  
30 As mentioned in section D, however, some countries have had positive experiences of 
social dialogue with results that have been recognized by the social stakeholders. See also 
Vega-Ruiz (2004).
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- Models that offer a high degree of income protection and 
significant subsidies to support workers until they manage to rejoin the 
labour market often pose a moral hazard that results in the abuse of these 
facilities. While a proper combination of incentives, disincentives and 
control mechanisms can help to limit such abuse, the results will vary 
depending on the attitudes and values prevailing in specific societies.31 
- In Latin America and the Caribbean, the short-term view tends 
to predominate, because the debate over reforming labour-market 
institutions is not part of a broader debate about long-term growth and 
development strategies.
- Given the heterogeneity among countries of the region, it is not 
surprising that the conditions for developing labour-market institutions 
of this kind vary greatly. Factors such as a low level of urbanization, a 
small percentage of wage workers, and a low degree of formalization 
represent structural constraints in this regard (Tokman 2007b).
As the European Commission itself has recognized, there is no 
single model of flexicurity nor any one road for achieving it. The 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean need to find their own path 
to the efficient and equitable integration of the three labour institution 
components, adapted to their social, economic, political and cultural 
reality.32 Those components must be regarded as mutually complementary 
and they must be related to non-labour policy instruments for creating 
a growth-friendly environment, promoting systemic competitiveness 
and integrating that portion of the population not covered by social and 
labour institutions.33
1.    Active labour-market policies
As noted in section F, recent years have seen some promising advances 
in improving the effectiveness, efficiency and fairness of active labour-
market policies. Yet these three criteria still show shortcomings, especially 
when it comes to training, which is a key component both for achieving 
systemic competitiveness in open markets and for giving workers 
opportunities for productive and stable employment and advancement.34
31 Indeed, it has been argued that for a flexicurity system to work there must be a high 
degree of “public-spiritedness” (Algan and Cahuc, 2006).
32 The former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe are also seeking a 
combination of more flexible labour-market regulation, new protection mechanisms 
and more effective active labour-market policies, to suit their specific conditions (Cazes 
and Nesporova, 2007).
33 See ECLAC (2007b), ECLAC (2008a) and Sorj and Martuccelli (2008).
34 See Auer, Efendioğlu and Leschke (2005) for a review of global issues, trends and 
challenges relating to active labour market policies.
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The strategic advantage of labour-market policies is that the 
coincidence of interests is greater in this area than in others. Firms 
and workers alike show great interest in training and in effective, 
efficient and fair employment services. Both parties are interested as 
well, although to a lesser degree, in employment creation schemes and 
the promotion of self-employment and micro-enterprises. This can lay 
the basis for bilateral alliances to promote these policies, especially in 
a context where most of the financing must come from government, 
which will be seeking a social return on the investment. The State, 
then, must foster debate on the role of training as part of a strategy 
for growth and development based on continuous improvement of 
systemic competitiveness. Following are some specific points that must 
be taken into account:
- A training system will produce better results if the education 
system is successful in broadening the population’s general skills and 
knowledge. It is essential, then, to enhance the coverage, quality and 
equity of education in the region, and to encourage young people to stay 
in the education system longer.35 Without these four elements, training 
systems are unlikely to do much to increase employment opportunities 
either in the short or the long term. 
- Training systems need to be reviewed and adapted to the 
varying needs of the different segments of the productive economy and 
the different sectors of the labour force, i.e., new entrants to the labour 
market (especially youth), the unemployed and different categories of 
the employed.
- It would be useful to design systems of ongoing (“lifelong”) 
training to help workers adapt to new technologies, to increase their 
productivity, and to enhance their employment possibilities. This 
will need a major effort to produce a prospective analysis of demand, 
involving labour-market players and academics.
- Special attention must be paid to adapting training to the needs 
and situation of disadvantaged groups (people with little schooling, in 
particular women, ethnic minorities and the disabled).
- Diversified institutional arrangements may be the answer for 
dealing with the great variety of demand for training and frequent changes 
in that demand. Yet if abuses are to be avoided, the range of training 
offered must be transparent and its results must be monitored, for example 
through recognized systems for certifying skills and knowledge.
35 See for example ECLAC/UNESCO (2004).
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- Fostering small business and micro-enterprise remains a 
challenge that will require a combination of instruments to improve 
access to financing, technology, training and information as a means of 
simplifying the formalization process and reducing its costs. Given the 
limited size of the formal sector in many of the countries of the region, 
this is an important task for increasing social and labour inclusion.
- Employment services must pursue policies such as 
decentralization, the incorporation of the various players into the labour 
market, the creation of incentives to make intermediation more effective, 
technological and organizational modernization, personnel training, 
the integration of intermediation with the different programmes of 
active and passive policies, and support for the creation of individual 
labour strategies.
- Since direct job creation programmes are an unsatisfactory 
substitute for generating employment through the labour market, 
they should be used only in special situations (economic crisis, low 
seasonal demand for labour, specific local problems). Direct employment 
programmes and subsidies for creating new jobs must both include training 
components to enhance the long-term employability of beneficiaries.
- At a time when there is pressure on fiscal spending to expand 
and improve active labour-market policies, it is essential to improve 
programme evaluation practices, so that policymakers can take informed 
decisions on priorities in this field. 
2.    Protecting the unemployed
Protection for the unemployed in Latin America and the Caribbean 
is the weakest component of the “golden triangle” of the flexicurity 
model. Few countries have protection systems that go beyond severance 
payments, and coverage and benefits are generally limited. Yet there is 
basic agreement on the need to improve protection for the unemployed, 
for social and economic reasons alike. The principal challenge is to design 
protection systems where:
- the focus is on income protection rather than job protection;
- a solidarity component is incorporated without raising non-wage 
labour costs too much; 
- coverage can be steadily increased;
- moral hazard is limited;
- the system is related to active employment policies and includes 
a mechanism for monitoring social security coverage (particularly health 
and pensions).
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An interesting proposal in this regard that was developed in 
Argentina (Goldin, 2008b) raises the possibility of transforming part 
of severance payment into an unemployment insurance, which would 
have greater coverage, would be more efficient, and would provide 
reasonable benefits. This would be achieved by replacing the portion of 
compensation that the firm would have to pay in case of a contractual 
rupture not attributable to either the employer or the worker by 
periodic contributions to an individual account. This would increase 
flexibility in case of layoff (although the cost of dismissal would still 
be higher where no “just cause” exists), without significantly raising 
labour costs. In addition, thought could be given to a scheme with 
additional contributions from workers and the State, as with Chile’s 
unemployment insurance, which combines individual accounts with a 
solidarity fund.
In some countries the portability of social security benefits is an 
important instrument for helping the labour market to work more 
effectively without diminishing protection for workers. Sometimes 
these benefits are linked to length of employment in a given firm, which 
can impede voluntary mobility, because workers stand to lose their 
accumulated rights. Making benefits portable means that workers can 
take advantage of better opportunities without losing this component of 
their social protection. At a time of substantial intraregional migration, 
another important issue on which some headway has already been 
made is the international portability of benefits.
3.    Labour-market regulation 
The regulation of individual and collective labour relations is no 
doubt the most complex aspect of the debate over how to redesign 
labour-market institutions. Many measures are seen as creating one-
sided benefits or risks, and it seems to be more difficult to find solutions 
that are favourable to all parties, as, for example, in active labour-market 
policies. This situation is reflected in a lack of consensus in many areas. 
There is even disagreement about the diagnosis itself, since the actors 
on the labour market are unable to reach a common interpretation of the 
current situation, which is needed to serve as the point of departure for 
the debate on pending reforms.36 Points at issue include the costs and 
benefits of integration into the global economy, and the characteristics 
of labour regulation and the functioning of the labour market. Labour 
flexibility is often confused with low labour costs, or it is identified with 
only certain aspects (such as ease of hiring and firing), but in addition 
36 This disagreement is characteristic of the debate but not just in Latin America; 
for conflicting opinions in the global debate, see Freeman (2005b) and Berg and 
Kucera (2008). 
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to flexibility in labour costs and external numerical flexibility, internal 
numerical flexibility and functional flexibility must also be considered. 
From a broader perspective, this concept embraces not only flexibility 
in the labour market (flexibility of employment and wages) but also 
flexibility in labour input (flexibility of human capital, mechanisms for 
promoting productivity) (Amadeo and Camargo, 1993). This covers, 
specifically, the generation of opportunities for workers to advance 
along a career path. In short, it is a complicated matter to describe labour 
institutions as flexible or rigid, because there are so many variables 
involved,37 and each side is likely to make selective use of research data, 
rendering dialogue difficult.
Moreover, the debate is generally conducted at different levels 
of abstraction, such as when an analysis of regulatory rules and 
their potential repercussions on the labour market is contrasted with 
another that considers how those rules and that market really work, 
for example by comparing mechanisms to limit layoffs and high 
turnover. What happens, in effect, is that the debate takes place “in 
different markets”, and some studies refer to the workings of the 
formal labour market while others include the informal sector in the 
analysis. Consequently, while from one perspective labour institutions 
may be stagnating in the absence of reforms, from another perspective 
the labour market may be undergoing profound changes because of the 
shifting occupational structure, different uses of existing institutions, 
and de facto modifications at a “lower” level than labour legislation 
(Bensusán 2006).
Another point relating to the foregoing discussion is that the 
debate often lacks specificity, for example when the labour market is 
accused of rigidity without any indication of the origins of this flaw or 
any explanation as to which specific regulation is causing what damage 
(Weller 2007). Rigidity may be due not only to labour regulations 
but also to the functioning of other markets and to the behaviour of 
participants in the labour market who might, for example, prefer stable 
relations to high turnover.
This lack of consensus on the diagnosis makes it difficult to 
reach agreement on how to improve labour regulation. While these 
discrepancies are not likely to be overcome in a short period of time, it 
would be as well to clarify the terms of the debate in order to address 
the challenges in this area. Among those challenges (with significant 
differences from one country to another) are the following:
37 Consequently, a country’s ranking in the classifications can change greatly, depending on 
the variables considered. 
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- Labour-market participants must recognize each other as 
legitimate stakeholders. Meeting this essential condition is complicated 
by the long history of conflict described above, which means that gradual 
strategies are needed to build mutual trust, in what is actually a learning 
process (Jørgensen, 2009). This process differs greatly among societies, 
because of the great variety of historic experiences.
- In many cases, unions need to strengthen their standing as valid 
and effective interlocutors for representing workers. To do so, they will 
have to set aside corporatist practices, overcome their lack of autonomy 
and internal democracy, and enhance their negotiating capacity by 
upgrading their research and analysis capabilities.
- The legal apparatus is sometimes inconsistent. For example, in 
some countries there are discrepancies between constitutional rights and 
labour legislation. This means that issues relating to the real functioning 
of labour institutions are removed from the political sphere, and also 
from collective bargaining, and are relegated to the courts, often with 
unpredictable consequences.
- In many countries, levels of compliance with existing standards 
are poor, and experience has shown that they cannot be improved merely 
by reducing costs and enhancing flexibility. This approach undermines 
the credibility of political decisions and encourages people to seek ways to 
evade the rules rather than make the effort to comply with them. Moreover, 
it is essential that regulatory compliance be objectively feasible;
- The new economic context tends to demand greater room for 
collective bargaining as opposed to detailed legal regulation. This is 
essential if labour institutions are to be efficient and fair. It is important 
therefore to define the levels of bargaining and the issues at stake. Yet 
legal regulation will remain essential for setting the “floor”, given those 
broad segments that lack the degree of organization and the necessary 
negotiating capacity.
- An integrated labour information system is an extremely 
important element for analysing how the labour market operates and for 
discussing its institutional framework. However, notwithstanding recent 
improvements, there is a dearth of labour-market data in many countries. 
While the design of labour institutions, as has been argued 
throughout this paper, can only be the result of processes specific to each 
country, a few suggestions for specific aspects, based on experience in 
the region are set out below:
- Experience within and beyond the region suggests that the 
introduction of “atypical” contracts has done nothing to create more jobs, 
but that it has led to greater segmentation of the labour market. Reforms, 
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then, might focus on “typical” contracts, making them more flexible and 
combining them with better protection mechanisms (Tokman 2007a). 
“Atypical” contracts should be reserved for special situations, such as 
seasonal or part-time work, and for specific tasks or training. Moreover, 
care must be taken to ensure that “atypical” contracts enshrine the same 
rights as “standard” contracts, in the corresponding proportion.
- Because the main argument against open-ended contracts is 
the rigidity produced by layoff compensation systems, thought should 
be given to transforming a portion of the severance payment into 
periodic contributions to an unemployment insurance system based on 
individual accounts. This would not reduce financial protection against 
unemployment and, depending on the monthly contributions, the total 
non-wage labour cost might not decline, but the actual cost of laying 
off workers would be lower. This raises two considerations: first, the 
conditions governing layoffs and dismissals must not be allowed to 
“petrify” existing labour relations, but neither should they encourage 
high turnover. The positive linkage between labour stability and human 
capital formation and higher productivity is a key factor.38 Moreover, 
it is frequently the case that firms do not use all the legal instruments 
available to them for achieving greater flexibility in their personnel 
management. This suggests that, from the firm’s perspective, maximum 
flexibility is not necessarily the best option.39 Rather, it would appear 
that in a scenario with great and frequent changes, the ideal solution for 
meeting both the immediate and longer-term objectives is not obvious for 
many firms, which are always looking for workable solutions.40 Second, 
there must be a clear distinction between labour costs and flexibility. If 
inflexibility caused by a specific regulation constitutes a bottleneck to 
the efficient working of the labour market, it may be advisable to amend 
it, even if that implies greater costs. The situation would be different if 
labour costs themselves constituted an obstacle;
38 Chacaltana and Garcia (2001) demonstrate this positive linkage in the case of Peru. 
Perry and others (2006) highlight the negative impact of labour instability on 
human capital formation, while Auer, Berg and Coulibali (2005) emphasize that the 
relationship between labour stability and productivity is positive but not linear.
39 In Colombia a discrepancy has been noted between certain economists, who favour 
flexible labour markets, and employers, who are more cautious about this (Universidad 
Externado de Colombia 2003). In Mexico there is a divergence between statements by 
business leadership and the behaviour of firms, which do not apply all the available 
instruments of flexibility (de la Garza and Bouzas 1998). In any case, different 
entrepreneurial visions exist concerning flexible labour markets as an instrument for 
optimizing results. (Echeverría and others, 2004).
40 For example, in the first stages of the economic downturn that marked the beginning 
of this decade, many US firms showed greater caution with respect to layoffs, 
compared to the similar situation in 1990-91, recalling the trouble they had during the 
subsequent recovery in recruiting back the skilled workers they let go during the crisis 
(The Economist, 2001 p. 56). 
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- In many countries there is debate over labour institutions as they 
relate to micro-enterprises and small businesses. Experience has shown 
that in these cases cutting labour costs is not enough to foster wholesale 
formalization (Chacaltana 2007). However, because these costs tend to 
be too high for firms of this kind, a gradual formalization strategy that 
would improve labour conditions in this segment could include special 
provisions that would lower them temporarily;
- Encouraging internal flexibility, in terms of functions, wages 
and working hours, is an increasingly important issue that requires a 
common legal framework and intense collective bargaining. While this 
aspect of flexibility may yield immediate productivity and wage benefits, 
as employment stability does, it also brings with it undeniable risks 
and burdens, and ongoing dialogue is therefore needed to produce the 
necessary adjustments; 
- On the supply side, lack of flexibility may be an obstacle to labour-
market entry, especially for women seeking opportunities to earn income 
for themselves and their family. This issue is important because, in many 
cases, it is precisely by sending more family members out to work that 
households are able to lift themselves out of poverty. At a time when 
cultural attitudes to the division of labour, which excludes broad segments 
of women from the labour market, are weakening, some restrictions 
persist, especially for women with preschool and school-age children. For 
this reason, by opening up the range of options for these women, policies 
whereby society assumes part of the responsibility for tasks related to 
reproduction can help to make the labour supply more flexible; 
- A number of women would prefer joining the labour market 
on a part-time basis and, indeed, this is usually cited as justification 
for the establishment of contracts of this type. Steps must be taken, 
however, to ensure that these more flexible contracts do not result in 
labour relations based on heightened job insecurity —for example, these 
part-time workers must be integrated into the social security system— 
and that they do not operate as an instrument that increases gender 
segmentation; thus, this issue ties in with the broader debate on the 
gender-based division of labour; 
- Given the high levels of non-compliance with many rules, 
workplace inspection will have to be stepped up. Inspection strategies 
should help firms to comply, rather than punish them for non-
compliance, especially in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(Schrank and Piore 2007). Other sound initiatives include government 
awards of “good employer” certification to firms that observe the rules, 
and voluntary adherence by firms to social responsibility or global 
commitment initiatives. 
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I.     Improving labour institutions:        
       some strategic considerations 
There is broad consensus that, while Latin American and Caribbean 
countries face similar challenges, their responses cannot be the 
same. The strategic options available for improving labour policies, 
unemployment protection policies, and active labour-market policies 
will depend to a great extent on labour institutions that evolved over 
time as a result of socio-economic and political processes specific to each 
country; these options will also depend on the nature of the relations 
between the main actors in the labour market as well as on the degree 
of labour-market development. 
In this respect, each country has to find its own way of responding 
successfully to the challenges posed by the global economy, in order to 
offer the greatest possible welfare to its people.41 Labour institutions 
must make their contribution here: their ultimate purpose is to generate 
high-quality jobs by fostering labour markets that work efficiently and 
by protecting and supporting those who are disadvantaged by a market 
with structural inequalities among participants. 
One important lesson from the flexicurity model is that the various 
components of labour institutions must be recognized as complementary 
and mutually reinforcing. Yet, because the issue is so politically sensitive 
in every country, it is unlikely that all these institutional arrangements 
can be reformed simultaneously. The key point, then, is to identify the 
main shortcomings in the current institutional structure. 
The long history of labour conflict in many countries is a great 
obstacle to achieving sustainable agreements and reforms in this area, 
where so much mistrust has been generated among the parties. The 
following are some strategic elements for making progress on this issue:
- Social dialogue. When reforms are imposed by certain specific 
stakeholders who seize upon a favourable political juncture to advance 
their interests, they will lack legitimacy and will usually spark pressure 
for counter-reforms once the political setting has shifted. This is why 
labour institutions in many Latin America and the Caribbean countries 
are in constant flux. By contrast, negotiated reforms have broader 
legitimacy and are likely to be more stable over time; 
- International labour regulations can be a valuable reference for 
social dialogue, especially the fundamental rights (freedom of association 
41 In order to ensure the sustainability of labour institutions, it is also important to 
maintain cohesion between its different components; thus, the validity of building 
such institutions in a given country on the basis of a series of best practices applied 
internationally may be questionable (Novick, 2008).
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and to join a trade union and the right of collective bargaining, 
the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the prohibition 
of child labour, the prevention of discrimination in employment 
and occupation). Bearing in mind their tripartite origin within the 
framework of deliberations in the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), international regulations are the outcome of social dialogue and 
generally there is ample opportunity to transform them through national 
dialogue into important and legitimate rules at the country level; 
- More resources must be devoted to reorienting labour 
institutions.  To avoid increasing labour costs, with potentially adverse 
fallout on labour demand, these resources will have to come from tax 
revenues. On various occasions,42 ECLAC has proposed a fiscal and 
social covenant that would set out consensus-based social objectives 
for the long term and would contribute to their financing and their 
macroeconomic sustainability through responsible fiscal management;
- Gradualism. While it may seem attractive to negotiate a 
comprehensive package of reforms covering all areas, such an approach 
is unfeasible in many countries because of the mistrust that prevails 
among the parties. Consequently, what is needed is a confidence-
building process as the basis for gradual reforms which, if successful, 
could pave the way for new accords; 
- Incorporating labour reforms into a long-term development 
strategy. Such a strategy, with its corresponding objectives, would 
define some of the requirements for sound labour institutions and 
would relate them to non-labour issues (for example, education and 
technological innovation).
Voluntary commitments relating to certain issues are another mechanism 
for building confidence. Such commitments might be given concrete form 
through adherence to codes of conduct, or through greater consideration of 
labour issues in policies for corporate social responsibility.
A significant transformation of labour institutions could spark 
concerns about workers’ rights, especially if one component of that 
transformation were the elimination of regulations that are seen by 
workers as offering protection and by employers as causing rigidity. 
Merely promising that such a reform would yield benefits for workers by 
stimulating job creation will clearly not be enough to make such a reform 
feasible. It would seem essential, then, to give priority to designing or 
improving a system of unemployment protection. Such a system would 
focus not so much on preserving jobs as on protecting incomes. The 
features of the system would depend on the specific situation in each 
42 See ECLAC (2004b).
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country and on its success in promoting a social covenant for reaching 
consensus on the complex variables of financing, coverage, rights, 
obligations and supplementary services, among others.
Active labour-market policies help to build confidence and learning. 
While there will no doubt be disagreements, for example over the 
financing, management and control of programmes, the fundamental 
interests of the main stakeholders are similar, and this should facilitate 
agreement on specific instruments. Given the major challenges still 
pending, in the area of training for example, a broad dialogue on ways to 
improve active labour-market policies could be very helpful in opening 
room for debate in other areas. 
Labour-market regulation is no doubt the most complex area, where 
specific interests clash most openly. It is important to remember that the 
ultimate purpose of regulation is to generate high-quality employment, 
and it must therefore fulfil the dual objective of fostering an efficiently 
functioning labour market and protecting the weakest participants in 
that market. In light of this dual objective, it is clear that it will not 
always be easy to find solutions where all players come out winners, 
even if there are some aspects of flexibility and stability (“rigidity”) that 
suit both employers and workers. As noted earlier, arriving at a common 
assessment would seem to be an essential condition for reaching 
agreement on ways to improve labour institutions.
As was argued in section C, there is no one recipe for this that is 
independent of space and time. What is needed is to analyse matters 
on a case-by-case basis and identify the obstacles that prevent labour 
institutions from meeting their goals in a specific situation. For that 
analysis, the proposal of Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) 
for promoting economic growth has been adapted. This consists 
essentially in identifying the bottlenecks in each country that constrain 
more dynamic growth. This strategy stands in contrast to those that 
offer common recipes for all countries, and it takes account of the 
great diversity that exists among societies in the region, where there 
are different ways of combining employment protection with social 
protection (Tokman, 2007b, p. 51).
To identify the constraints on the generation of high quality jobs 
we may use the “inverted tree” shown in figure I.5.43 If there is a dearth 
of high-quality jobs —as there is in all Latin American and Caribbean 
countries if we consider unemployment rates, low incomes, scant 
social security coverage and other factors— we should first examine 
43 Weller (2007, pp. 59-64) provides some examples for identifying bottlenecks and possible 
solutions for overcoming them.
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whether formal job creation is low, or if it is significant but low-quality 
jobs prevail.44
If formal employment generation is low, the second step would 
be to determine whether the problems are due primarily to weak 
economic growth, or to the fact that growth does not have a sufficiently 
positive impact on the labour market, which could be the consequence 
of either the low output elasticity of formal employment or the 
limited size of the formal sector in the country’s economic structure. 
If low economic growth is identified as the principal reason for weak 
employment generation, causes related to the labour market must be 
differentiated from those not related to it. Among the former there are 
qualitative factors that have to do with human capital accumulation, 
and factors that hinder greater labour-market participation, based 
on demographic or cultural factors, or on institutional factors that 
constrain labour supply and hiring.
If economic growth is reasonably high but formal employment 
generation remains low, it could be that certain macroeconomic prices, 
such as the exchange rate, are biasing investment against the hiring 
of employees, or that growth is led by sectors that make little use of 
labour. It may also be that institutional factors cause rigidities or high 
labour costs to the detriment of formal employment. Moreover, there 
may be cases where the formal employment elasticity of economic 
growth is reasonably high, but the absolute number of new formal 
jobs created is low because of the small size of the sector. 
Lastly, even if formal employment generation is reasonable, there 
may be problems in generating high-quality jobs, as indicated by low 
and stagnant wages or problems with social protection. In these cases 
as well, the nature of the difficulties can be identified and specific 
solutions proposed.
The purpose of the “inverted tree” is not to identify a single key 
element for resolving labour problems. Besides indicating bottlenecks, 
it can help differentiate between priority and secondary issues. The 
former represent a major constraint on quality employment generation, 
and eliminating them could have an important impact. Eliminating 
obstacles in the second category will have a lesser and sometimes 
doubtful impact, and will frequently carry high political costs in 
44 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that good-quality jobs are concentrated in the 
formal sector, and so the main intermediate objective is to generate formal employment. 
This is not to deny that there may be good-quality jobs in the informal sector, where 
improving labour conditions is an important challenge, or that there may be low-quality 
jobs in the formal sector. The concept of the informal economy, which is broader than the 
sectoral perspective, partially embraces these dimensions (see Hussmanns, 2004). 
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relation to the expected benefit. If politically feasible, reforming these 
secondary features could be part of a negotiated package, where the 
consensus would relate to the package as a whole and not to each of its 
individual components. 
Figure I.5
MECHANISM FOR IDENTIFYING OBSTACLES TO THE CREATION OF QUALITY JOBS 
Source: J. Weller, “La flexibilidad del mercado de trabajo en América Latina y el Caribe. Aspectos del 
debate, alguna evidencia y políticas”, Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, No. 61 (LC/L.2848-P/E), 
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2007. United 
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Chapter II
The Danish “flexicurity” system and the 
relevant lessons for Latin America1
Henning Jørgensen
Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark
E-mail: henningj@epa.aau.dk 
A.    Diverse government approaches to adaptation
As a result of globalization, investments, capital, goods and services, 
and to a certain extent, labour can easily move from one country to 
another. This facility has increased pressure on national employment 
relationships, wage formation, and tax and welfare arrangements to 
adapt in order to promote competitiveness and efficient economic 
performance. New economic and social situations have bred insecurities 
related to modern economies and labour markets, and both governments 
and wage earners must respond. Employer demands for more flexible 
labour markets and less restrictive labour regulation are met with the 
hopes of more jobs, higher incomes and greater employment protection 
from employees. The contradictions inherent in these demands make the 
discussion of flexibility and security increasingly relevant. Questions on 
how to modernize labour markets in response to external pressures and 
domestic demands and how forward-facing decisions can be taken in 
relation to such politically sensitive issues are central to the debate. 
1 For an extended version of this chapter, see Jørgensen (2009).
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In most Western countries, adaptation needs have for a long 
time been met by lowering taxes and spending, and deregulating the 
economy and labour market. This formula has been implemented to 
different degrees depending on the country in question, but one cannot 
deny that these neo-liberal theories have been used in most advanced 
capitalist countries. The concept of “flexicurity” offers an alternative 
to this policy blueprint and is a way of combining competitiveness 
and social cohesion in an alternative understanding of the relationship 
between flexibility and security. The concept of flexicurity avoids the 
assumption that only flexibilization will lead to more jobs and better 
functioning labour markets. An intelligent and fair balance between 
flexibility and security, taking into account the different interests of 
social partners, will facilitate labour-market efficiency. Even the OECD 
has endorsed this policy (2004) and the European Union in 2007 made 
flexicurity an official institutional policy after many years of intense 
debate. International interest in flexicurity has grown enormously over 
the past four to five years.
The basic philosophy behind flexicurity is that flexibility and 
security are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, in many situations 
they can be mutually supportive. New ways of orchestrating the 
interplay between flexibility and security have the potential to create 
win-win situations in cases that would otherwise be considered conflict-
ridden or dangerous to competitiveness and perhaps the social order 
during adaptation processes. This also implies that flexibility is not to 
be seen as the sole concern of employers and security is not to be seen 
as the sole concern of employees. Modern labour markets bear witness 
to the interests of many employers in maintaining stable employment 
relationships and in keeping loyal and well-qualified employees. For 
their part, many employees have realized that they have an interest in 
flexible ways of organizing their work-life balance and adjusting their 
lives to more individual preferences. The public sector has an interest in 
balanced developments and in reaching public policy goals. Therefore, 
flexibility and security are multi-dimensional concepts and flexicurity 
has to be studied in national settings, describing and analysing the 
interaction between the components in each concrete system.
Denmark is considered one of the best real-world examples of 
flexicurity, despite the fact that Denmark is a small, open economy that 
is particularly vulnerable to the competitive pressures of globalization. 
The Danish system of flexicurity has been recognized by the European 
Union and other actors as a “good practice” example to learn from. In 
Denmark, weak job protection is combined with strong income and 
employment protection. Denmark has high tax rates, a comprehensive 
public sector, generous welfare benefits, and strong policy coordination 
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with corporatist traditions —clearly not in line with the internationally 
dominant economic orthodoxy. But the Danish capacity to reach socio-
economic success as a result of the interplay between economic, political 
and social institutions is unquestioned now. Danish flexicurity is now 
highly regarded, but the flexicurity system’s mechanisms and rationale 
are still not very well understood. The literature on flexicurity often 
classifies it as identical to Danish labour-market arrangements, but this 
is too one-dimensional. More evidence-based knowledge is needed as 
are comparisons and considerations of policy transfer of flexicurity 
elements. In this connection it is important not to fall into the trap 
expressed by a Chinese proverb: “The chicken in our neighbours’ 
garden looks like a goose.”
Even if there is no commonly established definition, nor the means 
to qualitatively or quantitatively characterize flexicurity, research and 
political debate concur that Denmark has a flexicurity system that 
works and can provide lessons for other countries. Flexibility has not 
been reduced in Denmark but the precariousness associated with it has 
diminished, and the more offensive elements of employment security 
and skills enlargement have contributed to Denmark’s successful 
economic and social development. To be effective, the encouraging 
of flexible labour markets and ensuring of security must allow 
wage earners to be adaptable, to enter and re-enter into productive 
employment, and to further their careers. This calls for a strong public 
emphasis on active labour markets, lifelong learning strategies, and 
strong social security systems, providing people with income security 
and allowing them to combine work life with private care and family 
life. Equal opportunities for men and women should also be a trait of 
the flexicurity system. 
This paper’s working definition of flexicurity is the institutionalized 
relationships between a labour-market regime and interventionist policies in 
relation to security for wage earners and the dynamics of the labour market. 
This understanding stresses the interplay between institutions and the 
production of complementarities that can promote competitiveness 
and social cohesion at the same time. It is not a trade-off between 
flexibility and security as it is not a zero-sum game. Flexicurity is not 
a simple, one-sided political strategy, as will be documented by our 
analysis of the Danish system. 
Denmark is performing well at the moment. We believe that other 
countries could learn more about Denmark’s success with the flexicurity 
system. The question of the system’s transferability to Latin American 
countries is to be addressed at the end of this paper. On the following 
pages an analysis of the Danish flexicurity system is offered.
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B.   Institutional pillars of the Danish flexicurity system
Situated in the northern part of Europe with a rather cold climate, 
Denmark is a highly developed capitalist country with a universal 
welfare-state framework. For more than 35 years, the service sector 
—public as well as private— has been dominant in the production 
structure and, currently, three out of four wage earners are involved in 
administrative and service-based activities. For a short period of time 
only, from the 1950s to the start of the 1970s, the manufacturing sector 
employed a majority of wage earners and provided most of the country’s 
exports. Now, the changing composition of the production structure has 
resulted in the mushrooming of knowledge-based activities. Small and 
medium-sized enterprises are characteristic of the Danish production 
structure. The country has a workforce of 2.8 million people out of a 
population of 5.6 million.
During the second part of the twentieth century, the Danish 
welfare-State developed into a comprehensive social security system 
with relatively generous economic compensation schemes and much 
public-sector aid. A strong tax system based on progressive scales is 
fundamental to the operation of the public sector. Compensation, 
prevention and public services are used to redistribute wealth and 
consequently, there are extensive public social expenses. In 2003, public 
sector expenditures in Denmark amounted to 28% of GDP. The universal 
welfare system is highly redistributive; it takes over care functions 
and promotes female employment. It builds on citizenship, giving 
everyone the same kind of benefits and services in accordance with 
politically defined welfare standards. The system is female-friendly, 
and has redefined the concept of family to include two breadwinners. 
The State also employs many women in public functions. The high 
taxes needed to finance this comprehensive public welfare system are 
generally accepted by the majority of voters as they benefit from these 
arrangements and because egalitarian values have been accepted by a 
vast majority of citizens. Almost one-third of the labour force is now 
employed by the State.
Full employment and economic growth have been core political 
goals from the very beginning of macro-economic governance, 
highlighted as perhaps the most important policy objectives during 
the 1950s and the 1960s and these are still top priorities in Denmark. 
The Social Democratic Party has held power during many periods; 
but normally there are minority government coalitions in Denmark, 
making compromises obligatory. Right wing governments have also 
supported the core policy goals. Full employment was never abandoned 
even during periods of acute economic crisis, particularly in the 1980s 
and the beginning of the 1990s. Macro-economic policies and selective 
67Regulation, Worker Protection and Active Labour-Market Policies in Latin America
interventions, especially through active labour-market and educational 
policies, have been the central means of trying to reach the goal of full 
employment. During the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, there 
was no great success in this respect as unemployment actually rose 
to 12.4% in 1993. Since then, Denmark has been very successful in 
combating unemployment, which is now down to 1.6% (August 2008). 
Employment has been growing as well and there is a surplus of all basic 
economic indicators. The Danish employment rate is 77.4% (2006), one 
of the highest in Europe; and most economists and analysts would 
credit good governance as the cause.
Our assessment is that this is only to be understood as being 
promoted by the institutional structure behind the Danish flexicurity 
system. A special interplay between the labour market and a universal 
welfare-State has been institutionalized, and this can be interpreted as a 
“hybrid” between the flexible, free market-based welfare arrangements 
(with liberal hiring and firing rules) and the generous Scandinavian 
welfare-State regimes (with high social security and universal coverage). 
Denmark is an outstanding or extreme case with regard to flexicurity.
There is a dual structure of social protection in Denmark following 
the division between social assistance and social insurance. Only with 
regard to unemployment benefits does Denmark have elements of social 
insurance maintained in the form of a so-called Ghent-based system, 
operating with unemployment insurance funds closely connected to the 
trade unions (and following the educational criteria for differentiation 
in trade union structure). The system got its name from the town of 
Ghent in Belgium in which the system was first introduced more than 
100 years ago. The Ghent system is defined as a State-subsidized, 
but voluntary, unemployment insurance system administered by 
trade unions. From 1907, the State supported these unemployment 
insurance funds financially and from 1969-1970 the State also took 
over the financial risk of rising unemployment. Economic conditions 
heavily influence the real burden put on taxpayers in this respect. The 
unemployment insurance system is basically a State-run system, while 
the social assistance which benefits non-members of the insurance 
system is administered by the municipalities. Normally, strong service 
and assistance-based systems are not as easy to change as insurance-
based systems. But the Ghent system has strong support from the trade 
unions, which have an important recruitment channel opened in this 
way. The dual structure of the Danish system is further reflected in the 
activation policies of the last two decades, administratively organized in 
a two-tiered system: one run by the State-run employment service and 
one by the municipalities. Today, 31 State-recognized unemployment 
insurance funds exist, ten of which operate within specific occupational 
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fields and only accept people with the same educational background. 
Unionization is high in Denmark. Almost 80% of all wage earners have 
joined a union. 
“Non-insured” unemployed people must apply for social assistance 
(cash benefits) at their local municipality. These cash benefits have a 
ceiling but are fundamentally means-tested and the amount depends 
on the individual’s family situation. An applicant must always be 
ready to take up work in the open labour market in order to have social 
assistance as well as unemployment benefits. The universal welfare-
State does not simply give rights to all citizens —it also defines duties. 
As to members of the unemployment insurance funds, there is no family 
concept operating in Denmark. It is important to stress that in Denmark 
citizens have been defined as wage earners with both rights and duties. 
An element of the protestant work ethic is clearly seen in the State’s 
universal welfare-State framework.
Denmark has a low level of job protection and this is a long-standing 
feature of the Danish labour market. This was institutionalized by the 
so-called “September compromise” of 1899, the first general collective 
agreement in the world. This agreement was the outcome of a big general 
strike in 1899 that lasted for five months and had severe implications 
for all parts of society. In the final September compromise, involving 
half of the total workforce, employers had to accept the trade unions 
as legitimate collective actors and counterparts in agreements but the 
compromise also defined the right of employers to hire and fire. Since 
then, the two sides of industry, the social partners, have been allowed 
to regulate wages, working conditions, working hours, possibilities of 
further training and education and many more matters via collective 
agreements. A tradition of voluntary labour-market regulations, by 
resolving problems in bilateral negotiations, has been formed. 
Normally, the political system does not only consult the social partners 
before formulating labour-market legislation; the social partners are 
often invited to participate directly in policy formation. One implication 
of this is relatively few political interventions in the industrial relations 
system (IR system) during the last 100 years. The low level of job 
protection created by the September compromise has persisted until 
now. The Danish IR system is most important in explaining arrangements 
operating now as core elements in the flexicurity system. It is the sectoral 
agreements that define individual job protection and the rules applicable 
to dismissals. Therefore, one will find different regulations within 
branches of the Danish labour market. In Denmark there is no politically 
defined minimum wage; here again one must look to the different 
sectoral agreements in order to find concrete regulations. The diversity 
of collective agreements and regulations implies that there is dispersion 
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between different groups. For example, in the construction industry 
dismissal periods can be down to only one day while other blue-collar 
workers enjoy protection similar to white-collar workers.
Decentralization of negotiations and agreements and the inclusion 
of more elements during the last 10-15 years have implied more flexibility 
and also more security in these private arrangements. Besides wages and 
working conditions, rights for workers to further training and education, 
co-determination, working time flexibility, pensions, protected jobs, 
and leave arrangements are examples of issues that are dealt with in 
collective agreements. At many levels the system secures flexibility in 
labour regulation. Stronger multi-level regulation has not eroded or 
weakened the flexicurity system even if the decentralized actors have 
gained more autonomy. 
C.    The Danish flexicurity system in operation
The flexibility options of employers and the interplay between the private 
IR system and public policies are crucial in trying to explain the operation 
of the Danish flexicurity system. The primary axis of this flexicurity 
arrangement is a highly mobile labour force and income security that 
is equally supported by active labour-market and educational policies. 
Together, they constitute one of the three pillars of the so-called Danish 
“Golden Triangle.” Graphically, you can see this represented in figure II.1.
Figure II.1
THE CORE ELEMENTS OF THE DANISH FLEXICURITY SYSTEM
Source:   Per Kongshøj Madsen, “Flexicurity - a new perspective on labour markets and welfare states 
in Europe”, document presented at the seminar on Flexicurity conducted by the Directorate-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the European Commission, Brussels 18 May 
2006 (See chapter II of this publication).
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No single element exists or operates in isolation; it is the 
interrelationships between the elements that account for the robust 
results achieved. Three general qualifications must be made in order 
to understand the processes operating between these elements and the 
consistency in the system. Firstly, there is a need for support from macro-
economic policies in numerous areas; secondly, social partners (or “the 
labour-market organizations” as they are called in the Scandinavian 
countries) are central actors in the system; and, thirdly, communication 
patterns between and contact capabilities of actors at different levels of 
society are inherently important. Often, the social partners are placed 
in pivotal positions in policy-making processes. 
Without employment friendly macro-economic policies, selective 
policy efforts will not have much chance of success. Both push and 
pull factors must be at work in order to have balanced growth and 
rising employment. And from 1994, the Danish government has 
actually tried to “kick start” the economy with financial and tax 
reforms, helping to raise domestic demand. A policy mix of general 
economic policies and fine-tuned labour-market policies has been 
central to the Danish success story since the mid-1990s. Demand-
driven growth and active labour-market policies have supported each 
other. When the economy recovered and the labour-market situation 
changed, macro-economic policies were corrected once again, to not 
let inflation rise. This exercise in synchronization succeeded, as can 
be witnessed by the fact that the Phillips curve for Denmark flattened 
out, simply, despite growing employment and falling unemployment. 
The policy mix seems to have worked well. Denmark has also turned 
a budget deficit into a surplus. But this has be to regarded as a side 
effect of successful governance experiments and experience with 
the flexicurity system, supported by welfare investments and sound 
general economic steering.
It is also important to stress the central position of the social 
partners, not only because of their own regulations through collective 
agreements —of huge importance in the Danish system— but also 
because of their central role as policy makers and implementation 
agents. “Competitiveness” and substantive, as well as procedural, 
justice are basic to the policy efforts. This is also an argument for the 
Scandinavian welfare-States to take overarching responsibility for 
labour-market policy developments as well as steering arrangements; 
but —as noted— the public authorities share their powers with the social 
partners and decentralized actors (municipalities and representatives 
of civil society). The social partners must be placed in key positions if 
there is to be cooperative adaptation as the labour-market organizations 
have effective veto power positions within the system. 
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Thirdly, contact capabilities —not only contract capabilities— are 
fundamental. At almost every level of Danish society short power 
structures have been developed, allowing for easy access to decision-
makers and other actors. A culture of cooperation and consensus is 
preserved by institutional and behavioural reproduction of common 
hands-on policies. Information, consultation, and co-determination are 
highly developed, resulting in the formation of trusting relationships 
between actors over time. This constitutes the institutional glue in 
the system. In reality, no security for the development of trust and 
cooperation is given; it is an open empirical question. No labour-market 
regime is without conflict dimensions —a regime simply builds on 
conflict lines. But the ways that actors find institutional frameworks for 
combating and finding solutions to changing problems are decisive for 
cooperation and learning.
The reduction of open unemployment from a higher level than the 
European average in the beginning of the 1990s to one of the lowest 
ones currently is one obvious result of the Danish flexicurity system. 
Other results to be recorded are growth in employment, high numerical 
flexibility, high mobility, low job security but high income and 
employment security. Inflation has also been avoided. This all makes 
quick and cooperative structural adaptation possible. Without active 
labour-market policy (LMP) and educational policies it would not be 
possible to reallocate resources and give wage earners the qualifications 
and motivations needed for bearing the costs of adaptation. It is also 
important to foster acceptance of the practice of coping with constant 
uncertainty. And here the collective representation of interests in the 
system on both the employer and employee sides is most vital to the 
process of joint decision-making and to the contact capabilities used.
Two diverging coordinates seem to be at work simultaneously. 
As noted, Denmark is special in having liberal traditions as to the 
flexibility element and Scandinavian welfare-State traditions as to 
security, creating a hybrid employment system. High mobility has 
been important for many years also because of the fact that Denmark 
and the other Scandinavian countries are open economies in need of 
quick adaptation and innovative organization of work. The dominance 
of small and medium-sized enterprises contributes to a readiness on 
the side of workers for job shifts and transitions within the labour 
market. Craft traditions and common skills and qualification priorities 
have facilitated the flexible labour market. Internal labour markets 
are seldom seen in Denmark because of the predominance of small 
and medium-sized enterprises in the industrial structure. And with 
lower entry barriers at the enterprise level it is easier to shift from one 
firm to another. Danes take up many jobs during their lifetimes. As a 
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consequence, tenure is low in Denmark compared to the rest of Europe, 
almost as low as in the United Kingdom and the United States (see 
Auer and Casez, 2003).
The level of job turnover and mobility between jobs is high for most 
categories of employees within the Danish labour market. Almost every 
third person within the Danish labour market shifts employment each year. 
Even if regulated job security is very low, perceived job security might 
be higher. It is the subjective job and employment security that counts. 
Political regulation of job security for wage earners is concentrated 
on collective dismissals as a response to European Union regulation. 
The tradition from the September compromise with high degrees of 
freedom on the side of employers has been so strong that protection of 
people in ordinary employment is very low in Denmark compared to 
other European countries. Despite having one of the lowest levels of job 
protection among OECD countries, Danish employees have a feeling of 
high employment security (OECD, 2004). This counts for all subgroups 
of employees (Auer and Casez, 2003). As to a recent Eurobarometer 
report, more than 70% of Danes found it was a good thing to change 
jobs every few years, while a level of below 30% was found in Germany, 
Austria, and Poland (Eurobarometer, 2006). 
It goes without saying that this hybrid character of the Danish 
system is a speciality seen in a European context. Denmark has 
one of the highest rates of turnover in Europe and the highest level 
of mobility —but also has one of the most advanced welfare-State 
arrangements with regard to income security and public services. Each 
year, many employees are affected by unemployment and will receive 
unemployment benefits or social assistance during a short period of 
time. But most of these people will succeed in finding a new job rather 
quickly. Long-term unemployment has been reduced dramatically 
since the beginning of the 1990s. Those who are unemployed for longer 
periods of time end up in the target groups for active labour-market 
policy arrangements, bringing them back to the open labour market with 
the help of various programmes (e.g., job training and education). 
The more passive elements of income security are supplemented 
in the Danish system with strong interventionist policies and public 
services. Reforms during the 1960s installed a public employment 
service system (“AF-systemet”) operating with decentralized offices 
all around the country and with social partners in important steering 
positions since 1975. The place for LMP has been clear to all political 
parties and to the social partners as well. Unemployment since the late 
1970s and especially during the late 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s was the background for stronger political efforts to fight social 
exclusion; and this implied raising ambitions and mobilizing resources. 
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Now Denmark is the European country that spends the most money 
on LMP. In total, Denmark spends 4.5% of GDP, of which about 2% 
is spent on active LMP measures. Compared to this level, the United 
States spends only 0.5% in total on LMP; the United Kingdom less than 
1%; Canada a little more than 1%; Italy, 1.4%; Austria, 2%; France, 2.7%; 
and Germany 3.4% (European Commission, 2006a).
Without doubt these heavy expenditures on active LMP are seen 
as productive social investments in Denmark. Even the present right 
wing government that took office in 2001 supports strong investments 
in labour-market and educational arrangements because without 
these the Danish flexicurity system would simply not be operational. 
Employers support the investment strategy of LMP also because they 
benefit from the active programmes that allow them to secure a supply 
of qualified labour even if they do not want a social rationale for 
public policy decision-making. As a result, Danish employers benefit 
from the hire-and-fire options and from very few political restrictions 
regarding their licence to operate as well as from strong public policy 
arrangements in labour-market and welfare policies. The public 
employment service helps all kinds of employers, free of charge, in both 
recruiting and providing further training and education for employees; 
and the costs of active LMP are placed only with taxpayers, that is, the 
employees themselves. The way public welfare institutions function 
with comprehensive childcare and health care facilities, leisure-time 
facilities, educational arrangements and eldercare, heavily supports 
women taking up full-time jobs in the open labour market.
This calls for a closer look at the importance and elements of active 
LMP and lifelong learning strategies in the Danish system.
D.   Active labour-market policy                      
      and lifelong learning strategies
When discussing active LMP, academics, observers, and politicians as 
well, always refer to Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries, 
as they constitute the active corner of Europe with regard to LMP. 
The Scandinavian countries all have a long tradition of work being a 
prerequisite for receiving economic compensation for the loss of income. 
Citizens in the Scandinavian countries have for a long time been defined 
as “workers”, backed by the powerful position of the labour movement, 
especially in Sweden. Early on, the norm was institutionalized that wage 
earners would be given rights only if they also accepted duties in relation 
to the labour market: one should actively be seeking a job. This “working 
line” and the public interventions through active LMP are among the most 
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important components for encouraging labour-market participation. The 
definition of (potentially) everyone participating in the labour market is 
not seen only as a public good and a measure to improve productivity, 
but also as a resource for tax revenues and a way of financing the welfare 
system. In the early part of the twentieth century, however, it was mostly 
men who benefitted from this consideration; during the last three decades 
women participate on an equal basis in active working life. 
There is a moral principle behind the Scandinavian labour-market 
policies: rights and obligations go together. A generous income substitution 
level presupposes a strong work ethic: one has to be ready to take up a 
job. Citizen rights cannot be understood unless one also recognizes the 
obligations of the individual. Income compensation is also calculated on 
the basis of earlier income from paid work. It is mostly within the policy 
field of pensions that there is a clear dominance of universal social rights. 
Now, as the active elements of LMP have been strengthened during recent 
years in Denmark this is mostly to be seen as a revival of the working line 
and qualification principles. “Activation” is the European concept for new 
State-sponsored ways to help unemployed people including measures 
such as job training and the upgrading of skills, but also to motivate 
workers to quickly return to the open labour market. Carrots and sticks 
support each other. These measures have not resulted in a break with 
the guiding principles of governance. However, elements of a “work 
first” approach have been seen during recent years. The job perspective 
has been strengthened. The municipalities have become more important 
producers of services and organizers of activation measures —also in 
order to mobilize those people that are outside the open labour market. 
Since 2007, new common organizations of activation measures in which 
State and municipalities cooperate are being created in Denmark. 
The labour market is crucial to solving adaptation problems 
nationally. The functioning of active LMP and educational policies in 
Denmark promises solutions to key issues in European labour markets: 
raising labour productivity in general and especially by investing in the 
skills and abilities of the labour force, reducing unemployment with the 
help of a mix of general employment-friendly measures and targeted 
measures to reintegrate unemployed people into the labour market, 
to encourage higher employment for those presently out of the labour 
market, to increase mobility on both a geographical and a professional 
basis, which will help both firms and individuals and which can keep 
wage increases and inflation down, and, last but not least, to compensate 
and redistribute income, work, and life opportunities. Readjustment and 
adaptation processes to combat mismatch problems have been facilitated 
in this way. And from the very beginning, the working line has been the 
focal point of labour-market and qualification policies.
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All of these objectives were part of the original contributions to active 
LMP, with Sweden as the fore-runner. Corporatist steering further aided 
LMP development. From the early 1950s, more and more measures were 
developed in accordance with the Rehn-Meidner model, which posits that 
interventionist policies should be based on the general economic control 
of prices and the acceptance of trade unions’ solidarity-based wage 
policies —with the “creative destruction of capital” as a positive side 
effect. This is to be seen as a Schumpeterian way of letting unproductive 
firms get watered down by competition. The model was accepted and has 
been used both as an identifier for the Swedish society (“folkehemmet” or 
the People’s Home) and for sectoral policy designs. Until the mid-1990s, 
Sweden kept its leading position in this policy area but Denmark has since 
taken the lead, particularly since 2000. Social policy goals and economic 
developments have not been seen as opposites, on the contrary: greater 
economic efficiency can go hand-in-hand with more welfare programmes 
provided for citizens. This also partly explains why neo-liberal policies 
have not been implemented in Denmark as they have been implemented 
in most other European countries during the past several decades. 
Institutionalization of interest representation, selective mechanisms built 
into the system with the division of labour between politicians and social 
partners as an important variable and path dependencies as to social and 
labour-market policies are operational.
Brought to its most fundamental elements, active LMP consists today 
of four functions: allocation, qualification, activation, and income security. 
Eventually, one could also add occupational health and safety, but this 
regulatory function is not very well integrated into the active parts of 
LMP as occupational health and safety is part of an independent system 
of policy regulations. The first three are the active functions. Allocation is 
fundamental and embedded in the way every modern economic system 
works: public help to bring demand and supply into balance. It is a kind 
of labour exchange, allowing employers and wage earners to find each 
other as quickly as possible by making the labour market transparent, 
giving guidance and information, and by matching firms and job seekers 
in a proper way. The transaction costs can be diminished, and mismatch 
situations, bottlenecks, and quantitative disequilibrium can be avoided. 
Seen qualitatively, the matching process will improve the functioning of 
the labour market. The allocation function also brings strong political 
backing to public employment services because it is a functional part of 
the operations of every liberal market system. 
During the last two decades, more and more decision makers have 
realized that the qualification structure of the labour force is a crucial factor 
in improving competitiveness and for the individual wage earner it is of 
crucial importance in order to stay in a labour market with changing 
ECLAC76
demands and job opportunities. The European Union’s Lisbon strategy 
from 2000 and the revised edition of 2005 strongly build on this view, 
promoting lifelong learning (LLL). LLL is now also one of the four core 
elements of the European Union flexicurity approach. Qualifications, 
mostly formal ones, give workers access to jobs and to careers. Both on-
the-job training and formal learning are crucial and the publicly organized 
and financed continuing vocational training (CVT) system in Denmark 
is key to the functioning of an economy in which small and medium-
sized firms dominate. There will be a permanent underinvestment 
in improving the skills of wage earners if the public sector does not 
intervene and organize activities, which, in the case of Denmark, it does. 
Denmark has set up a further education and vocational training system 
for both employed and unemployed people. A system was founded in 
1960 for non-skilled workers and an equally broad and comprehensive 
educational system was founded in 1965 for skilled workers. Secondly, 
the unemployed also need to improve their qualifications through 
“activation” measures and education and further training have also 
been central elements in the programming and implementation of active 
LMP. A stronger ambition is to have LLL for all persons realized and this 
has been an official goal for several decades now. In fact, Denmark is 
one of the European countries with the most adults taking part in CVT 
courses every year. More than half of the labour force has been registered 
as being involved in some kind of education —public or private, job-
oriented or not job-oriented, during or after work hours— during 2007 
and 13% conclude a CVT course each year.
Until 2000, the number of people and the financial resources spent 
on vocational training and education were on the rise but since then these 
figures have stagnated. Politically, efforts to try to change this trend are 
now being made with the help of neo-corporatist arrangements. In 2006 
and 2007 tripartite negotiations resulted in the new allocation of public 
money and joint efforts on the part of the social partners to bring LLL to 
a more prominent position within the system. 
Giving unemployed people training and education is part of this 
ambition, and by combining qualification measures for the unemployed 
with measures for the employed one might produce immediate gains 
for the labour market and develop potentialities. However, a number 
of traditional economists still challenge this assessment, based on 
quantitative evaluations made on the measures of individual support 
and income situations. Others use other methodologies. Our position is 
that the quality of the activation is most important for positive motivation 
and for producing robust results. Here the Scandinavian countries again 
were early pioneers as to “activation” arrangements, helping with 
transitions and change of occupations. Carrots have been used more 
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than sticks. Rehabilitation and efforts to bring down sickness levels are 
becoming more and more important as the labour market is approaching 
full employment and a greater supply of labour is needed. Then all 
productive resources in society are to be mobilized with the help of 
employment and labour-market policies, and it is not only individuals 
who must be reactivated: it is a question of mobilizing the whole system 
of social protection.
High unemployment benefits and other forms of income security give 
people a way of coping with temporary placement outside the labour 
market and help the unemployed to not lose faith in the future. By trying to 
reallocate resources in this way, the public sector helps the individual and 
his or her family to still function at a decent level, it keeps up total demand 
in society, thereby securing total employment levels, and it prevents the 
development of unjust and unacceptable exploitation practices in the 
labour market. This passive part of labour-market policy is, however, a 
necessary element in giving people “welfare security” and the capacity to 
cope with flexibility. The relative generosity of the Danish unemployment 
benefit system is documented by the OECD, which indicates that it has 
the highest net compensation rate in Europe (OECD, 2004). The Danish 
level is 30% higher than in France, almost 20% higher than in Germany, 
and more than four times higher than in Italy and Greece. In addition, 
unemployment benefits last up to four years in Denmark, much longer 
than in most other countries (Madsen, 2006a and b).
In recent years, the Danish compensation ratio has not been 
regulated in full accordance with increases in the general price and wage 
levels. Therefore, the unemployed have suffered a relative loss of about 
10% during the last decade. Some marginal groups in Danish society 
—couples on social assistance and new immigrants— have seen their 
economic compensation reduced even more. Political decisions placing a 
ceiling on social assistance and a special low rate for “start help” for new 
immigrants have downsized social security for these groups since 2003. 
This is not in accordance with the general and traditional trend in Danish 
labour-market and welfare policy.
The active elements in LMP along with educational measures are, 
however, the most important ones for understanding how the flexicurity 
system works. By adding the LLL arrangements in the form of continuous 
vocational training and education to the Danish flexicurity system, we 
can reformulate the core elements and their interrelationships. This 
means adding to the “Golden Triangle” of high mobility, income security 
and LMP, a fourth element of LLL. This new coordinate brings to wage 
earners the opportunity to be mobile within the labour market during 
more years of their active working life: they will, it is to be hoped, 
experience “the security of the wings” (Gösta Rehn). This means the 
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combination of employability, permanent further training and education, 
and wage earner mobility. Flexibility on the side of the work force, high 
mobility and skills enhancements and education go together. A life-
course perspective is also brought into the picture by this extension of 
the “Golden Triangle.” Graphically, the reformulated Danish flexicurity 
system looks like this, now forming a “Golden Quadrangle.”
Figure II.2
“THE GOLDEN QUADRANGLE”: EXTENDED VERSION OF THE DANISH  
FLEXICURITY SYSTEM
    Skills enlargement, job rotation possibilities, and reintegration 
measures are interrelated in the Danish system. Qualification elements 
and LLL strategies do not only stem from education in active LMP but 
also —and fundamentally— from the Danish CVT system set up for 
both employed and unemployed people. Active help for both groups of 
people is orchestrated in ways that improve productivity, employability 
and mobility opportunities at the same time. The history of this CVT 
system goes back to the 1960s as does the history of LMP in Denmark, 
but the flexicurity system is not identical to the new active LMP of the 
1990s, as often described in international contributions to the flexicurity 
literature. Here “activation” has been made the core element in LMP. Even 
if it is a major European reform strategy one has to see the Danish policy 
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market
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Source:   Prepared by author on the basis of Per Kongshøj Madsen, “Flexicurity - a new perspective 
on labour markets and welfare states in Europe”, document presented at the seminar on Flexicurity 
conducted by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the 
European Commission, Brussels 18 May 2006, and Henning Jørgensen, “Flexible labour market, 
workers’ protection and the ‘security of the wings’. A Danish ‘flexicurity’ solution to the unemployment 
and social problems in global economies?”, Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, Nº 76 (LC/L.2993-P), 
Santiago, Chile, CEPAL, 2009.
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elements as broader and more strongly integrated into an existing axis of 
dynamic labour market and social security elements.
The system functions not only to cover an immediate demand for 
labour power, but also to stress a more long-term strategy because the 
general qualifications of the labour force have a dynamic effect on trade 
composition and productivity, and thus also on flexibility in establishing 
different types of trades. The formula has been: improve skills rather than 
increase flexibility or training and education rather than work in return for 
benefits. However, the newest LMP reform of 2003 did bring more “work 
first” elements into the policy mix. Finally, the training efforts can also 
be seen as an element of social integration. It is important to stress that 
the unemployed have rights in this context: the availability requirement 
is accompanied by a right to an individual job plan and activation. The 
changes in 2003 again reduced the role of qualitative activation offers, 
and immediate job placement was given priority. The shortest possible 
route to a job and in the quickest possible way has been stressed again 
and again by the present government as the policy choice. This clearly is 
a “work first” approach now being integrated into the Danish activation 
system and it is another kind of logic than the one prevailing during 
the 1990s. Now, threats —or the motivation effects of activation— are to 
dominate qualification effects according to the government. But not all 
municipalities and regional bodies agree. 
As mentioned, a right wing government took office in Denmark 
in late 2001. In 2003 the government succeeded in getting a political 
majority, including the Social Democrats, to support LMP changes. 
The reform was called “More people to work” and substituted 
longer activation measures with successive contacts and talks with 
the unemployed as to firm timetables, introduced “other actors” 
—meaning privatisation— in the implementation of policy, and reduced 
the share of education in activation measures to 50%. The result has been 
more “creaming”and “parking”of unemployed, and a re-regulation of 
processes, resulting in a more bureaucratic system. The instruments in 
use were reduced to three: (a) guidance, training, and education; (b) 
practical introduction; and (c) wage subsidies. From 2004, unemployed 
people have also been classified in five groups of “matching” categories, 
according to skills and immediate employability. This classification 
system was copied from the Dutch system.
The new LMP programme, “More people to work,” was not 
announced as a break with the former policy, but in reality it slowly 
changed the policy profile, the content of the work, and the activities. 
The municipalities and the AF were slowly merged. From 1 January 2007 
there has been a total rearrangement of the steering structure: integrated 
job centres for both insured and non-insured unemployed —formed 
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after policy transfer from the Netherlands— organize labour-market 
activities together with the “other actors” (mostly private firms); the 
municipalities have taken the lead within a two-tier system of benefits. The 
employer organizations and the trade unions were strongly against this 
“municipalization” of labour-market policy, but their common protests 
were not accepted by the government. 
A recalibration of the steering structure was orchestrated. The social 
partners are no longer in pivotal positions in the steering bodies. The 
regional labour-market boards were transformed into monitoring bodies 
only, but the municipalities —especially the bigger ones— have clearly 
become important players in the game. The social partners still have a say 
as to the outsourcing of services, but they are no longer policy-makers. 
This has repercussions as to the implementation and legitimization of 
policies. This might reduce motivation and commitment from the side 
of employers and trade union representatives. Special “problem groups” 
have now also experienced reductions in benefit levels (people receiving 
social assistance, immigrants and refugees). A change of policy content 
and an abrupt change of steering processes will form a path breaking 
point as to active LMP —and to the fundamental principles of universal 
rights and equality and the dialogue and consultation principle of the 
Danish system. To observers, these changes may appear odd as they are 
so different from the 1994 policy arrangements that brought international 
awareness of the winning potential of the Danish labour-market regime.
E.    Dysfunctional elements within the Danish    
       flexicurity system
Some dysfunctional elements or badly functioning policy components 
in the Danish system can be found also. Denmark has not been very 
successful in reducing the number of people between the ages of 18 and 
65 that are on public assistance, and large groups are actually expelled 
from the labour market. 
The integration problem is perhaps the most severe. The share 
of inactive adults between the ages of 16 and 64 is still almost 25% 
and the groups forming this percentage have been remarkably stable 
during the last twenty years, even during several years of booming 
economic conditions and many job openings. However, the high 
demand for manpower during the last two years has given more people 
on social assistance the chance to find employment and a reduction 
of 10% has been reached during this time. But this is not the normal 
situation for these people; for the most part, they remain outside the 
open labour market. It is a labour-market regime that functions well 
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for core groups and some people in transitional positions. Solidarity 
with the people outside “the Golden Triangle” might not be that big 
—not even with the extension of the system into “the Golden 
Quadrangle”. One reason for this is the fact that a highly dynamic labour 
market, involving many job shifts, continuously tests the productivity 
of each individual employee. There is an inherent selection process 
installed in this regard and some wage earners will be expelled from 
the labour market when they do not meet the productivity criteria 
of the employer. Because of the few restrictions placed on employers 
in Denmark in regard to dismissals and lay-offs this risk becomes 
manifest in a large number of cases. Marginalization as a labour-market 
problem can occur at the same time as bottleneck problems. This is now 
a prevailing situation in Denmark. There is a price to be paid for the 
Danish labour market’s high level of efficiency.
It must also be recorded that about half of all people on social 
assistance have a non-Danish background. Elements of social exclusion 
and discrimination within the Danish labour market cannot be totally 
ignored. From the mid-1990s, there were several shifts in welfare 
elements in the LMP: introduction of activation requirements and 
tougher conditions for staying in the unemployment insurance system; 
introduction of activation requirements for non-insured unemployed; 
and the option to reduce the benefits if the activation requirements 
are violated. The benefit level has not been changed, however, for core 
groups. The “working line” has been strengthened and the benefit period 
has been reduced from seven to four years, which is still comparatively 
a very long period of time. But during recent years, the right wing 
government has reduced social assistance for immigrants and placed a 
ceiling on permanent social assistance as well. There are also more cracks 
in the Danish system’s success. For example, persons who are not of 
Danish origin have limited participation in the labour market; only 47% 
of ethnic minorities are employed compared to 77% of Danes. 
Lack of qualifications by newcomers —or lack of recognition of 
immigrants’ qualifications— is part of the problem. Job and educational 
preferences based on immigrant cultures constitutes another problem, 
but surely discrimination within the Danish labour market is also to 
be found. Anti-discrimination legislation is rather weak in Denmark 
compared with most other European countries. This is also due to the 
fact that the social partners themselves want to regulate employment 
relations and production and the norms are not that favourable for the 
integration of immigrants and refugees. 
As for social assistance, income levels have also been reduced 
in recent years for some immigrant groups: a special “start help” for 
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new immigrants and a ceiling of social assistance for families have put 
strong pressure on the universalistic principles of the Danish system. 
Some groups within Danish society are not well covered by the public 
assistance system and thus by the flexicurity arrangements. In fact, a 
poverty trap might be visible for people on start help. Very few people 
actually find new jobs this way.
Another problem with the flexicurity system is, in a paradoxical 
way, the high mobility of the labour market. This means that workers 
not only find new jobs in case of restructuring or closure but that they 
seek other jobs and occupations on a regular basis. This gives businesses 
and public authorities a disincentive to invest heavily in further training 
and education because they can lose their investment. This is why it is 
important to have strong public interventions to secure education and 
CVT courses.
It goes without saying that the high public sector costs of running 
active LMP and educational policies are a problem addressed in 
political discussions. When using between 4% and 5% of GDP on 
labour-market measures it is understandable that discussions pop up 
as to the efficiency and effectiveness of the measures and the benefit 
levels. The relatively high income replacement rates might produce a 
risk of financial disincentives, and especially for low-income groups 
this will be a reality, according to economic textbooks. However, it has 
been difficult to document the magnitude of the problem empirically 
in Denmark, and the authorities have heavily relied on early activation 
measures to counteract these potential problems. 
F.    Policy lessons to be learned
Unilateral government decisions will not suffice to establish and develop 
a flexicurity system. Collective learning processes are important in 
finding out which kinds of policies will help tackle uncertainties and 
foster flexibility and security at the same time, thereby producing 
institutional complementarities. An important lesson to be drawn from 
the Danish experience is that a policy must be economically reasonable and 
politically and institutionally feasible at the same time. Otherwise actors 
during the implementation process will do damage to the policy or 
target groups will not use the measures. The solution to this decisive 
policy formation question often lies in the process itself: in interaction, 
mutual understanding, and learning (Jørgensen, 2002). But the political 
authorities must actively secure conditions for these interplay and 
decision-making rounds. The State has to set up institutions, norms and 
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procedures as well as accountability rules and evaluation criteria for a 
well-functioning flexicurity system.
We also know that labour-market regimes are created historically 
in national welfare-State frameworks. All markets are socially and 
institutionally embedded —but some are more strongly embedded 
than others. In Denmark, a central role has been given to the social 
partners in setting policy priorities, in participating in (de)centralized 
programming and implementation, and in securing and evaluating 
results. Positive functions of the participation of social partners in public 
policy making and implementation and in finding cooperative solutions 
to adaptation problems have been strongly stressed, especially during 
the 1990s. Mutual trust and collective learning processes are part of 
the success formula. Other systems, in which social partners do not 
have a comparatively strong position, will have to rely more heavily on 
governmental and political actors when formulating and implementing 
flexicurity strategies, but the goal of supporting and integrating the 
social partners must be followed. Good decision-making processes and 
robust results do go together.
In trying to learn from the Danish experience there is a strategic 
point of view to be stressed: the different kinds of employment and 
labour-market problems call for a two-tier strategy. As to general economic 
policy, employment friendly policies as well as policies to control inflation are 
recommended but they have to be combined with other sectoral policies 
and especially active LMP and educational policies (lifelong learning). These 
policies will help to overcome mismatch problems in the labour market, 
reallocate resources, and prepare the working population to meet future 
employment and qualification demands. “The security of the wings,” 
high qualifications, and employability are fundamental to adaptation 
processes and the positive attitude of wage earners. Open jobs and 
unemployed people have to be matched quickly and the qualification 
structure of the workforce is crucial for productivity and adaptation. 
Strong numerical flexibility in a system may induce employers to invest 
less in vocational training and further education, thereby reducing the 
employment security of employees. This results in the need for strong 
public engagement in organizing and financing educational measures. 
For the unemployed, the public sector’s labour-market measures offer 
transitional positions in the move back to the open labour market. 
Activation is important when tailor-made efforts are made to combine 
individual profiles and the needs of the local and regional labour market 
with the help of qualitative offers. Many long-term unemployed people 
simply do not react to economic incentives as they have other problems 
in addition to the lack of a job. They need specialized help. In Denmark, 
employment security (not job security) is being promoted, and together 
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with publicly guaranteed securities and services, “labour-market 
security” is installed. It is important to note that Denmark has chosen 
not to decrease levels of unemployment benefits —meaning lowering 
the reservation wage— not to deregulate, and not to have welfare 
retrenchment policies implemented.
It has been more important in the Danish system to keep employers 
in situations where they can respond quickly and easily to changing 
demands and pressures. The easy ability to hire and fire workers is part 
of this —liberal— element in the Danish system and socializing the cost 
via the tax system together with active measures in LMP and social 
policies are other elements. The flexibility advantages are only accepted 
on the basis of strong income security and strong public policies to 
improve qualifications, employability, and the learning potential of 
wage earners. Qualification effects of activation have also been more 
important than motivation effects, documented by developments from 
1993 to 2003. Forms of security are important for flexibility. This is a 
central policy lesson.
To formulate the central line of argumentation in this chapter: 
-  Interaction and institutional coordination across policy areas and 
between different levels of society is crucial to social and economic governance 
that aims to secure full employment and the balanced development of the 
labour market. Social dialogues and compromises are central to processing 
policy adjustments and societal adaptation is necessary to handle changing 
environments and pressures. 
-  Core elements of a flexicurity approach are market-oriented and 
employment-friendly economic and industrial policies, collective bargaining 
and active and offensive labour-market and educational policies that bring 
the skills and abilities of the workforce into focus. The wage earners are to be 
flexible, skilled, mobile, and motivated all the time.
-  And from the Danish experience, we can see that public welfare 
policies that provide security for wage earners are crucial, as well as removing 
conflict-ridden negotiation issues from the enterprise level and providing 
general conditions for flexibility arrangements. Labour-market security 
fosters flexibility.
Real learning from the Danish experience and policy transfer might 
be difficult in the short run. But the tendency is strong to look abroad 
to see how other systems have responded to similar global trends, 
pressures, and labour-market problems, to share ideas, to draw lessons, 
and to bring foreign evidence of success to comply with domestic policy-
making traditions. The relevance of the Danish flexicurity system for 
Latin America is an important and difficult question.
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G.   The relevance for Latin American countries
Latin American countries have a diversity of institutions, interests, 
cultures, and policy traditions. This is also documented in other 
contributions to this book. Differences seem more important than 
similarities in some respects. Welfare institutions are relatively poorly 
developed and embedded in the social reproduction structure of each 
country. Social and welfare policies are generally of a haphazard nature. 
In the region’s labour markets, the partial modernization of the economy 
has resulted in a strong division between firm job holders at the core of 
the labour market that have strong job protection, and many underpaid 
workers with precarious employment relationships. Many unemployed 
people are also unrecorded. One of the problems with exporting Danish 
solutions to employment and social problems is that social protection 
has always been a closed nation-State affair: solidarity and social justice 
pertain to closed communities. Political cultures are mingling practices, 
values, and language and national governments and communities still 
have difficulties in learning in this new environment.
Because one cannot copy a system, it is much more interesting to 
ask what can be taken from the Danish experience and used in a political 
strategy for introducing and implementing flexicurity elements in the 
national system. Even if the transferability of Danish flexicurity to Latin 
America is limited at the system level, some guiding principles and lessons 
can be addressed, highlighting the relevance of the system’s components 
and the relationships of these elements for those countries. Three aspects 
of policy change can be considered: the content side, the processes of 
policy-making and implementation, and the policy outcomes. This equals 
principles of (1) policy design, (2) social dialogues, and (3) outcomes.
(1) The fundamental principle as to the content of the policy in question 
must be to integrate flexibility and security in policy drafts and arrangements. 
To simply change one of the core elements will do damage to the whole 
flexicurity construction. More risk taking on the side of wage earners 
presupposes stronger income security and employment security. And more 
flexibility for the employers’ benefit requires better training and education 
of workers, stronger binding of the actions of the firms to goals in public 
policies, and measures to make transitions worthwhile. A goal must be to 
give wage earners the experience of “the security of the wings.”
 Uncoordinated production structures in Latin America do not 
eliminate the possibility of redistributive welfare policies. They may 
complicate the decision-making process but the successful formula is 
to include reforms in the production structure, the labour market, and 
the welfare regime at the same time. The growing informal sector is 
of course a special Latin American problem as is the power structure. 
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Latin American labour markets cannot be called inflexible because they 
have absorbed many new workers and many different kinds of workers. 
Supply has been excessive, however, and unemployment is a well-
known phenomena. In a few cases, countries have experienced falling 
employment rates —and thus rising unemployment— but in the rest of the 
region rising unemployment seems to be related to growing participation 
rates which the labour markets have not been able to absorb, especially 
not in the Middle and Southern countries. Youth unemployment and 
urban unemployment are among the pressing problems to be addressed 
by flexicurity strategies. Low productivity developments also need to be 
addressed. More and more workers are employed in jobs and sectors that 
pay very low wages. It is not to be expected that flexicurity arrangements 
can conquer all these problems immediately. Therefore a medium-term 
and a long-term perspective for changes might be appropriate. 
(2) In regard to the processes themselves, a principle of supportive 
and productive social dialogue, involving negotiated trade-offs must be 
applied. Building social and political consensus is essential to advance 
reforms. In order for plus-sum-games to be imagined and arrangements 
accepted by all actors, some kind of “horse trading” and compromise 
is needed. Flexicurity does not install itself. It needs social and political 
forces to promote this new set of policy principles, and it needs broader 
acceptance within the regimes in order to be implemented. By including 
social partners and making associations stronger in the decision-making 
process in Latin America, better policy-making and implementation can 
be facilitated. The social partners are to be permanent participants in 
the policy-making process. The more polycentric structure of interest 
representation here could, however, be used more strongly by integrating 
more associative networks and organizations in security arrangements.
(3) Finally, as to the outcomes of flexicurity arrangements, principles 
of sustainable employment, protected mobility and social cohesion are relevant. 
Realizing sustainable employment for both core groups and groups in 
weak positions can only be done when these groups are included in 
active measures to further skills and abilities as well as the motivations 
of the persons involved. More than economic incentives are needed to 
secure these principles. A positive motivational base is to be fostered 
by strengthening actors’ social positions and income support. People in 
weaker positions should be empowered to cope with their own situations 
by supporting them in developing labour-market and life projects. To 
ensure continuous adaptability of firms, to keep up productivity levels 
and employability of workers, reliable and responsible lifelong learning 
systems must be established or improved.
Women still have a low employment rate in Latin America and are 
typically employed in informal sectors, with low wages and benefits. 
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The participation of women in the labour market is limited by their 
responsibilities as mothers and caregivers, and also by the low status 
accorded to women in some countries and to the lack of public childcare 
facilities. The last element can be changed rather easily with the expansion 
of public services as part of a flexicurity offensive. Gender mainstreaming 
in public policies is also highly relevant. The challenge is to intelligently 
design reforms that will have the support of social and political actors 
and civil society representatives while avoiding opposition from families. 
The interests of firms as well as the interests of workers are to be taken 
into account to foster stronger LMP and LLL priorities. 
Flexicurity as an integrated policy and policy-making formula has to 
be developed in ways that will improve firms’ competitiveness, facilitate 
transitions within the labour market, reduce segmentation, and improve 
workers’ labour-market security at the same time. But again: flexicurity 
will take different forms from system to system. The initial conditions 
and national traditions will influence the processes and designs strongly. 
No single road map can be outlined for Latin America. No one-size-fits-
all approach is appropriate (contrary to those recipes to be found in the 
“Washington Consensus”). Flexicurity must be promoted not as a question 
of imitation but as one of inspiration. National change strategies must be 
elaborated in each case, sequencing changes and integrating existing 
institutions in the arrangements. Political and cultural diversity is to 
be addressed as well. Employment security and broader labour-market 
security are to be promoted together with the creation of more and 
better jobs. Bringing flexicurity principles into Latin American policies 
will surely be in line with the ongoing turn away from the “Washington 
Consensus.” It will require a renewal of policy programmes and 
institutional structures within the labour markets in order to facilitate 
innovation and adaptability of the national system. Public investments 
in better health care systems and childcare facilities are to be regarded 
as productive economic developments; they should not be run down by 
outdated economic theories or political ideologies. But flexicurity must 
also be regarded as a new test to national reform programmes of the 
labour market. A recalibration of existing elements might be the first 
step, both following and challenging national traditions.
Flexicurity is not a recipe to save society from the ravages of 
uncontrolled economic competition but rather a way to rethink and 
reorganize structures and ways of behaviour in order to redeploy 
resources and give new meaning to the reconciliation of economic 
and social forces. This must be done in accordance with national 
traditions, institutions, and levels of development. Reorientation of 
macro-economic policy could supplement these efforts. Rapid policy 
proposals might inspire —but may not have persistent effects. The 
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results of reforms can neither be trivial nor cosmetic if support for 
flexicurity solutions is to be produced and renewed.
In modern labour markets, interest structures have eroded 
old understandings and conflict perspectives, and new flexicurity 
arrangements can show that flexibility and security are not 
contradictory, but can be mutually supportive. This also implies that 
there should be no talk about striking a balance between flexibility 
and security as it will unduly simplify the nexus —also in a Latin 
American context. The Danish example should be instructive in this 
respect. But the systemic character of the Danish case is documented 
by the long and winding road to its installation. A long history, political 
and professional compromise, and a highly evolved learning process 
are part of the explanation of this system. These systemic traits are 
not transferable to Latin American countries. Preferences, norms, and 
ideas are difficult to understand outside the context in which they are 
constructed and Latin American meaning has to be constructed by 
detaching policy ideas from the Danish institutional context. But with 
the help of, firstly, communication and, secondly, local and national de-
coding and re-conceptualization, policy diffusion could be facilitated 
in the form of flexicurity translation. Thirdly, the institutionalization of 
adopted policy ideas and principles will be a separate and long-lasting 
affair in which re-interpretation will be a permanent national element. 
A fitting flexicurity policy must be fluid. 
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Chapter III




This document starts from the premise that labour institutions have a 
threefold calling: they must balance their functions of worker protection 
and security with their own modalities of interaction with the economy 
and the production system and with their impact on the labour-market 
and employment situation. This is undoubtedly a precarious equilibrium 
in which the different stakeholders’ interests must be constantly juggled, 
in a context of more open markets, the demands of competitiveness and 
growing needs for innovation in technology, organization, knowledge and 
skills. The revision of employment standards and rules of labour-market 
institutions and policies is no easy task and certainly cannot be reduced 
to a simple choice between indiscriminate deregulation and unthinking 
adherence to the existing rules. 
This discussion takes as its reference the Danish model known as 
“flexicurity”2 and enquires into its relevance to institutional reform in 
1 For an extended version of this chapter, see Goldin (2008a and b).
2 See the chapter by Jørgensen in this volume for a more detailed account of the 
Danish model.
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Argentina. In grappling with the complexity of labour institutions as 
mentioned above, the Danish model could be taken as a possible route 
towards establishing the balance described there. This is because it 
consists of a systematic array of policies that promote flexibility in labour 
markets, work organization and labour relations, on the one hand, and 
social and labour security for workers in and outside the labour market, on 
the other (Bredgaard and Larsen, n/d). In other words, the model seeks to 
facilitate the adjustment of labour markets at the same time as increasing 
worker security in terms of continuity of income and social inclusion. It 
goes about this by deploying active labour-market policies, a system of 
lifelong learning, adequate compensation in the event of unemployment, 
services aimed at reconciling work and family life and a health coverage 
regime that does not depend on the worker’s employment situation. Seen 
again in relation to the complexity described at the outset, the security 
that is lost through the flexibilization of labour rules is regained through 
policy instruments outside the worker-employer relation as such, in the 
form of social security and labour-market policies.
To what extent is the Danish experience relevant to Argentina? 
This will be elucidated later, after examining practices and institutions 
in Argentina that could be linked with the concept of flexicurity. For 
the moment, what can be said —as European analyses of flexicurity 
unanimously conclude— is that no single model is suitable for all 
countries. Each society must explore its options to find the combination 
between flexibility and security that suits its circumstances and the 
best road ahead from its particular point of departure. Those who 
acknowledge the value of “assisted mobility”, active market policies 
and a strong social security presence, as well as the irreplaceable role 
of stakeholders and social dialogue in designing and developing them, 
broadly agree that the combination of the instruments and the resulting 
balance is a non-transferable product of each national situation.
A.   The employment situation and the normative   
      framework of individual working relations
In early 2003, after the deep crisis unleashed in 2001, different calculations 
placed Argentina’s unemployment rate at between 20.4% and 26.6%. 
In the first quarter of 2008, only five years later, that rate had dropped 
to 8.4%. In the interim, employment expanded strongly on the back of 
active creation of registered jobs and the emergence of new employers, 
whose number increased by 51.6% in those years. Underemployment, 
too, decreased considerably in that period, from a rate of 17.7% in the 
first quarter of 2003 to 8.2% in the first quarter of 2008.
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The regulatory framework governing individual worker-employer 
relations is analysed from the perspective of labour flexibility, to use a 
typology that can be compared with the flexicurity model. 
In this regard, consideration will be given first to the hiring and firing 
regime and second to the instruments of productive decentralization, 
given their relevance to what is known as “external flexibility”. 
The Argentine hiring and firing regime may be qualified as a system 
of impure relative stability, which manifests a clear preference for non-
timebound contracts and admits modalities of hiring for a fixed term 
or for a particular purpose only when objectively justified. Arbitrary 
dismissal or dismissal without just cause merits constitutional sanction 
and is thus illicit but nonetheless valid. This means that the employer 
can end a contract of employment at any time, even without invoking 
or demonstrating a justifiable cause and, illicit though it may be, such a 
decision effectively ends the contract and obliges the employer to pay 
an indemnity which, generally speaking, is equivalent to one month’s 
salary for each year of employment. The legal regime also provides a 
number of conditions under which the employment contract expires 
through causes that are not imputable to either party; here the employer 
is obliged to pay compensation equivalent to half that provided in the 
case of unjustified dismissal. All this is apart from the particularities of 
hiring and firing regimes that exist for special categories and situations, 
such as those applicable to construction workers, internships and other 
training contracts. The regime is thus legally flexible, although its degree 
of flexibility or rigidity may be debatable from the point of view of cost 
of indemnization.
Conversely, the constitution enshrines “the stability of public 
employment” to which, under the law, employees are entitled after a 
trial period of 12 months. This means that dismissal is invalid unless it 
can be attributed to a legally recognized, just disciplinary cause, which 
must be duly accredited at a prior proceeding in which the worker is 
guaranteed the right to a defence. The law also provides for restructuring 
measures, including the elimination of bodies, departments or functions 
and the resulting destruction of jobs. The procedure here leans towards 
staff relocation as a first option or, failing that, termination of contract 
upon payment of an indemnity. 
The decentralization of production processes and outsourcing 
are treated in a variety of ways in labour law: where employment 
fraud is presumed to have occurred, the figure of the intermediary is 
dismissed and, accordingly, a direct link between the worker and main 
company is acknowledged; in other cases, depending on the type of 
activity the employer has hired the intermediary to do, either solidary 
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responsibility is imposed on both —so that they are jointly responsible 
for the worker’s entitlements— or the intermediary is solely responsible 
for the worker’s entitlements, freeing from responsibility the principal 
employer who uses the intermediary’s services. Although the law does 
not forbid the use of productive decentralization strategies, it does 
impose certain conditions that make them problematical. The legal 
scheme of employment protection is also weakened because the figure 
of the employer is made more diffuse by the implementation of those 
organizational strategies.
With respect to the normative mechanisms associated with the 
different forms of internal flexibility, the first point to consider is that 
the employer has the right to change certain conditions in employment 
contracts, provided that this power is not used unreasonably, the basic 
conditions of the contract are not altered, no material or moral damage 
is caused to the worker and the alterations are not used as disciplinary 
sanctions. The definition of professional categories and the application 
of functional versatility are not governed by the law but by collective 
agreements in the Argentine institutional system. Those matters were 
negotiated in rounds of talks in the 1990s and more recently, which have 
continued to incorporate —though to a much lesser extent— functional 
versatility clauses, modes of organization of work that presuppose them 
and changes in professional categories.
With the exception of the minimum wage and the complementary 
annual wage, the structure and amount of wages are mostly determined 
autonomously: by collective agreements for workers covered by such 
instruments and by individual contracts of employment for those who are 
not. On the matter of wages, the technique of “desalarization” (treating 
wage items as if they were not) merits some criticism. This is one of the 
strategies used to lower the cost of labour and consists of deducting part 
of the wage on which the calculation of social contributions is based and 
replacing it by other entitlements. Argentine law places no restrictions 
on the use of variable wage modalities, however, which is one of the 
most widely used tools of internal numerical flexibility.
Working hours are regulated basically by ILO Convention No. 1 
on Hours of Work (eight hours per day or 48 hours per week, in the 
case of Argentina); hours are shorter for night-time or insanitary work. 
In terms of internal numerical flexibility, the modulation of working 
hours —or average hours— regime established in 1991 by law 24013 
remains in force. Under this regime, collective labour agreements can 
set longer daily or weekly hours for certain periods of time, which must 
then be compensated, on a basis of averages, with shorter hours during 
a subsequent period. This sort of internal numerical flexibility enables 
employers to draw more heavily on their workforce while the market 
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for their products so requires, and then compensate when demand is 
lower. Collective agreements made extensive use of this instrument in 
the 1990s and have continued to do so, albeit to a lesser extent, in the 
most recent rounds of talks.
It may be concluded that the scope for internal flexibility as regards 
professional categories and functional versatility, wages and working 
hours depends to a great extent on the regime, performance and coverage 
of collective bargaining. 
B.   Collective labour relations
With respect to collective working relations, this section will examine 
trade union organization, collective bargaining and conflict. Having 
stated that collective stakeholders, especially trade unions, play such 
a significant role in improving labour security, it would seem logical to 
examine trade union organization in Argentina, its historical structure 
and institutional make-up. The more centralized —supra-firm— forms 
of trade union organization in Argentina have advantages as far as 
representation is concerned. Conversely, disadvantages arise from 
heavy (legally empowered) State intervention in the life of trade unions 
and the fact that the unity of these organizations, though valuable in 
itself, is not the product of free choice on the part of workers and their 
leaders, but is imposed by law.
As far as collective bargaining is concerned, it is important to look 
at the legal regime, the parties to the negotiation and its effects (which 
are broad, since it confers obligations and benefits upon all workers 
within the scope of application of the agreement, whether they are 
affiliated or not, and on business owners, whether or not they form part 
of the negotiating group). Other important aspects are the duration 
of agreements (which remain applicable even after they expire, until 
substituted by new ones) and the diversity of spheres in which negotiations 
can take place (the firm, group of firms, activity or sector). Under the 
legal regime, staff delegates (up to four) acting in the firm must take part 
in any agreement signed at that lower level by a union pertaining to a 
higher level. Notably, while a new agreement may alter a previous one 
—whether to the benefit of workers or “downwards”— made at the 
same level, any new agreement made at a different level must establish 
more favourable conditions for workers, institution by institution. 
 The collective bargaining regime can also be distorted by the 
practice of ultra actividad, whereby, in the absence of further negotiations 
or agreement, a contract’s provisions remain in effect indefinitely, 
with the result that some of those in force now are over 30 years old. 
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Other distorting factors are the negotiation of employer contributions 
to the trade unions, which can compromise the unions’ determination 
to pursue demands, and restrictions on mutual concessions when the 
level of negotiation changes.
In this normative framework, there has been a notable increase 
in collective bargaining —in terms of volume, coverage and numbers 
of agreements— in the last six years, and in supra-firm bargaining, 
which had declined heavily in the 1990s. These negotiations refer 
mainly to wage issues and, to a lesser extent, to other matters such 
as hours, organization of work, hiring modalities, labour relations 
and contributions to unions. As a result of this intensive negotiating 
activity, wages set in collective agreements began to converge with 
wages actually paid, narrowing the wide gap that had had developed 
between the two in the preceding decade in the context of waning trade 
union power.  
Social dialogue is severely weakened by the fact that government 
and social interlocutors are not strictly separated or mutually 
independent in Argentina. This is due, in turn, partly to the legal and 
political instruments that allow the State to intervene in the formation, 
organization and internal and external relations of the stakeholders, 
particularly trade unions. 
That wages are such a conflictive issue in Argentina has to do 
with a combination of output and employment growth, a shift in the 
power balance (this time in favour of the trade unions), high inflation 
and the resulting loss of the purchasing power of wages. In addition, 
certain cultural and historical traits permeate the approach to conflict 
in Argentina: one is a historical (neither democratic nor pluralist) view 
of conflict as something pathological, dissentious and troublesome 
—and hence something to be denied and repressed— and the other is 
a predilection for skirting around the legal system’s dispute settlement 
framework and working out ways of compatibilizing the different 
interests involved in the conflict.
C.   On the (in)effectiveness of labour rules
1.    Inefficacy and “in black” work
Having described the institutional fabric of individual and collective 
labour relations, mention must be made of the gap between the letter of 
the rules and the extent to which they are applied in reality. In a broad 
context of a regime that is weakened normatively (in the degree to which 
rules can govern practice), subjectively (in the personal sphere of social 
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law) and applicatively (in the efficacy of rules), the law and the reality 
of social rights are far apart in Latin America in general. In addition, 
there is the specific Argentine tendency towards anomie, manifested in a 
detachment from the law. 
This ineffectiveness has been worsened by the employment crisis 
that swept over Argentina in the early 2000s. One of the most conspicuous 
effects of this is unregistered or “in black” work, which peaked at 49.7% 
of all wage employment in the third quarter of 2003. It then began to trend 
gradually downwards and stood at 37.3% in the first quarter of 2008.
The problem was serious enough to prompt the legislature to 
introduce sanctions at the contractual level, mostly in favour of “in 
black” workers (as well as administrative and penal measures available 
to the labour oversight agency), aimed at making it potentially very 
expensive to hire workers illegally. These sanctions were established 
under successive pieces of legislation, which were not always consistent 
with each other. This approach does not appear to have been particularly 
efficacious, since the incidence of unregistered work continued to rise 
strongly even after the new rules came into force. 
Market incentives such as lowering employer contributions to social 
security during trial periods and fixed-term contracts, the treatment of 
certain labour relations as if they were not, and  “desalarization”, as 
described earlier, also failed to produce satisfactory results. Despite all 
these strategies, the level of unregistered employment continued to rise. 
2.    Inspection of labour
The existing system of labour inspection recognizes the faculties 
of the provinces and the city of Buenos Aires, which are enshrined 
in their respective policing powers. It also invests the Ministry of 
Labour, Employment and Social Security as the “central authority” and 
attributes an important role to the tax collection agency. The system has 
unmistakable failings, however: the extremely tight budgets of most 
local jurisdictions, shortage of inspectors, low wages, lack of means 
of transport and training gaps. Although better endowed, the federal 
government inspection service does not have the means to adequately 
compensate for those failings.
The National Work Regularization programme, which was created 
a few years ago with the purpose of identifying unregistered workers, 
appears to have been more successful. By July 2007, it had inspected 
463,407 establishments and 1,258,672 workers and had found up to 24% 
of surveyed workers to be unregistered. Of those unregistered workers 
found, up to 36% were regularized through the work of the programme.
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D.   Social security
1.    Health-care coverage
        (a)    The social works regime
The regime of health-care coverage, which encompasses medical 
care, medicines and complementary benefits (prosthesis, orthopedics, 
rehabilitation, and so forth), comes under the social works system. These 
operate mainly under the auspices of trade unions, but there are also regimes 
under State or public-private administration, corporate and management 
schemes, regimes for the armed forces and security personnel and social 
schemes created by agreement with public and private companies. The 
primary beneficiaries are employed workers in the public and private 
sectors, retirees and pensioners of the national level social security and of 
the government of the city of Buenos Aires, and those in receipt of non-
contributory pensions.  Secondary beneficiaries are the primary family group 
(spouses and children, as well as common-law partners and dependents 
of the primary beneficiary). The regime is funded by contributions from 
both workers and employers (3% and 6%, respectively, of wages). Of these 
resources, 10% go into a solidarity redistribution fund to be channelled to 
agents (social works) that receive lower average income per beneficiary and 
to provide loans, grants and subsidies to agents and health programmes 
and plans to beneficiaries. Social works must provide health benefits in 
line with national health policies, either by providing services directly or 
through third parties, and must cover at least the benefits included in the 
compulsory medical programme set forth by the Ministry of Health.
Viewed from a flexicurity rationale, the first thing to note is that 
beneficiary status lasts for the life of the contract and only three months 
after it expires. It also lasts for three months during medical leave and other 
types of paid and unpaid leave, unless the worker undertakes to pay his or 
her own contributions as well as those that would have corresponded to 
the employer. Workers in receipt of unemployment benefit also retain their 
coverage. In sum, health coverage is closely associated with the worker’s 
employment status, registration and formality. Workers in the informal 
sectors and those who have not been registered by their employers are 
not covered. Neither are unemployed persons who are not receiving 
unemployment benefits, those whose coverage has ended, those yet to 
begin their first job, or those working independently. 
2.    Unemployment coverage
The Argentine system of unemployment insurance recognizes 
as beneficiaries duly registered employed workers covered by the 
employment contract law. Rural and construction workers (who both 
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have special regimes of their own), domestic employees, public employees 
and civil servants, workers in private education establishments, own-
account workers and those employed by single tax payer employers are 
not covered. Neither are unregistered workers —just under 40% of the 
wage-earning population— or first-time (usually young) job-seekers. 
Unemployment insurance gives the right to 4, 8 or 12 months of benefits 
—depending on how long the person has been paying into the system— 
and its wage-replacement ratio is very low; the benefit ceiling was of 400 
Argentine pesos at the end of 2008, when the minimum wage stood at 
1,200 pesos and the average wage at 1,800 pesos.
The coverage of unemployment insurance is very low, owing to the 
exclusions mentioned and to the fact that many potential beneficiaries 
are unable to properly demonstrate their unemployed status. The 
population eligible for unemployment insurance tends to represent 6% to 
9% of all unemployed, of whom between 60% and 80% actually receive the 
benefit. In 2002, at the time of highest unemployment and greatest coverage, 
a mere 6.2% of the unemployed were able to claim unemployment benefit; in 
2006, only 1 of every 25 jobless workers was covered. 
3.    Work and family: labour rules and social security
The labour and social security rules governing different aspects of work-
family relations  provide for various types of leave for meeting the requirements 
of family life (the birth of children, marriage, death of a family member, and so 
on). There are also provisions enabling married couples who work for the same 
employer to take vacation at the same time and rules on maternity-related 
issues: prenatal and post-natal leave (which are covered by a social security 
benefit), time off for breastfeeding, the non-regulated requirement to set up 
day-care facilities, additional unpaid maternity leave or time off for caring for 
a sick child. As for the right to return to employment, the law forbids dismissal 
by reason of pregnancy or marriage and provides for additional indemnity 
if this rule is infringed; women with newborn children also have the right to 
compensation in the case of resignation from employment.  
The law also offers special protection to workers with family 
dependents in the case of illness and concerning sanctions for absence from 
work. Certain benefits related to the worker’s family are “desalarized” 
and exempted from tax, such as the provision of school supplies and 
overalls, reimbursement for day-care costs, reimbursement of medical 
and dentistry expenses, among others.
The social security system has a regime of family allocations 
specifically aimed at covering dependent workers’ families (except in the 
case of domestic employees). This regime is financed by employers, with 
a contribution of 7.5% of wages paid, and it provides monthly benefits 
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for each child under 18 years of age and for disabled children; annual 
benefits to help with schooling for basic and differential education and 
for rehabilitation; single payments for marriage, birth and adoption; 
and fixed-term benefits, such as prenatal benefit —up to 9 months 
from conception— and a maternity benefit, equivalent to the worker’s 
earnings, during the period of leave before and after the birth.
E.    Labour-market policies
The profound crisis unleashed in late 2001 —which took unemployment 
to the highest levels ever and pushed 53% of the population below the 
poverty line and 24.8% into indigence— led the government of the 
time to create a massive income supplementation programme, called 
Unemployed Heads of Household Plan (PJJHD from the Spanish 
acronym). The coverage of this programme peaked in early 2003, with 
2 million recipients. Beneficiaries were jobless heads of household 
(male or female) who also met certain other conditions relating to 
family composition. The plan offered beneficiaries 150 Argentine pesos 
monthly, against accreditation that their children were attending school 
and having regular health care and check-ups and that they themselves 
were engaged in training to facilitate their reentry to the job market. 
They also had to work between four and six hours per day in community 
productive or services projects. 
Although PJJHD was not satisfactory as an programme to promote 
employment, education and health and although it created a certain 
disincentive to work, analysts broadly agree that that its massive 
deployment was a decisive instrument of social containment —much 
more as a programme of social aid that of employment promotion— that 
helped to ease some of the worst lacks in the most dramatic moments 
of the crisis. 
The economy began to recover in 2004 and the government set 
about gradually “exiting” from PJJHD. Those who did not meet 
employability conditions were moved into programmes for vulnerable 
groups —passive social welfare programmes— created by the Ministry 
of Social Development. One of these was the Families for Social Inclusion 
Programme which, up to September 2007, had absorbed 289,838 
individuals from PJJHD. PJJHD beneficiaries who met employability 
conditions were transferred to active programmes launched by the 
Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security. What is known as 
the Integral Employment Plan “More and Better Jobs” arose out of that 
effort to “activate” labour-market policies. The Plan consists of several 
programmes and components:
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• Sectoral skills-building plans. Sets of measures designed and 
coordinated by stakeholders —trade unions and businesses— 
in a particular sector of the economy, in coordination with 
institutions that offer professional training services. They 
receive financial and technical support from the Ministry of 
Labour, Employment and Social Security (which oversees the 
quality of training institutions, which must registered with it) 
and from other government departments. Their purpose is to 
meet specific needs for skills in order to broaden opportunities 
and improve job quality. These plans were created to promote 
worker training in response to real, specific demands of the 
different branches of the economy and to improve the quality 
of training, infrastructure and teacher profiles. Arrangements 
of this sort were made in many sectors, including clothing, 
footwear, construction, the naval industry, metallurgy, timber 
and furniture, agribusiness, software, and so forth.
• Area training programmes. Consisting of two components: 
projects to boost employment by area; and area training 
plans and educational projects. The employment projects are 
arrangements between the Ministry of Labour, Employment 
and Social Security and the stakeholders in a particular 
geographical area and are aimed at promoting the quality of 
employment there. Local stakeholders are responsible for 
promoting development in their geographical area; the business 
community, in particular, is the best placed to boost local 
development opportunities. These plans should be treated as a 
specific dimension of local development strategies that already 
exist. The Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security 
identifies those development processes and offers to partner 
with the local stakeholders in order to increase their momentum. 
Management is local, although efforts are made to coordinate 
with provincial and national policies. The geographical training 
plans, meanwhile, are aimed at coordinating policies with 
production, labour and training at the provincial level, in order 
to meet the demand for skills in the region and reach out to 
unemployed or underemployed segments of the population. By 
the 2003-2005 biennium, 155 agreements were in place across 
all the Argentine provinces. In that period, 9,315 unemployed 
underwent skills training.
• Employment quality and professional training programmes. 
Created to boost equity and competitiveness by developing 
work competencies and enhancing the quality of employment 
and the employability of workers. These programmes are aimed 
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at stakeholders involved in identifying, regulating, evaluating 
and certifying work competences, and at professional training 
institutions, in their capacity as executors of training activities. 
In 2005, the system had prequalified 152 institutions; another 
42 were in the process of upgrading and 230 teachers had been 
trained. In addition, 1,500 workers and 35 assessors had received 
skills certification.
• Training and employment insurance. Created basically to 
serve as a means of “activating” the back-to-work process of 
PJJHD beneficiaries who met certain employability conditions. 
The aim was to encourage beneficiaries to update their skills, 
provide job-seeking support and help them find quality jobs. 
The programme may be accessed gradually and is voluntary for 
PJJHD beneficiaries, except for those under 35 years of age who 
have not been absorbed into the Families for Social Inclusion 
Programme. It provides a non-remunerative monetary benefit of 
225 Argentine pesos per month for the first 18 months and 200 
pesos per month for the following 6 months. Beneficiaries must 
draw up their own job-search plan and engage in activities to 
enhance their employability, such as orientation, training, work 
experience, work-related intermediation and technical assistance 
for drawing up self-employment schemes. They are also expected 
to take any suitable job offers they receive. The duration of 
the monetary benefit is treated as time worked for pension 
purposes. Although this regime provides an unemployment 
benefit (which reproduces one of the passive elements of PJJHD, 
which it is intended to replace), that benefit is activated through 
coordination with measures aimed at increasing employability 
and adaptation to the job market, including intermediation and 
job-seeking assistance, orientation, professional training, work 
experience and self-employment initiatives.
• Employment offices. The purpose of these is to intermediate and 
place people in employment, assisting job-seekers and helping 
to fill vacancies in firms and organizations that need staff, by 
placing people with the right profiles; in other words, to align 
employment supply with demand. 
There is a legal regime for fee-charging employment agencies, 
which were prohibited in Argentina until the ratification of ILO 
Convention 96, particularly part III, which provides for the regulation, 
rather than the suppression, of such agencies. Another legal regime 
concerns the right to professional training, which is provided under the 
Constitution and regulated by law 24576, whose text was incorporated 
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into employment contract law. These regimes are also factored into 
many collective work agreements. 
F.    The position of the stakeholders
It may be said that the Danish model of flexicurity has yet to enter 
the debate in Argentina. The social stakeholders make little —if any— 
reference to that rather complex approach. One of the few such references 
was made in a work published recently by the Ministry of Labour, 
Employment and Social Security and its Office of the Under-Secretary 
for Technical Programming and Vocational Studies. It refers to the 
flexicurity model indicating that: “…the outline of the new labour policy 
in Argentina suggests initiatives more along the lines of a strong return 
to the social (of the Welfare State variety), than akin to schemes such as 
workfare in the United States or the Active Welfare State proposed by 
Boyer for Europe…”.3 During his administration, the Minister for Labour, 
Employment and Social Security has repeatedly distanced himself from 
the flexibility policies developed in the 1990s, referring to them as failures 
and “inefficient for creating employment”. On another occasion he 
expressed his lack of faith in “those reform packages based on one set of 
justifications after another, none of which have worked”. The Minister’s 
position seems to lean much more towards active labour-market policies, 
as is evident from the strategies developed to activate social containment 
policies in response to the deep crisis of the early 2000s.
The position of the trade unions —especially the largest, the General 
Confederation of Labour (CGT), led today by secretary general Hugo 
Moyano— is openly opposed to any reform proposal premised on greater 
flexibility. With slight variations, this stance is also taken by the alternative 
union known as the Central of Argentine Workers (CTA). On the contrary, 
CGT backs reform proposals that strengthen legal protection and, as this 
chapter was being written, was in parliamentary procedures brokered 
by Héctor Recalde, president of the parliament’s commission on work 
legislation and adviser to the office of the secretary general of CGT. 
The unions’ position was less monolithic during the labour reforms of 
the 1990s. At that time, CGT —then steered by the leaders of the major unions 
(light and power, sanitation and commerce, railway workers, mechanics, 
telephone company workers, and so forth)— had aligned, or at least gone 
along, with the economic and social policies of the Justicialista government 
of the time, even those that entailed privatization of social security (pensions, 
occupational hazards) and employment flexibility. Another trade union 
group, the Argentine Workers’ Movement  (MTA), headed by Hugo Moyano 
3 See Novick and Tomada (2007).
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(now Secretary General of CGT), took a very different stance at that time, 
strenuously questioning the economic model and employment flexibility 
policies of President Menem.
The business community, once adamant in its demands for and efforts 
to obtain greater employment flexibility, is not so militant in this regard 
today. With the political delegitimization of the previous decade’s reforms, 
together with the unmistakable orientation of the current administration, 
businesses have been more circumspect about their preferences. They are 
now rather more on the defensive, confining themselves to denouncing 
the hypothetical normative excesses of the before mentioned proposals of 
Héctor Recalde, a member of parliament.
Although the position of the business community tends more 
towards the defensive, it also has concerns over the need for differentiated 
legislative treatment for small companies and for a review of the 
occupational hazards regime, some of whose rules the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional.
When the present administration was about to take office, it 
announced its intention to convene a social dialogue, both the large 
business organizations and the trade unions expressed a willingness to 
take part. One of the objectives of this dialogue was undoubtedly to table 
a strategy of wage moderation, in view of the worrying inflationary trend 
under way in Argentina. After meeting with trade union leaders, however, 
the government announced that it would opt for negotiations by sector. 
Social dialogue was dropped as an imminent political enterprise and thus 
far the social stakeholders have not shown any interest in starting it on 
their own initiative.
G.   Conclusions
1.    Prior considerations
Debates on labour institutions in Argentina in the last few years 
have been marked by extreme and rather biased perspectives. While some 
appeared to see no alternative to indiscriminate deregulation (as far as the 
unavoidable political restrictions would allow), others professed an unshakeable 
faith in the existing  rules, which they assumed to be good simply because they 
existed (from which perspective any reform proposal was seen as regressive).
A first concluding reflection on the idea of flexicurity is that any 
attempt to reproduce or replicate the original Danish model would be just 
as simplistically schematic as the extreme positions taken in the Argentine 
debate. Although the Danish model implies a more complex and balanced 
perspective (indeed, its very conception combines flexibility and protection), 
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in conditions so different from those prevailing in Denmark, it would inevitably 
be totally unviable. As the introduction to this chapter noted, each society must 
establish the optimum combination of flexibility and security for its own 
situation and find the road ahead from its own starting point.
Any pretense at literally transferring a model so at variance with the 
institutional, historical and cultural factors at work in Argentina would 
simply entrench the biased and one-sided positions of the stakeholders 
more deeply. Workers would suspect, not without reason, that flexicurity 
was nothing more than a fresh exercise —albeit less direct and perhaps 
merely cosmetic— in covert dismantlement of the entitlement structure. 
Businesses, for their part, would probably bear out this suspicion, by 
treating the proposal as a strategy for inducing acceptance of larger degrees 
of employment flexibility, while avoiding the substantive commitments 
written into other components of the model.
In the Danish experience, the determinants of levels of worker 
protection and security grew naturally out of that society’s firm commitment 
to the Welfare State. If labour-market and social security policies were used 
to justify the introduction of greater employment flexibility in Argentina, 
the very idea of flexicurity would be taken as stark conformation of the 
biased perceptions mentioned earlier. 
It must be understood, then, that the social legitimacy of flexicurity 
depends absolutely on the means and the sequentiality employed to build 
up the equilibria implicit in the idea. In any case, the flexicurity rationale 
can be channelled only through long-term policies which, for example, 
provide for increased formalization of employment relations and acceptable 
income continuity as essential conditions for legitimacy. What kind of 
security can there be when almost 40% of workers are outside the system? 
What expectations can workers be presumed to have of increased flexibility 
—which is legislatively easy to implement— when its only counterpart is 
a mere promise of income security, a promise uncertain to be kept and 
costly to fund? Ironically, flexibility, which is actually more controversial, 
can be implemented with a single stroke of legislation, whereas labour-
market and social security measures guaranteeing worker security, which 
are probably less polemic in terms of the employee-employer relationship, 
are much more costly and sometimes inaccessible.
If Argentine workers are to feel, like their Danish counterparts,4 that 
their security depends more on active labour-market policies and social 
4 See the joint paper on the flexicurity concept prepared by the Danish Confederation of Trade 





security instruments than on a guaranteed right to job stability, then 
they must be made to experience it; they cannot be expected to simply 
believe or sense it. It follows that the security scheme must necessarily 
be built first. 
Be that as it may, it will be no easy matter to interest the government 
or the social stakeholders in such a scheme, since neither appear willing 
to consider anything that involves rethinking employment flexibility 
strategies for a second time. And, for the time being, businesses do not 
appear to be making a priority of the issue either. 
2.    Worker security in Argentina
What is needed first, then, is a security scheme which, as Bredgaard 
and Larsen (n/d) note,5 carefully and harmoniously combines job 
security, provided by the employment stability regime; the capacity to 
recoup a job lost, which is clearly related to the worker’s endowments 
vis-à-vis the labour market; income continuity, through a regime of 
unemployment coverage and other social security instruments; and 
continuity of health coverage, beyond occupational status at a particular 
point in time. Without lapsing into the simplistic pretense of replicating 
a social security system built in another context and within another 
historical trajectory, the following paragraphs attempt to identify 
measures that could be compatible with Argentina’s institutional culture 
and financial capacity. 
A security scheme in the Argentine context should have at least the 
following components:
        (a)     Employment security and registration
It is imperative to significantly improve rates of employment 
formality. These have increased somewhat in the last few years, but have 
yet to rise much above 40% of the wage-earning population. Any labour 
security measure is merely academic from the point of view of a worker 
who is not formally registered. The government should continue its efforts 
to regularize workers, but this will require it to tackle other unresolved 
institutional matters. One of these is the need for a special statute for 
work inspectors. Inspection work should be hierarchical, stable and well 
paid. Inspectors must be formally trained and participate in ongoing 
programmes of specific training, in the framework of an oversight model 
that is adapted to the local context and practices and inspection policies 
that are sustainable and consistent. 
5   See the chapter by Jørgensen.
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In this connection, it is also necessary to reorganize the regime of 
sanctions for unregistered work, now regulated somewhat haphazardly 
by laws 24013, 25323 and 25345 (the anti-evasion law), which suffer 
from contradictions, gaps and overlaps. The contents of these pieces of 
legislation need to be rolled into a single instrument in the interests of 
consistency and effectiveness.  The objective must simply be to impose a 
financial sanction on employers who fail to register workers and provide 
incentives to them to do so. Hiring workers “in black” must necessarily 
be made more costly than hiring them legally.
        (b)     Security of income and health coverage
At present, Argentina’s institutional system offers little in this 
regard. On the one hand, as explained earlier, the authorities have taken 
measures to activate PJJHD, a programme of social containment that was 
developed in response to the critical situation that arose at the start of 
the decade. That process will be revisited later, in relation to the subject 
of professional training; for now, suffice to say that it is mainly an exit 
programme for beneficiaries of PJJHD, which is considered, justifiably, to 
have fulfilled the purpose for which it was created.
Unemployment insurance and benefit. Work now needs to begin on 
developing a regime that offers wider coverage for unemployment and 
income continuity, to replace the extremely limited existing unemployment 
insurance, which has provided only meager assistance to a mere 6% to 7% 
of unemployed thus far. It is necessary to substantially broaden coverage, 
lengthen the period of benefits and raise the replacement rate, as well as 
incorporating compulsory activation mechanisms such as job-seeking 
assistance and orientation, intermediation between supply and demand 
for work, and training and retraining to suit market needs. Some of the 
instruments created as part of the PJJHD exit strategy could well provide 
the experience and institutional capacity for these components of the 
regime. The unemployed worker should have the right to be covered by 
an income continuity regime, but this should also carry obligations and 
incentives aimed at ensuring proper use of the regime, averting moral 
hazard and enabling the beneficiary’s timely reintegration into the labour 
market. It should also be articulated with a regime of non-contributory 
unemployment benefits for jobless who have come from the informal 
sector or are not registered, subject to the same “activating” conditions. 
Additional severance benefit. A benefit of this sort could take the form of 
a contractual obligation and be financed from the non-punitive component 
of severance indemnity. It could usefully be linked with the system of 
unemployment coverage, in order to assist those recently made redundant 
until unemployment benefit is activated. This idea will be explored in 
reference to the flexibility and dismissal issues discussed below. 
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Duration of health coverage. As noted earlier, the health coverage 
provided under the social works regime ends three months, if not sooner, 
after the termination of a contract of employment. Although it also remains 
active for workers in receipt of unemployment benefit, the poor coverage 
and limited duration of this benefit means that the Argentine system 
offers little security in the event of illness or accident. It is hard to see 
how proper continuity of social protection can be provided unless health 
coverage is separated from employment status and protection is assured 
throughout periods of unemployment as well as during employment. 
This broader protection is unlikely to be covered by contributions; the 
State must necessarily contribute to this sort of coverage.
        (c)     Professional training 
In this area too, the efforts institutions have made in the last few 
years have basically been directed at backstopping the exit strategy 
from the social containment programme implemented to deal with the 
aftermath of the monumental crisis that swept through Argentina early 
in the decade. 
During the period of recovery, professional training programmes 
will have to meet a wide range of demands. They must cater to the training 
needs of young people —one of the worst-off groups in Argentina’s labour 
market— trying to break into the employment market and find their first 
job. One step in this direction is the plan implemented by the Ministry 
of Labour, Employment and Social Security in early 2009 to train some 
600,000 young people, with financial support from the World Bank.
Naturally, as noted earlier, training must also function as a 
counterpart and trigger of systems that provide unemployment benefit 
and ensure income continuity. From this perspective, the redesign of 
those regimes —essential in itself— must tie in with professional training 
programmes that respond efficiently to demand and to markets. To this 
end, the State needs to partner with social stakeholders to provide sectoral 
training programmes that can properly identify those needs. Because it is 
socially responsible for coverage, the State must take the initiative in those 
programmes, provide financing (directly or through tax incentives) and 
supply technical assistance for implementation. The sectoral approach 
should facilitate the transition from training to actual employment.  
Employed workers, too, should be offered training and retraining 
programmes to equip them to deal with productive, technological 
and organizational changes in their existing jobs and in others, in the 
event of a change in occupation becoming necessary. There is a strong 
role for the State in encouraging the adoption of programmes of this 
type, particularly through tax incentives and direct financing. It is 
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especially important to ensure that, as well as the specific skills that 
firms are looking for, training schemes impart other, transferable skills 
that strengthen the worker’s later position in the labour market. This 
requires active public policymaking.
Collective agreements also play a prominent role in this area. With 
the levels of intermediate centralization existing in Argentina (by activity 
or branch of the economy), it is possible to organize and finance training 
on a sectoral basis. Trade unions should use this sphere to promote 
training in transferable skills. Collective agreements provide scope for 
trade offs that can ensure the incorporation of both job-specific know-
how and other broader or more transferable knowledge, thus helping to 
overcome firms’ reluctance to fund training that may then be captured 
by other market agents.
Social dialogue and the resulting broader macro agreements form 
a framework that is well suited to developing training programmes 
on three levels —for first-time job-seekers, the unemployed and the 
employed— particularly the second two of these. Inversely, professional 
and “life-long” learning represent a good bargaining chip for negotiation 
and consensus-building and are therefore valuable in helping to revert 
the weakness in Argentina’s social dialogue.
        (d)     Work and family obligations
Much remains to be done in this area in Argentina; for example, 
regarding the provision of care for children and dependent older adults. 
Efforts to align labour provisions with paternity and maternity 
issues, in line with prevailing international thought, offer a good point 
of departure. For example, a project now in parliament aims to provide 
fathers with 15 days of paid leave upon the birth of a child, to enable 
them to assist mothers at this crucial time of integrating the newborn 
into the family. If this receives legislative approval, the wage-equivalent 
for that period should be covered by the social security in order to ensure 
its economic sustainability. Argentine law also gives new mothers the 
right to request unpaid leave of between three and six months after the 
end of post-natal leave. From a perspective of equality, such leave should 
be available indistinctly to either parent, or to both simultaneously. If the 
social security regime had the resources, the mother or father could obtain 
a wage-equivalent benefit during this period, in order to encourage their 
enjoyment of and dedication to the newborn child.
3.    Labour flexibility
In order to consider something along the lines of flexicurity in 
Argentina it would be necessary to surmount inevitable prejudices and 
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build up an appreciable degree of worker security before moving ahead 
with other components of the model. It would also be necessary to bear 
in mind that in the 1990s Argentina experienced a whirl of labour reforms 
that, in the framework of the simultaneous economic reforms, failed 
to produce positive effects on either socio-labour conditions or on the 
Argentine labour market (with high unemployment, growing informality, 
precarious and insecure employment conditions, lack of job protection, 
declining real wages and social protection and sharply rising poverty and 
inequality). Starting in early 2004, this situation led to a virtual reversal of 
the reforms of the 1990s, which were blamed for the poor social conditions. 
Consequently, any attempt to retable the issue of labour flexibility, in 
itself a politically sensitive issue, is bound to meet with the reservations, 
rejection and warnings born of this traumatic experience.
This is not the occasion to embark on a critique of those reforms, 
although the author has done so on other opportunities.6 Suffice to state 
here that the possibilities for institutional reform have not been entirely 
exhausted, despite the frustrations encountered. But the inspiration and 
contents of any proposed reform would have to be different this time 
around. So too, would their timing; hence the importance of building up 
worker security. More broadly, it is necessary to arrange the process in a 
manner less prone to anachronistic declamations and more committed to 
effective employment protection, real applicability and compatibility with 
production and employment processes. This is the logical and conceptual 
sequence on which the proposal on flexibility offered below is based.
The original model of flexicurity refers to a balance between worker 
security and labour flexibility, based on the Danish situation. Again, the 
balance is unique and non-transferable; each society must identify what it 
needs to reach that point of equilibrium in the context of its own situation. 
Dogmatic and indiscriminate stances on flexibility have no place here; 
instead, what must be asked is what degree of labour flexibility may be 
compatible with the security scheme existing in Argentina.
4.    Internal flexicurity
First of all, in the Argentine context, an emphasis should be placed on 
the continuity of employment relations, given the clear social advantage 
of this and the positive externalities it offers in terms of gains in terms 
of on-the-job training, accumulation of human capital and productivity. 
With regard to flexicurity, continuity should be preferred whenever 
possible (Gazier, 2006) and the severance regime and related external 
flexibility treated as a necessary, though secondary, alternative.
6 See Goldin (2007).
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It is therefore advisable to seek the best possible balance of internal 
flexibility (functional and numerical) and, therefore, internal flexicurity, 
as its most valuable component.
Besides other smaller details, it will be recalled that such important 
issues as wage-setting, professional categories and multifunctionality, 
organization of work and the modality of working hours are governed 
in Argentina by collective bargaining. Since it is so important here, there 
follow some considerations on collective bargaining in Argentina:
(i)  It is a relatively well-equipped system for negotiation. The 
supra-firm trade unions, which prevail in the Argentine system, 
help to maintain a good balance of power, facilitate dialogue 
and, above all, give the workers of small firms access to trade 
union representation. Trade union unity is valuable when it 
comes to negotiation, but when this is the product of legislation 
—as in Argentina— it can distort representativeness.
(ii)  The law has enshrined compulsory participation of grass-roots 
leaders (staff delegates) in collective bargaining at company 
level, which enhances trade union representation. Despite the 
imperative of the legal provision, however, participation is still 
not insufficient.
(iii)  The existing legislation prevents mutual concessions when 
the negotiation is conducted at a level different from that of 
the preceding agreement. It would be beneficial if the system 
were to evolve towards legitimizing such concessions in all 
cases, obviously operating “above” the floors established by 
the legislator. Among other things, this would help to broaden 
the scope of collective bargaining, which is confined basically to 
wage matters today.
5.     External flexicurity
        (a)    Severance indemnization
The first point to consider in relation to external flexibility in 
Argentina is that paragraph 2, article 14 of the Constitution provides 
“protection against arbitrary dismissal” and the “stability of public 
employment”. As constitutional provisions, these must be fully 
respected. In the Argentine regime, indemnization for dismissal without 
cause7 is conceived as perhaps the least restrictive means of complying 
with that constitutional provision. The legal regime for dismissal from 
7 Unjustified dismissal is not prohibited nor in any way non-valid, as it is in other 
Argentine ordinances.
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private employment is legally flexible, insofar as its validity is not subject 
to prohibition, prior legal or administrative proceedings, annulment or 
obligation of prior payment.8
However, as has been noted, dismissal carries a cost: broadly 
speaking, a month’s salary for every year of employment. The degree 
of economic flexibility or rigidity  is therefore debatable. The upper limit 
the law sought to establish —that the sum of the months per year of 
employment could not exceed three times the average wage in the 
respective agreement— was disqualified by the Supreme Court. The total 
indemnity payment thus has no limit in Argentina, as it does in Uruguay, 
where it may not exceed the equivalent of six months’ wages, or in Chile, 
it may not exceed the equivalent of 11 months’ wages.
(b)    A severance benefit?
In Argentina there is virtually no basis for contract termination 
—except for the employee’s sole will or responsibility— that does not 
involve the payment of an indemnity by the employer, equivalent to half 
the amount provided for unjustified dismissal (15 days’ salary per year 
of service). Therefore, that “first half” of dismissal indemnity does not 
form part of the punitive component of indemnization, but has more 
to do with social security provisions —here, those covering job loss— 
attributable, in this case, to the employer. 
From this perspective, it would be possible to convert this first 50% into 
a severance benefit, which the employer would pay regularly into an individual 
account in the worker’s name. The worker would then have access to this upon 
termination of the contract of employment for whatever reason. It would thus 
serve as a secure and immediate first assistance in the event of unemployment, 
and could be linked in with the unemployment regime in the strict sense of 
the term. This application would not affect the punitive imputation of the 
other 50% of the indemnization, which the employer would pay the worker 
directly in the case of unjustified dismissal. In this case, the worker would 
receive payments for both items; compensation would not be diminished, but 
improved, since the 50% provided in the form of a security benefit would not 
be subject to the employer’s willingness to pay and would also be received in 
severances not imputable to the employer. In turn, the employer’s financial 
burden at the end of the working relationship would be lighter, since the funds 
for the severance benefit would have been built up gradually.
8 Such restrictions do exist in the case of public employment or in the event of dismissal 
of a trade union leader or staff representative; conversely, certain collective dismissals 
are subject to the crisis procedure regime and, therefore, must be preceded by 
reconciliatory proceedings.
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Chapter IV
Flexibility and security in the labour market:           
improving social protection for                
Brazilian workers 1
José Paulo Zeetano Chahad
Introduction
The globalization of the world economy and the changes it has brought in 
its wake have imposed a new reality on social actors in nearly all modern 
societies. Enterprises need new tools to maximize their competitiveness, 
including flexibility in market regulation, particularly labour legislation. 
Workers, in turn, need additional training to enhance their productivity 
in more competitive markets and, in particular, a new system of social 
protection to cope with the greater vulnerability that comes with labour-
market flexibility. Governments have fewer degrees of freedom for 
policy-making in a globalized setting but also need to enhance the social 
protection system, by strengthening social security and at the same time 
deregulating the labour market. 
1 For an expanded version of this paper, see Chahad (2009). The author is grateful to               
Jürgen Weller of ECLAC for comments on earlier drafts. He also thanks José Pastore, 
José Dari Krein, Paulo Tafner, José Celso Cardoso Filho, Rodopho Torelly and Sérgio 
Lisboa dos Santos for providing bibliographic material; Carolina Chahad Secco for 
assisting with bibliographic research and revising the final text.
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The challenge of finding a satisfactory solution to these dilemmas is 
even greater in the current Latin American reality: most of the region’s 
countries display alarming levels of income concentration, compounded 
by poverty and social exclusion affecting broad swathes of the population. 
Nonetheless, while those structural problems will ultimately only be 
overcome through a sustainable economic development process, the 
problems caused by globalization, such as greater workforce flexibility 
and the need for greater social protection for workers, may possibly 
be addressed through models that emphasize changes, reforms and 
improvements in the country’s institutions.
This paper uses the Danish model described by Jørgensen in 
chapter 2 as a paradigm to discuss possibilities for adopting a similar 
model in the Brazilian labour market, while bearing in mind current 
stakeholder attitudes towards the institutional changes needed to 
successfully implement a Brazilian model of flexibility with security, 
or flexicurity.
The text is structured as follows: the first section considers the 
present degree of flexibility in the Brazilian labour market in the light 
of current individual and collective labour relations. Section 2 describes 
the Brazilian system of social protection for the unemployed. Section 3 
describes the active labour-market policies currently in force, indicating 
the scale of expenditure involved; and Section 4 discusses stakeholder 
attitudes towards the reforms needed in the labour and union domains 
and in active labour-market policies. Section 5 reviews discussion of the 
scope and limitations of a flexicurity model with Brazilian characteristics 
to expand protection for Brazilian workers.
 
A.   Regulation of labour relations: implications for  
       flexibility in the Brazilian labour market         
       and social protection for workers  
As explained by Jorgensen in his contribution to this volume, the 
Danish flexicurity model can be characterized as a “golden triangle”, 
involving a flexible labour market, high levels of social protection 
for the unemployed, and active and efficient labour-market policies. 
This section presents the first component of the flexicurity model, 
represented by the implications of regulating individual and collective 
labour relations in terms of flexibility and social protection for workers, 
and particularly their consequences for the functioning of the Brazilian 
labour market.
Brazil’s very extensive labour legislation (see Chahad, 2008, Chapter 3), 
which has governed individual and collective labour relations since 1930 
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when the country’s worker and social protection system began to be 
consolidated, can be summarized as follows:2
(a) From the outset, based on the Italian corporate model Brazilian 
labour relations featured strong intervention by Government, which still 
plays a key role, particularly in collective bargaining. 
(b) There was also a predominance of protection for individual workers’ 
rights to the detriment of collective rights, which meant that collective 
bargaining in Brazil remained underdeveloped, partly because this formed 
part of the ideology underlying the model implemented in 1930;
(c) Labour legislation has always been relegated to secondary status 
owing to the weakness of “upward mobility” (Süssekind and others, 
2002), so that social struggles put pressure on society and the government 
to set up top-down labour-market protection systems, which were longer-
lasting and more cohesive, and strengthened institutions that protected 
workers more permanently; and
(d) As a consequence, at each point in the country’s economic 
history, labour legislation and the functioning of the labour market have 
responded to the needs of economic policy, e.g. wage policy after the 
military uprising of 1964, economic recovery following the 1983 recession, 
the Cruzado Plan in 1986, the fight against hyperinflation in the early 
1990s, price stabilization with the Real Plan in 1994, and labour-market 
deregulation to cope with globalization at the end of the twentieth and 
start of the twenty-first century.
Nonetheless, Brazilian labour legislation has always aimed at 
consolidating State involvement in guaranteeing individual workers’ 
rights; and only recently, in the early 1990s, did it try to prioritize collective 
bargaining. The reality is a labour market that is apparently very well 
protected with everything guaranteed by law, and where bargaining can 
only address wages, profit and earnings sharing, and the length of the 
working day, under certain conditions. The main result is that:
“The situation in Brazil is an apparent paradox: legislation is rigid 
but the labour market is flexible. The rigidity of legislation is reflected 
in the impossibility of bargaining over most individual rights that 
guarantee worker protection. That type of bargaining is not allowed 
even if the parties consider it useful to exchange a benefit guaranteed 
by law for another (more advantageous) benefit guaranteed by 
negotiation” (Pastore, 2005, p. 25).
2 Apart from the report that underlies this paper, the reader interested in the history              
and characteristics of Brazilian labour legislation should also consult the following 
bibliographic references, among others: Mascaro Nascimento (2004), Moraes Filho and 
Moraes (2003), and Süssekind et al (2002).
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In view of this reality, how can we measure the rigidity and degree 
of protection provided by Brazilian labour-market regulation compared 
to international standards? What economic factors are involved in this 
market rigidity? 
One way to assess this would be through the impact that excessive 
labour laws and regulations, interference by the justice system in 
employment negotiations and underdeveloped union activity have 
on labour costs, through their influence on labour productivity and 
non-wage costs.
Although labour productivity has grown considerably in 
Brazil, especially in the industrial sector and particularly after the 
trade liberalization that occurred in the early 1990s, it is still low by 
international standards, as shown in the studies outlined in Chahad 
(2008, Chapter 3). 
Apart from the low quality of the labour force, the factors that 
undermine productivity in Brazil include excessive regulation of all kinds 
governing the functioning of enterprises, excessive informality in labour 
relations, the tardiness and mode of action of Labour Courts, the causes 
of excessive labour turnover in the Brazilian labour market, including the 
Length of Service Guarantee Fund (FGTS) (a severance payment fund), 
and the rigidity imposed by labour laws that are intended to provide 
social protection for workers.
Another key component in determining the cost of labour are non-
wage costs. There is a major controversy in the Brazilian literature over what 
should be included in this cost category, and how to distinguish it from 
the wage. Anyway, excessive legislation covering individual and collective 
rights, consisting of 46 constitutional provisions of 922 articles in the Labour 
Law Consolidation (CLT), in addition to a vast complementary legislation, 
generates a high level of non-wage costs (Pastore, 2005; Chahad, 2008).
Wide-ranging and well-known international experience shows 
that the non-wage costs involved in hiring a worker in Brazil are clearly 
above those prevailing in other regions and countries of the world 
(Chahad 2008, p. 109). Consequently, the overall cost of labour in Brazil, 
ceteris paribus, tends to be high by international standards, because 
excessive legislation tends to produce adversely impact on productivity 
and considerably raise non-wage costs (known as encargos); and both of 
these put upward pressure on labour costs.3 
3 Although the discussion concerns the concept of the cost of “ hiring” a worker, it also                
represents the cost of “dismissing” a worker; both hiring and dismissing workers in 
the formal Brazilian labour market are relatively expensive. 
115Regulation, Worker Protection and Active Labour-Market Policies in Latin America
The Brazilian labour-market features high labour turnover rates, 
high levels of informality, many possibilities for atypical labour contracts, 
relatively high open unemployment and significant wage flexibility. No 
further information is needed to understand that the country has a labour 
market with high levels of mobility and flexibility, whether numerical, 
occupational, or in terms of wages. But is this the result of the labour 
legislation in force in the country? The answer is no, according to the 
international institutions and organizations that have analysed this issue 
(Djankov and others, 2004).
The flexibility existing in the Brazilian labour market does not stem 
from labour legislation or the existence of a wide-ranging system of 
collective bargaining. Brazilian labour laws provides rigid conditions for 
hiring workers and relatively inflexible conditions for laying them off. 
This can generate high costs and make employment conditions within 
firms very inflexible.
It is also important to ascertain the degree of social protection that 
labour legislation provides to Brazilian workers who are employed, i.e. 
what level of protection is received as a result of employment in a formal-
sector enterprise. Does Brazilian legislation protect the worker employed 
in a firm a lot or a little? The answer is: a lot.4
To summarize, Brazilian laws governing individual and collective 
labour relations are not responsible for the high level of flexibility 
prevailing in the Brazilian labour market, because they actually make 
hiring workers difficult. Secondly, they generate high non-wage costs 
at the time of hiring, and thus promote high labour costs overall, in a 
low-productivity setting that is also caused by excessive labour-market 
regulation. Lastly, the legislation gives considerable protection to 
workers, but only to those employed by a firm in the formal sector. 
B.   The system for protecting unemployed workers
This section considers the second element of the flexicurity model, 
namely the social protection system for the unemployed.5 
Brazil has two main tools for providing assistance in situations of 
involuntary unemployment: (i) the payment of unemployment insurance 
4 For information on recent international experience in terms of social protection           
evaluated through indicators, see Botero and others (2003).
5 The basic document underlying this chapter (see Chahad, 2008) also includes a wide-            
ranging review of the Brazilian Social Security System (Previdência Social). This system 
plays a major role in providing social protection for labour force, mainly by combating 
poverty and extreme poverty, defining the specific characteristics of Brazilian social 
security arrangements, bearing in mind the Golden Triangle of the Danish model. 
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(UI) benefits to the unemployed, which can be viewed as the only passive 
labour-market policy along the lines of internationally recognized 
models; and (ii) the Length of Service Guarantee Fund (FGTS), which 
makes a compulsory severance payment to a worker dismissed without 
just cause, following the models proposed by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). Both of these are entitlements for workers placed 
in situations of involuntary unemployment, although only covering 
workers employed in the formal labour market.
1.    The trend and size of unemployment insurance in Brazil 6
Despite forming part of Brazilian law since the Federal 
Constitution of 1946, this benefit was finally integrated into the 
social protection system for Brazilian workers by Decree Law 
2.284, of 10 March 1986, the main objective of which was to set up 
a price stabilization plan. The mechanism proposed included the 
requirements contained in existing international programmes, with 
the aim of providing temporary assistance to private-sector workers 
who became involuntarily unemployed.7
UI gained notoriety and effectively became incorporated into the 
system for protecting involuntarily unemployed workers under Law 
7.998/90. This consolidated previous item and regulated all constitutional 
purposes, except the provision on funding the programme from the 
contribution made by firms on the basis of their turnover rate (Article 
239 paragraph 4 of the Federal Constitution of 1988). The merits of this 
law included an autonomous fund to finance unemployment insurance, 
known as the Workers’ Protection Fund (Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador 
- FAT), of a financial-accounting type funded out of federal tax revenues. 
Subsequent legislation up to the present day has generally been based 
on Law 7.998/90, adapting and/or amending its content to address 
specific situations. 
Ordinary and complementary legislation on UI displays increasing 
liberalization in terms of access for unemployed people, firstly by 
relaxing the need to have contributed to the Social Security System 
(Previdência Social), and later by requiring less of an engagement in the 
formal labour market. Nonetheless, in a country short of resources, the 
“wealth” of the FAT has increasingly been coveted for other purposes, 
6 Readers seeking a detailed explanation of the main aspects of the emergence,            
development, and implementation history of insurance employment in Brazil should 
consult Azeredo (1998) and Chahad (1987, 2004, 2008), among others.
7 See the report prepared for the then Minister of Employment by Chahad and Macedo              
(1985), which was used by the Federal Government as a reference for introducing 
unemployment insurance in Brazil.
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when in fact it could have been channelled into active programmes to 
improve the workings of the labour market.
Table IV.1 shows how Brazilian unemployment insurance has 
developed. In the period 1996-2006, it paid benefits to an average of 
roughly 4.7 million unemployed people, with demand peaking in the 
latter year at around 5.8 million. Average expenditure per year between 
1996 and 2006 amounted to US$ 2.8 billion, reaching a level of US$ 4.77 
billion in 2006, equivalent to 0.44% of GDP. Each unemployed person 
received a benefit equivalent to 1.5 times the national minimum wage 
on average for that period. 
Table IV.1














1996 4 360 917 99.2 1.6 0.42
1997 4 400 738 99.4 1.6 0.40
1998 4 357 528 99.1 1.6 0.44
1999 4 315 593 97.7 1.6 0.40
2000 4 176 004 98.0 1.5 0.37
2001 4 686 756 98.2 1.5 0.40
2002 4 803 535 98.4 1.4 0.44
2003 4 971 712 98.4 1.4 0.43
2004 4 812 008 98.4 1.4 0.40
2005 5 362 968 98.0 1.4 0.41
2006 5 749 511 98.2 1.3 0.44
Average 1996-2006 4 727 025 98.4 1.5 0.41
     
Source:  Ministry of Work and Employment. Public Employment Policies Secretariat. Employment and 
Wage Department. General Coordination of Unemployment Insurance and Wage Support.
Although relatively recent, especially by industrialized-country 
standards, the size of the Brazilian unemployment insurance 
programme should not be underestimated. Table IV.2 shows that UI 
expenditure in relation to GDP in Brazil is greater than in developed 
countries with already consolidated markets and low levels of 
employment protection, such as the United Kingdom and the United 
States; similar to that in developed countries that offer greater 
employment protection such as Japan, or those with similar economic 
characteristics as Australia; and much less than in countries that have 
a strong welfare state, such as Denmark.
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Table IV.2
BRAZIL VS. REST OF THE WORLD: EXPENDITURE ON LABOUR-MARKET POLICIES                          
IN RELATION TO GDP 
Countries/regions ALMP a PLMP b Total
 [1] [2] [3]=[1]+[2]
Australia / 2005-2006 0.45 0.61 1.06
Denmark / 2005 1.74 2.51 4.25
United States / 2005-2006 0.13 0.24 0.37
Hungary / 2005 0.29 0.39 0.68
Japan / 2005-2006 0.25 0.43 0.68
OECD / 2002 0.69 1.10 1.79
Poland / 2005 0.43 0.86 1.29
United Kingdom / 2004-2005 0.49 0.19 0.68
Czech Republic / 2005 0.25 0.24 0.49
Brazil 0.44 (2005) 0.44 (2006) 0.88
Brazil 0.44 (2005) 1.72 (2006) 2.16
    
Source:   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Employment Outlook, 2007, 
Paris, 2007; and J.P.Z. Chahad, “Políticas ativas e passivas no mercado de trabalho: aspectos conceituais, 
a experiência internacional e avaliação do caso brasileiro”, document prepared for the ECLAC/UNDP/ILO 
project, São Paulo, June 2006.
a  ALMP: active labour-market policies.
b  PLMP: passive labour-market policies.
c  When expenditures are measured with employment compensation payments from FGTS.
2.    A summary of the distortions and shortcomings    
       of UI in Brazil
In terms of historical development since its implementation and 
up to the present day, unemployment insurance in Brazil has pursued 
three lines of action: (a) expansion of the service in terms of paying 
benefits; (b) diversification of the target public in line with the growth 
of surplus funds in the FAT, and mainly, the specific nature of the 
Brazilian labour market; and (c) coordination, albeit far less than desired, 
between payment of the UI benefit and active policies (labour-market 
intermediation, microcredit and vocational training).
Protection for unemployed people in Brazil provided through 
unemployment insurance has expanded rapidly, as have the problems, 
disadvantages and distortions involved in its operation, as numerous 
studies have pointed out. According to Mazza (1999), Cunningham 
(2000), Thomas (1999) and Chahad (1999), the main shortcomings 
and difficulties of Brazilian unemployment insurance include the 
following: (a) unemployment insurance and active labour-market 
policies are poorly integrated; (b) UI is increasingly accessed by 
young people and high-income workers; (c) demand for the benefit 
depends little on unemployment as such; (d) payment of the benefit 
has perverse effects owing to the existence of an extensive informal 
sector; and (e) there is an accumulation of benefit payments at the end 
of an employment relation.
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3.    Brief history of FGTS as a system for compensating   
       workers who are laid off 8
The FGTS was created by Law 5.107 of 13 September 1966, and 
in practice replaced the old regime then in force for compensating the 
employee for termination of contract.9 Until then, Article 478 of the CLT 
provided that a worker dismissed from a firm without just cause would 
receive compensation of one month’s pay for each year worked. If the 
worker stayed in the same firm for over 10 years, he or she would become 
permanent, and could only be dismissed for a serious fault or for reasons 
of force majeure (Article 492).
From the legal standpoint, the FGTS was definitively established as 
a worker’s right when it was included in the list of social entitlements 
in Title II (Fundamental Rights and Guarantees), Chapter II (Social 
rights), Article 7, paragraph III of the Federal Constitution of Brazil of 
1988. Nonetheless, not all Brazilian workers are covered by the FGTS 
legislation: beneficiaries include workers governed by the CLT, along 
with piecework and rural labourers, but exclude self-employed workers 
and casual workers, as well as public-sector workers and the military, 
who have their own labour legislation.
4.    The main FGTS statistics
Table IV.3 shows the trend of withdrawals from the FGTS between 1996 
and 2006, reflecting compensation payments made to workers dismissed 
without just cause. On average in this period, US$10 billion was spent each 
year in paying FGTS to laid-off workers, i.e. the equivalent of 1.39% of 
average Brazilian GDP in that period.
Taking the period 1996-2006 as a reference, more resources were 
allocated to protect unemployed workers under the FGTS than the amounts 
paid out in unemployment insurance. In fact, FGTS payments represented 
1.39% of GDP, while the UI/GDP ratio was much lower at 0.41%. As a 
whole, Brazil spent an average of roughly 1.80% of its GDP each year to 
pay compensations and benefits, with a view to guaranteeing protection 
for formal-sector workers who became involuntarily unemployed.
8 Further details on the history, functioning and other aspects of the FGTS can be found               
in Ferrante (1978), Chahad and Macedo (1985) and Carvalho and Pinheiro (2000). This 
section will only provide an outline of the FGTS as a compulsory severance payment 
system to protect workers who become unemployed without just cause.
9 In fact, at the outset, the FGTS was not a replacement as such but an alternative. Over 
time, however, firms began to hire workers only under the FGTS regime, and did 
not permit additional employees in the employment stability regime. Under the new 
Federal Constitution of 1988, the stability regime ceased to exist, and the FGTS was 




BRAZIL: FGTS - WORKERS’ WITHDRAWALS; 1996-2006 
(Thousands of dollars)
Year FGTS: Worker withdrawals FGTS payments as % of GDP Unemployment rate a
 (Thousands of dollars)     
1996 10 921 495 1.32 6.95
1997 12 425 777 1.45 7.82
1998 14 569 102 1.76 9.00
1999 9 783 313 1.65 9.63
2000 9 087 952 1.46
2001 8 039 548 1.44 9.35
2002 6 084 889 1.33 9.16
2003 6 828 670 1.20 9.73
2004 7 917 900 1.14 8.90
2005 10 869 320 1.21 9.31
2006 13 763 806 1.28 8.40
Average 1996-2006 10 026 525 1.39 8.83
    
Source:   Coordination-General of Employment Inspection / Federal Employment Inspection System 
(SFIT) / MTE Caixa Econômica Federal. Central Bank of Brazil.
a PNAD.
Prepared by the author on the basis of the listed sources.
5.    Access for unemployed workers to the health sector   
       and Previdência Social
Both the Single Health System (SUS) and the National Workers’ 
Health Policy in Brazil, as well as the Previdência social security system, 
have guidelines for dealing with access to worker health services for 
unemployed workers.
The SUS is premised on the basis that health is a citizen’s right 
and a State duty; and it establishes universal and comprehensive 
coverage, benefiting all citizens and residents in Brazilian territory. 
Thus any Brazilian citizen is entitled to health care through the SUS, 
irrespective of work or employment status, and including unemployed 
workers of any type.
For its purposes, the National Workers’ Health Policy defines 
workers as all individuals engaging in activities to earn their own 
livelihood and/or that of their dependants, irrespective of their mode 
of participation in the labour market, in the formal or informal sector of 
the economy, together with those who are temporarily or permanently 
outside the labour market owing to illness, retirement or unemployment. 
Thus, the policy further strengthens access for unemployed workers to 
the Brazilian health system.
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Previdência Social also offers opportunities for re-education or 
vocational retraining to its insured affiliates who are work-disabled (as 
a result of illness or accident), to enable them to return to the labour 
market. Other benefits include sickness subsidy (paid to the insured 
worker who is unable to work as a result of illness or accident for over 
15 consecutive days), provided he or she has contributed to Previdência 
Social for at least 12 months. 
An unemployed worker can receive benefits, such as sickness 
subsidy, from Previdência Social, provided he or she has contributed to 
the system for at least 12 months and submits certain documents such as 
the work identification number - NIT (PIS/PASEP), a medical certificate, 
laboratory exams, hospitalization certificate, outpatient treatment 
certificates, among others proving medical treatment; identification 
document (ID card and/or employment and social security card); and 
the natural person register (cadastro de pessoa física). 
C.   Active labour-market policies in Brazil:   
      history, scale and balance  
The third element of the Golden Triangle model of flexicurity is the 
existence of a wide range of active labour-market policies to help 
unemployed workers return to the labour market, thus complementing 
the solidity of social security. This section describes current Brazilian 
experience with active policies and their importance for a national model 
of flexibility with security.
1.    History of active labour-market policies in Brazil
Active labour-market policies (ALMPs) are relatively recent in 
Brazil, having emerged mostly in the early 1990s. Table IV.4 summarizes 
the main federal job creation, work and income programmes which 
constitute active policies currently institutionalized in the country.
There are various reasons for the late appearance of active labour-
market policies in Brazil. Part of the delay can be explained by the belief that 
prevailed until the mid-1980s that the country had innate characteristics of 
permanent economic growth, such that any unemployment would only be 
frictional. As a result, all labour-market issues were relegated to secondary 
status, and many people considered the social issue and labour-market 
problems as a “matter for the police”. The delay can also partly be explained 
by the historical composition of political forces that have formed Brazil’s 
governments over the years, where the pursuit of harmony in labour and 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































123Regulation, Worker Protection and Active Labour-Market Policies in Latin America
in discrimination against workers. Lastly, the government authorities have 
also shown a lack of interest in maintaining the continuity of technical 
teams working on this issue in public agencies, thereby frequently 
allowing institutional memory to be lost.
The most important active policies in Brazil, as noted in table 
IV.1, are:
• The National Employment System (SINE): Instituted by Decree 
70.403/1975, coordinated and supervised by the current Ministry 
of Work and Employment (MTE), the creation of which was 
inspired by ILO Convention 88. SINE actions are implemented 
in a decentralized way by the country’s Federative Units and 
basically aim to enable workers and the unemployed to engage 
with the labour market. For that purpose, SINE provides a labour-
market intermediation service, supporting the unemployed, 
generating labour-market information and advisory services 
on vocational training and labour-force qualification and skill 
development. It also participates to some extent in the supply 
of microcredit.
• Vocational training: Recently, Brazil has experienced two 
milestones in relation to workforce vocational training. The 
first was in 1996, when the National Vocational Training Plan 
(PLANFOR) was implemented during the first administration 
of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. This ambitious 
plan aimed to train 5.0% of the workforce each year. From the 
labour-market standpoint, the plan had the following objectives: 
(i) improve the chances of finding work and generating or 
increasing income, by reducing levels of unemployment and 
underemployment. (ii) increase the chances of remaining in 
the labour market, by reducing risks of dismissal and turnover 
rates; and (iii) raise the productivity and competitiveness of 
firms and improve workers’ incomes.
The second milestone in terms of vocational training policies was 
in 2003, at the start of President Lula’s first term, when PLANFOR was 
replaced by the National Skill Development Plan (PNQ). This was instituted 
by Resolution 333/203 of the Deliberative Council of the Worker Protection 
Fund (CODEFAT), and involved closer monitoring and control of its actions, 
establishment of minimum working hours, prioritization of long-term 
courses, greater importance for occupational certification, development 
of labour-skill development methodologies, and mainly, a greater effort 
to integrate with other active and passive policies. From its inception, the 
concept of the PNQ moved along different paths than its predecessor, seeking 
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to fill gaps in areas such as social inclusion, educational shortcomings, the 
right to citizenship, community participation, and others that extend beyond 
vocational training. 
• Employment and Income Generation Programme (PROGER): 
This policy was implemented through CODEFAT Resolution 59 
of 25/3/94, with the aim of offering credit to the unemployed 
and workers intending to set up small enterprises, together 
with labour force vocational training and skill development 
programmes. Following its creation, there was a vigorous 
expansion of active policies to generate employment and income, 
all of which increasingly absorbed the resources of the Worker 
Protection Fund (FAT). This represented a major step forward 
in implementing ALMPs in Brazil, at least from a quantitative 
standpoint. Programmes and credit lines were rapidly created to 
finance projects in urban areas (Proger Urbano), for agricultural 
and rural regions (Proger Rural) and to provide financial support 
to small-scale farming and family businesses (Pronaf), among other 
programmes. The growth of FAT expenditure was not limited to 
supporting small-scale producers; it was also used for larger-scale 
enterprises with high potential for creating jobs and improving 
the quality of life of workers (Proemprego); and an ofshoot of this 
programme, but only implemented in northeastern Brazil and to 
the north of the state of Minas Gerais, poor regions with a large 
contingent of unemployed and informal workers (Protrabalho).
The expansion of Proger and other FAT programmes also involved 
the microcredit area, releasing resources for the National Development 
Bank (BNDES) to lend as part of the Popular Productive Credit 
Programme (PCPP). This credit line aimed to set up a network of private 
institutions to finance small businesses. Within the microcredit line, in 
2004 MTE itself instituted the National Targeted Productive Microcredit 
Programme (PNMPO), to provide incentives for job creation and income 
generation among low-income micro-entrepreneurs.
2.    The trend of ALMP expenditure in Brazil
Despite criticisms of active policies in Brazil, table IV.5 shows 
that expenditure has grown in relation to the country’s GDP. ALMP 
expenditure represented 0.06% of GDP in 1995 and had risen to 1.08% by 
2006. During this period, there seem to have been three distinct periods: 
very rapid growth until 1997, fluctuation between 1998 and 2003, and 
strong growth again until 2006. 
This increase is illusory, however, both in terms of the balance 
of expenditure, and, particularly, in terms of policy coordination. 
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Expenditure on labour-market intermediation has decreased even in 
absolute terms since 1995, while the growth of expenditure on vocational 
training or skill development was compromised by being inefficiently 
used, displaying a drastic reduction that shows no sign of recovery, either 
qualitatively or quantitatively, on the scale needed to meet the country’s 
productive requirements. 
In fact, what has happened is that the entire expansion of ALMPs 
in Brazil involves the granting of loans under the widest variety of 
modalities within Proger, with the aim of generating employment, income 
and work. In 2002, intermediation and vocational training programmes 
still accounted for 10.0% of all ALMPs, but in 2006 these had practically 
disappeared, representing no more than 1.1% of total expenditure. At the 
present time, the actions of active policies in Brazil, in expenditure terms, 
are confined to large numbers of special loans in the form of credits and 
microcredits aimed at generating employment and income.
3.    A balance sheet of ALMPs in Brazil
The policy of labour-market intermediation through SINE suffers 
from excessive State intervention at all stages of service provision. 
While it guarantees some equality of access, it also seems to be a source 
of typical public-sector inefficiency. In terms of the chain that exists 
in the process of redeploying an unemployed worker (identifying a 
vacancy, registration of the unemployed worker, matching the vacancy 
to the worker, and sending the selected person to firms) the main 
difficulty stems institutional inefficiency at the stage of directing the 
worker to firms. 
By nature, an identified vacancy is a highly perishable good (Barros 
and Carvalho, 2002, p. 70), and, once detected, the chosen worker must 
be sent immediately to occupy it. If the vacancy is identified after the 
unemployed worker has been registered, he or she must be called urgently. 
It is also essential for the unemployed worker to periodically return to the 
intermediation agency, given the perishable nature of any vacancy that 
matches his or her profile. These procedures are among the most costly 
in the labour intermediation process, and SINE has lacked resources 
ever since its inception. Moreover, bearing in mind the precarious nature 
of its premises and lack of quality human resources, the redeployment 
chain was never well implemented in terms of providing guidance to the 
unemployed worker.
Many criticisms have been made of vocational training and the old 
Planfor programme, but the most serious of these concerns selection 
criteria for courses and choice of clientele to be served. The plan’s 
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as identified by employment commissions. Later, the courses chosen 
were handed over to a group of executing agencies which structured the 
supply; but the search for trainees failed because of inadequate publicity. 
To justify the supply of courses, the executing agencies filled available 
vacancies with their own demand, introducing a bias regarding the 
preferences of the target public.
The new PNQ programme appears to have been built on excessively 
broad foundations. It also seems more ambitious than its predecessor, 
because it goes far beyond providing vocational training to adapt the 
profile of the labour force to needs in the productive sector, either based 
on mismatches arising from structural unemployment, or as a result of 
the need for skilled labour arising from economic growth. More precisely, 
there is a notion that seems to be gaining ground in other social, cultural 
and mainly educational domains, which requires the formulators of 
these policies to have great understanding and make great efforts to 
avoid overlapping tasks, accumulation of functions, dual command and 
other inefficiencies that its predecessor, Planfor, despite shortcomings 
and recognized failings, did not commit.
The main specific limitation of the microcredit policy is well known, 
namely difficulties in identifying a supply of credit at reasonable interest 
rates and providing access to the poorest sectors in a developing economy, 
where credit is scarce and interest rates are high. As lending to such 
individuals is essential for them to be able to undertake their activity, the 
key issue is to clearly identify those that are really in a position to move 
out of poverty through this instrument.
On this basis, the framing and implementation of employment and 
income programmes are highly constrained by high interest rates, which 
causes a number of problems. The first is that the population actually does 
have limited access to credit institutions, which in part is due to the lack 
of a branch network of institutions that provide credit to micro- and small-
scale entrepreneurs. The existence of entry barriers to private sector banks 
in the credit distribution network has greatly restricted the development of 
branches in the system and, hence, access for the agents that need them.
The second negative aspect is that it is impossible to implement a 
microcredit policy with market interest rates, because potential borrowers 
do not have enterprises with the capacity to pay excessively high interest 
costs. Only subsidized interest rates allow greater access to the credit 
available for micro- and small-scale entrepreneurs.
The third issue relates to the type of credit line that should be 
prioritized, i.e. to what point the opening of credit lines for working 
capital and consumption can or cannot contribute to the goals of creating 
employment and income and promoting greater social inclusion. 
ECLAC128
Traditional investment financing tends to have a greater and more lasting 
impact on employment; but, in a recessionary climate, the demand for 
investment tends to fall, and a lack of working capital can compromise 
the enterprise’s existence and thus the maintenance of jobs. 
The fourth factor that undermines Brazilian income and employment 
creation policies involving credit to the poorest sectors are beneficiary 
selection criteria. As this policy has been implemented by official bank 
institutions, which end up assuming the risk of the undertaking, they 
demand collateral based on the parameters used in the traditional credit 
market. But this has been shown to be incompatible with the profile of 
the workers that form their real clientele. In this regard, an expansion of 
these programmes to private banks will not necessarily have advantages, 
because the choice of clientele could be even more rigorous.
 The main problem of ALMPs in Brazil, however, does not concern 
resources as such or limitations on their use, but highly inappropriate 
policies. There is also a problem that has been widely recognized since 
the implementation of the SINE in 1975 and adoption of unemployment 
insurance in 1986 and Proger in 1994: ALMPs are not coordinated either 
amongst each other or with passive policies. In other words, although the 
country has adopted ILO Convention 88 on Employment Services, it has 
never turned this into an “Interest of State” (razão de Estado) thus forcing 
the Brazilian federal authorities to take steps to implement it definitively.
D.   The attitude of the main Brazilian social actors  
       towards the need for reforms in labour relations   
       and social security
To move towards a sound model of flexibility with security, with its own 
characteristics, Brazil needs wide ranging institutional reforms. This 
section summarizes attitudes among the leading social actors towards 
the need for such reforms, and the possibilities for changes in key 
elements of the “Golden Triangle” comprising the Brazilian model, to 
make institutions more efficient, improve workers’ well-being and direct 
these institutions towards future adoption of the flexicurity model. 
1.    The attitude of workers towards labour and union reforms
The position adopted by Brazilian labour unions, particularly after 
entering the Federal Government in 2002, has been to oppose changes 
in labour legislation that seek to expand collective rights relatively to 
individual ones, even where this is done through collective bargaining. 
They have also prioritized union reform ahead of the reform of labour 
relations, and believe that many of the problems currently existing in 
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the Brazilian labour market can be overcome by strengthening the State 
inspection apparatus.
In brief, workers’ attitudes towards the labour reforms recently 
proposed have been as follows: 
(a) Unionized workers have upheld the philosophy that the 
principle of “flexibilization” contained in the reforms would be a 
major defeat for the labour rights earned as a result of bitter struggles 
over the years. It would also undermine the very extensive protective 
system provided by the CLT. Moreover, in a country with weak 
unions, where only a few of the better organized economic sectors 
could respond to the economic pressure exerted by employers, it 
would be foolhardy to abandon workers to union entities lacking the 
minimal conditions needed to satisfactorily defend their interests. 
(b) They argue that proposals for “flexibilization” would run 
counter to various ILO Conventions ratified by Brazil, since collective 
labour agreements and contracts would have higher rank than those 
conventions. According to union leaders, if the labour “flexiblization” 
process becomes law, there would be a sharp reduction in the level of 
social protection as envisaged in the conventions ratified by Brazil.
(c) Labour reform should be implemented to strengthen the 
Government’s supervisory role, because the union movement believes 
that action by the Government inspection authorities (i.e. State control) 
is essential to prevent jobs being made more precarious by way of 
service provision contracts that have employment characteristics.
(d) Any reform should aim to expand the labour rights contained 
in the Federal Constitution, which are viewed as a minimum platform 
for negotiation by Brazilian workers.
While workers have been passive towards the need for labour 
reform, while firmly rejecting any attempt to “flexibilize” or deregulate 
labour relations, which they see as a suppression of workers rights, they 
are moving towards a relatively more active approach towards discussion 
of the need for union reform. In fact they consider it essential to complete 
reforms to strengthen unions first, and then undertake a reform of labour 
legislation so as to extend rather than reduce established rights.
The key aim pursued by workers in any reform of union legislation 
has recently been regulated by the National Congress, i.e. legalization of 
union federations which previously were not part of the organizational 
structure of unionism in Brazil.10 The promotion of such legalization 
10 Brazil’s large union federations were legally recognized when Law 11.648, passed on            
31 March 2008, entered into force.
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not only aimed at legitimization but also involved institutionalizing 
a trend of the Brazilian union movement, namely centralization. On 
the issue of union organization, workers seek a “soft amendment” of 
the current model: attempting to preserve the “old union monopoly” 
arising from the single-union structure applying to unions existing 
before the reform, while permitting the existence of another union 
in the same area, provided a representative group of workers in that 
economic category wants this. In both cases, the statutes need to be 
democratic and the emergence of a new union must be decided upon 
by a representative assembly.
Several other claims defended by workers are decisive for their 
participation in the discussion and future approval of any actual union 
reform. These include: (a) the right to collective bargaining for private-
sector workers; (b) the right to collective bargaining and regulation of the 
right to strike in the public sector; (c) union membership for outsourced 
workers; (d) the right for workers to organize in the workplace, not only 
in large firms, but in all enterprises, and established by law; (e) measures  
against anti-union practices during strikes; (f) ultratividade or continued 
validity of national employment contracts; (g) job stability for union 
leaders; (h) procedural substitution, in which all workers of a given 
economic category can be represented, whether or not affiliated to the 
union, even if they have not been convened for this; and (i) ratification 
of ILO Convention 158.
Union reform for Brazilian workers also includes the defence of 
labour rights enshrined in Article 7 of the 1988 Federal Constitution, 
which they deem to be immutable clauses (cláusulas pétreas) and thus 
non-negotiable. In other words, they agree to the possibility of changing 
the union model as a precondition for labour reform, but this should 
be based on a minimum set of social and labour rights that cannot be 
negotiated, and others which can be augmented.
2.    The attitude of employers towards labour            
       and union reforms
The Brazilian employer sector has a much more active approach 
to the need for reform of all labour and union legislation, which they 
blame for the high cost of labour and see as a source of the country’s 
social, economic and even cultural backwardness. In the strategic map 
of the productive sector, they consider adaptation of labour and union 
legislation to the requirements of international competitiveness as 
fundamental in a globalized world that demands rapid responses; and 
this is also seen as decisive in laying the foundations for sustainable 
development. In this context, worker protection should be based on a 
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minimum set of legally guaranteed rights and the social responsibility of 
actors at the time of negotiation (Godoy, 2005).
Why are Brazilian employers pressing so strongly for wide-ranging 
labour and union reform? The main arguments include the following:
(a) Excessive and overly detailed legal interference: The legal 
framework governing the employment domain is extremely wide 
ranging and growing on a daily basis. It currently consists of 46 
constitutional provisions, 922 articles of the CLT, plus a 100 ordinary 
and complementary laws, 153 regulations issued by the Ministry of 
Work and Employment, and 68 ILO Conventions ratified by Brazil. 
In the judiciary sector, the Brazilian Supreme Labour Tribunal has 
handed down 363 rulings, 375 directives on jurisprudence, and 119 
regulatory precedents regarding employment relations in the Brazilian 
labour market. This legalistic excess forms part of Brazilian culture and 
reflects a belief that only the law can protect the worker. Little value is 
placed on the contract between the parties, and a lot on the law. 
(b) There is a mismatch between labour legislation and the changes 
unfolding in the world of work: As a general rule, labour laws are 
passed to protect industrial workers in a regime of subordination, 
which is still predominant but undergoing major change. While the 
labour market has diversified and is throwing up new situations, 
Brazil’s labour legislation has remained totally static, covering only 
the traditional typical relation of subordination in which the protection 
system is tied to the employment relation rather than to the worker 
(Pastore, 2005, p. 105). 
(c) The legislation does not protect new types of labour relations: 
Brazilian laws are doubly perverse, because they only protect 
workers in the formal labour market with a well-defined employment 
relationship (insiders), but not those who do not have a traditional 
relationship of subordination, are outside formal labour relations, or 
even unemployed (outsiders). 
(d) There is a lot of legislation and little possibility for negotiation: 
The Brazilian Federal Constitution and the CLT allow for negotiation 
only on two workers rights: the wage and the share of profits and 
earnings. Working hours can only be negotiated through a series of 
legally established restrictions. All other employment provisions 
contained in a contract are fixed in laws and are thus non-negotiable. 
(e) Much of the legislation causes high labour hiring costs: 
The excessive number of labour laws, combined with rigidity in 
negotiation, gives rise to a high and rigid non-wage labour cost 
(Fecomércio, 2006, p. 10).
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Unlike workers, employers are against separating the discussion 
of changes in labour laws and the structure of union organization. 
They claim that discussing the two issues separately is very inefficient 
efficiency and a waste of effort. Giving precedence to union reform is at 
best illusory, or possibly even a strategy used by those who do not want 
change, because there is almost nothing to negotiate except the wage and 
sharing in profits and earnings, as noted above. Moreover, unions are not 
strengthened through reforms alone, but by making them negotiate even 
in conditions of change.
Employers believe that changes in labour laws should aim to reduce 
non-wage labour costs, allow for flexible management of the labour force 
at the firm level, and prevent labour legislation becoming a hindrance to 
enterprise competitiveness. 
The employer sector also wants certain of the labour rights 
included in Chapter 7 of the 1988 Federal Constitution to be relegated 
to lower-ranking legislation, so that they can be negotiated with a view 
to customizing labour costs to each specific situation and moment in 
time. As the Federal Constitution contains a minimum level of labour 
rights that protect individuals, employers have argued for changes in 
the labour and union area to give “precedence to what is negotiated over 
what is legislated”. This reflects a belief that, having established the rules 
of negotiation, the parties best know what their common interests are, 
and there is no need for government interference.
On the issue of union reform, employers prefer minimum legislation 
and maximum negotiation. They propose new legislation to strengthen 
unions through representativeness, to make collective bargaining more 
effective. Along the same lines, they want to see the end of exclusive 
unions, abolishing the monopoly of union representation, and replacing 
it with a model that offers plurality, but without this degenerating into 
total union fragmentation. 
In relation to funding, employers support a gradual elimination of 
compulsory union dues; and, with regard to dispute settlement, they do 
not accept that Labour Courts should continue to exercise regulatory 
power by handing down sentences in their rulings, to resolve conflicts of 
interest between mitigating parties.
3.    The Federal Government and labour and union reforms
During his electoral campaign, President Lula, who has a long 
personal history as a unionist, promised to reform labour legislation. As 
President-elect, he indicated that this would be accomplished by setting 
up the National Labour Forum (FNT), with aims including modernization 
of the institutions that regulate the labour market, particularly the 
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Labour Courts, and the Ministry of Work and Employment (MTE). The 
FNT also permanently works to promote tripartism and constructive 
dialogue between social actors, to ensure social justice in labour dispute 
settlement and union guarantees.
Its main specific mission was to undertake labour and union reform, 
but only the latter has become a proposal sent to the National Congress. It 
should be noted that the government’s arguments for postponing labour 
reform and prioritizing union reform fully coincide with those indicated 
by workers, particularly the need firstly to strengthen the role of unions, 
and only then consider the reform of labour laws (MTE, 2005b). 
Even so, although the government and workers have a great affinity 
with each other, since they are all unionists, and even with a union reform 
that emerged from a long process of discussion which also involved 
employers, there was no effort to follow through with the union reform 
after it had been sent to the legislature. The Federal Government seems 
to have limited interest in promoting a full-scale union reform and, in the 
case of changes in employment relations, it is in no way promoting a wide 
ranging labour reform. It has opted for a strategy that includes topical 
issues, based on the so-called “Provisional Measures”,11 an expedient 
that was widely condemned by unionists themselves before they came to 
power. Furthermore, along with workers, the Federal Government seems 
to have a passive attitude to changes in the labour domain, preferring to 
deny reality rather than confront it.
4.    Social actors and efforts to implement a public    
       employment service in Brazil 12
Active labour-market policies in Brazil have always had the Federal 
Government has their main social advocate. Employment policies in 
Brazil have developed in a dispersed way, using Law 4.923/65 as an 
initial frame of reference. This called for the creation of an Assistance 
Fund for Unemployed Workers (FAD), mentioned the need for labour 
intermediation, and mooted the future creation of unemployment 
insurance. Following implementation of the SINE, these policies gained 
11 The Provisional Measure (MP) is a legal instrument used to streamline Federal            
Government decision taking on issues of immediate national interest. 
12 Suggestions for implementing a public employment service in Brazil, sometimes          
identified as a public employment system, were frequently made throughout the 1990s, 
and were very clear about the need for such integration to improve the performance 
of the Brazilian labour market. See, in particular, Azeredo (1998) and Chahad (1999). 
Moreover, as part of the work of the former Ministry of Labour and Administration 
in 1992, an embryonic proposal for a public employment service was formulated, in 
which the present author participated; but this failed to prosper because of the serious 
political crisis that hit the Federal government. See MTA (1992).
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their own space in the Brazilian labour-market scenario, but the range 
of alternatives finally opened up with regulation of the unemployment 
insurance programme and establishment of the FAT as its funding 
source in 1990.
Along the same lines, Law 8.900/94 amended Law 7.998/90 (which 
had structured the unemployment insurance programme and created 
the FAT) in relation to paragraph II of Article 2, specifying that:
 “The unemployment insurance programme aims to assist workers 
in job search, through comprehensive actions of guidance, relocation and 
vocational retraining.”
This effort to integrate and articulate active and passive labour-
market policies has gained renewed strength in President Lula’s 
administration, under the direction of the MTE. Thus, following two 
National Congresses on the Public Employment, Work and Income 
System, with participation from wide ranging segments of civil 
society, particularly workers, employers and members of the Federal 
Government, a number of resolutions were prepared, with a view to 
guiding the MTE itself and CODEFAT in constructing the so-called 
Public Employment, Work and Income System (SPETR). 
Following wide-ranging debates directed by the MTE, in which 
consensus was reached among stakeholders, it was decided to adopt 
this SPETR, which is based on a wide range of general principles 
(see MTE, 2005a).
Unlike what happened in the areas of labour, union and social 
security reform, there is greater consensus among stakeholders on 
active policies, although the task of consolidating a genuine public 
employment service is still at a very embryonic stage. This is because, 
as occurred with previous governments, the decision to implement the 
public employment service was taken and the model was well designed, 
but official actions to implement have not been forthcoming.
E.   The scope and limitations of the flexicurity model,  
      in terms of strengthening the labour market and   
      expanding protection for workers in Brazil
This final section assesses the chances of adopting a flexicurity model, 
bearing in mind the improvement of the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the Brazilian labour market, expansion of social protection for workers 
and better quality of life for the population, in a world of employment 
characterized by greater numerical, functional and wage flexibility.
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1.    The need for reforms towards flexicurity aimed at      
       social inclusion
        (a)     Reforms in the labour and union areas
Brazil’s labour market contains a major paradox: high levels of 
flexibility, despite very rigid labour legislation, in all senses. The labour 
market itself is flexible, but the employment contract is rigid. This 
generates high non-wage costs, which, combined with low productivity, 
generate high labour costs. It is thus a pernicious flexibility, because it 
arises to evade the laws, which end up giving considerable protection to 
a worker who is employed, but provides no guarantee of remaining in 
employment, and hinders the hiring of new workers. 
This excess individual protection needs to be changed, by legally 
guaranteeing a minimum set of basic rights consistent with the ILO, and 
leaving other items of relevance for workers’ well-being to collective 
bargaining. One objective of this change is clear, however: to reduce hiring 
costs, particularly for small businesses, by encouraging the productive 
sector to hire workers who enjoy a minimum standard of social protection. 
Another aim is to strengthen collective bargaining as a way to guarantee 
rights, with social dialogue as the way to settle disputes.
Fundamental basic rights would not be guaranteed for formal 
workers only, but also for the others in the informal sector, thus forming a 
universal social protection system. Achieving this requires reforming the 
system of access to Previdência Social for own- account and self-employed 
workers and extending basic social security benefits to them. Workers 
in the formal sector already have their social protection in traditional 
schemes of unemployment insurance and compensation for dismissal 
without just cause (FGTS); but in the Brazilian case, these benefits need 
to be consolidated to avoid the distortions they cause in the functioning 
of the labour market (Chahad, 2008).
 Another immediate reform involves the structure and functioning 
of Brazilian union organizations. The corporate model based on union 
monopoly and public funding, implemented in 1930, has now been more 
than superseded; and it is clearly contrary to the type of modern unionism 
needed in a globalized, competitive and rapidly changing world. The 
reform broadly aims to increase competitiveness between unions, making 
them fight for their funding capacity if they want to remain outside the 
State apparatus, thereby guaranteeing their autonomy, liberty and other 
aspects of governance. 
How representative is this in terms of social protection? Workers 
in the formal market are automatically protected by labour and social 
security legislation, either in the standard indefinite contract, or in 
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atypical contracts; but as they are formal they will hold a signed 
employment record booklet (carteira de trabalho). 
        (b)    The changes needed in active policies 
Pursuit of the flexicurity model leads us to the element of the Golden 
Triangle that concerns the system of active compensatory policies in a 
flexible labour market. Brazil already uses these, but they suffer from 
a number of deficiencies. The amount of resources available is still 
relatively small for the size of the Brazilian workforce, the role of policies 
is very small, basically confined to three (job intermediation, vocational 
training and employment and income generation programmes); and, 
worst of all, these policies are poorly integrated amongst each other 
and are not articulated with employment insurance.
The main consequence of this framework is that active labour-
market policies in Brazil are inefficient, ineffective, and do not promote 
equity as they should. Moreover, they fail to promote the “activation” 
needed in each case, thereby aggravating the negative behaviour of 
certain aspects of the labour market.
In the case of job intermediation, the reform starts by substantially 
increasing expenditure with a view to striking a better balance between 
labour supply and demand and serving informal workers, including 
investment in human resources and information technology; and 
it ends with major investments to increase the network of service 
branches. Greater competition is needed between SINE and private 
agencies; and the system for supervising the latter and promoting 
permanent evaluation of SINE needs improvement, comparing ex 
ante targets with results obtained ex post. The efficiency of the system 
depends on continuous monitoring, which does not happen today.
The key challenge for active policies is in the area of vocational 
training. The country has a very low average schooling level by 
international standards (roughly 5 years’ study), and the illiteracy 
rate is very high (11.0% in 2005). In conjunction with other educational 
shortcomings, this results in a low-skill labour force. A substantial part 
of this problem will need to be resolved through medium- and long-
term policies implemented by the Education Ministry, as part of a 
wide ranging education programme to bring the Brazilian population 
up to the educational standards of more advanced nations. 
Nonetheless, part of the improvement of labour skills involves 
the system of vocational training and human resource formation, and 
in the Brazilian case the challenge here is greater, because the numbers 
are dramatic; and basic education activities for the labour force, in the 
framework mentioned above, have been below expectations, not to 
say non-existent, in terms of quantity or quality.
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Reform of the vocational training system should aim to 
considerably increase expenditure on the system with a view to 
improving job potential, for unemployed workers first and foremost, 
but also for those who are employed but need retraining or want avoid 
obsolescence. In any of these cases, it is essential for the productive 
sector to show interest in vocational training because it is the sector 
that provides employment after the training has taken place. 
Here it is worth noting that the success of vocational training 
partly depends on its coordination with other active or passive 
policies. In particular, integration between training and labour 
intermediation clearly improves the chances of success in redeploying 
an unemployed worker; and coordination between training and the UI 
programme tends to have the same effect, both helping to reduce the 
open unemployment rate.
The other active policy that needs to be reformulated is the 
employment- and income-generation programme. Unlike other active 
policies, a review of this policy would suggest to a more judicious 
allocation of resources, compared to the situation prevailing today. As 
shown in table IV.5, nearly all resources destined for expenditure on 
active policies (99.3%) are channelled into employment- and income-
generation programmes. 
Over time, these resources, which have been lent in the form of 
microcredit, come to reflect political demands, with no commitment 
toward generating employment and income and no concern for 
evaluating loan results. This framework needs to be changed to put a 
lending policy in place that benefits the most needy workers, whether 
engaged in informal activities or atypical modes of production, so that 
the results of their enterprise, within specific evaluation standards for 
this type of loan, can be evaluated in terms of resource-use efficiency.
2.    Obstacles, difficulties and bottlenecks for reforms   
       to strengthen the labour market and expand              
       social protection
Apart from the intrinsic difficulties of formulating and 
implementing the reforms themselves, there are other shortcomings that 
obstruct the search for a labour-market and social protection model in 
the framework of Danish flexicurity, but with Brazilian characteristics. 
These are all hard to overcome, either because they mean changing 
habits, customs and cultural inheritance, or else because they require a 
long time to change, in the case of a model that requires all its elements 
to be fully balanced to function properly.
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        (a)     Lack of official leadership and little political will to   
                 impose a model leading to change
Implementation of a flexicurity model with Brazilian characteristics, 
in which greater labour-market flexibility would have a counterpart 
in a more solid social protection system, needs official government 
support to turn it into an “Interest of State” (razão de Estado) thus 
making it a fundamental national priority, which would therefore 
have to be addressed. Experience shows, however, that this would be 
very hard to achieve in the current Brazilian reality. This reflects a lack 
of initiative not only on the part of the current Federal Government, 
but of Brazilian Governments generally, in which the predominance 
of economic issues has always been, and remains a major obstacle to 
development in other areas. 
        (b)    The interests of social actors in relation to the changes  
                are highly antagonistic
We have seen that the attitudes of workers and employers, the two 
main groups likely to suffer from the reforms needed for a new model, 
are highly antagonistic. This is particularly true in relation to labour and 
union reforms, whereas there is a certain convergence, but not consensus, 
on the changes needed in the area of active labour-market policies. There 
is also wide disagreement over the changes demanded in the social 
protection system for the unemployed.
Strong antagonism is natural; what is not normal, is that there is 
wide divergence, little detachment (desprendimento), a sterile dialogue 
and an apparent wish to leave the status quo unturned, to see whether a 
higher body will resolve the conflict. The outcome is that changes, when 
they do occur, are piecemeal; an obsolete model remains in place; and 
problems accumulate to be solved by a new model.
        (c)     Incipient development of social dialogue and only recent  
                 emergence of suitable negotiation forums
Despite gaining strength over time, social dialogue, of the form 
practised in more developed countries, has little tradition as a dispute 
settlement mechanism in the Brazilian political-labour-social scenario. 
This clearly imposes a major obstacle to the success of reforms aimed 
at implementing a labour-market model in which social protection is 
based on flexibility with security. 
Social dialogue is still taking its first steps in Brazil, compared 
to the experience of other countries. Although already in practice, 
the culture of interlocutors still does not seem to include the idea 
of detachment or compromise, which significantly prolongs the 
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negotiations and makes them unsuccessful. Apart from that, the 
new forums that have arisen suffer from being new, and are not fully 
structured or consolidated, although they represent a new stimulus 
for social dialogue in Brazil.
        (d)     The new model will have to respect the current role   
                  played by elements of the Golden Triangle in the            
                  Brazilian case
Labour, union and active policy reforms, apart from other 
complementary measures, aimed at setting up a Brazilian flexicurity 
model, need a dual characteristic: attaining the goal of flexibility 
with security (social protection) and maintaining (or transferring) 
the function currently played by its institutional framework to solve 
problems in the labour-market or social protection system.
        (e)     Public spiritedness as an obstacle
One of the reasons for the success of the Danish model seems 
to stem from a high level of “public spiritedness” in relation to the 
moral issues generated by the generosity of the welfare state, or more 
specifically the unemployment insurance programme, which completes 
the Golden Triangle of flexicurity. 
In the Brazilian case, there is already sufficient evidence of 
corruption, deceit and fraud in social security programmes. Nonetheless, 
moral issues arising from generous social security programmes are not 
exclusive to Brazilian or Latin workers, but form part of labour force 
behaviour in any country. In popular Brazilian culture the idea that the 
State should help in everything is widespread; it is the so-called “country 
of the poor”, especially because much of the labour force is unskilled, 
and a large proportion of the population lives on low incomes. Thus, a 
generous unemployment insurance or a welfare benefit paid for a long 
time is seen as an end in itself, apart from often making up a large part 
of the family income.
For someone who knows Brazilian culture and the behaviour of 
workers in relation to programmes in which there is little coordination, 
little activation, deficient supervision and risible sanctions, when they 
exist, this is an obstacle difficult to overcome. Poverty and low skill 
provide fertile ground for a lack of “public spiritedness”.
        (f)     The financing and equilibrium of Brazilian                   
                 public accounts
The flexicurity model is expensive, because it offers wide-ranging 
social security and generous unemployment insurance, and spends 
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a lot of public money on active compensatory policies. It requires a 
country with public finances that are permanently in equilibrium, 
which is not true of the Brazilian public sector. Despite improvements 
in the revenue collection system and the management of public funds, 
public expenditure is still hard to control. This has implications for 
the Brazilian tax burden which is reaching high levels, but above all is 
highly inequitable.
Moreover, while funds are available to finance certain elements 
of the Golden Triangle, such as unemployment insurance or active 
policies, these have been used incorrectly, thus compromising their 
continued existence to implement a flexicurity model.
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Chapter V
Flexibility, protection and active policies in Chile
Mario D. Velásquez Pinto
A.   Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the factors which determine the 
feasibility of systems of labour-market flexibility with protection, also 
known as flexicurity, taking into account the national particularities of 
Chile.1 The Danish experience has been taken as a reference: it has been 
working for over a century and its effectiveness is founded upon the 
legitimacy which comes from a broad consensus among social actors.
This model is based simultaneously on three fundamental pillars: 
a flexible labour market; a social welfare system which supports labour-
market reintegration for those who have lost their jobs and prevents 
falls in workers’ living conditions; and active labour-market policies, 
including training, aimed strategically at providing qualifications for 
workers throughout their active lives.
1 See a more detailed version of this work in Velásquez (2009).          
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Experiences with flexicurity are specific and cannot be applied 
directly to the realities of different countries such as those of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Nonetheless, analysing the components 
and interrelationships, as well as the functioning of labour markets and 
institutions, is a highly useful exercise in identifying ways of increasing 
employers’ and workers’ capacity for protected adaptation in response to 
changes, in accordance with each country’s particularities and rhythms.
B.   Methodology
This chapter will initially consider the functioning of the labour market in 
accordance with the various regulatory frameworks which have existed 
since the 1970s, bearing in mind the degrees of flexibility or protection 
that were intended and the results achieved. Second, it will identify 
individual labour regulations and analyse recent changes in them in 
respect of both external (numerical and wage) flexibility and internal 
flexibility (wage and non-wage compensation systems, duration and 
organization of the working day). It will also consider collective labour 
regulations, particularly those relating to trade union organizations and 
collective bargaining.
The analysis of active policies is based on a public-spending series, 
to determine the scale and evolution of components in recent years. It 
is complemented by a study of the coverage of beneficiaries and some 
aspects of the design of the most important programmes. Lastly, it 
identifies the main positions of social actors, particularly entrepreneurs, 
workers and the State, based on important experiences of negotiation 
and social dialogue in this area.
C.   Institutional frameworks: from deregulation  
      to flexibility with protection
Chile has a highly varied experience of labour flexibility, defined as the 
adaptability of the labour market and of labour as a factor of production. 
There have been a variety of institutional frameworks in the past 50 
years, and various combinations of flexibility and protection have been 
imposed on the labour market. From 1979 to 1989, the Plan Laboral was 
in force. In practice, its sought to impose high levels of flexibility on 
labour relations with little protection of workers’ rights, in the context 
of a military regime which repressed trade-union activities. That 
framework was modified substantially with the return to democracy 
from 1990 onwards; individual rights were restored and active policies 
were implemented to promote flexibility with protection.
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Table V.1
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR THE LABOUR MARKET AND MAIN TRENDS, 1973-2007
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Source:  Prepared by the author and P. Romaguera and others, “Reformas al mercado laboral ante la 
liberalización de la economía: el caso de Chile”, Informe estudio nacional, Santiago, Chile, Economic Research 
Corporation for Latin America (CIEPLAN), 1994.
The results of a system with high flexibility and weak protection 
showed that it was not the way to achieve improved results in terms of 
growth, employment and working conditions. This strategy also proved 
not to be conducive to a sustained pattern of growth based on rising 
productivity, which is necessary in the framework of an open economy. 
From 1990, with the return of democracy, a model was established based 
on the exercise of workers’ individual and collective rights, promoting 
participation and facilitating organization among social actors, oriented 
towards establishing a new system of labour relations founded upon 
dialogue and negotiation, and which has an active function in recovering 
the real value of basic parameters such as minimum wages and public-
sector wages; this has led to increased growth and more lasting benefits, 
as well as a considerable rise in productivity.
The informal sector still makes up 32% of urban employment, 
however, although it has trended downwards in recent years. The 
informal sector is a major barrier to the development of a flexicurity 
system because its workers and enterprises function outside regulations, 
have no representation and are generally excluded from conventional 
social welfare systems.
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D.   External flexibility
The Chilean labour market currently operates with considerable 
flexibility; thus, to a great extent, it meets one of the basic conditions 
for the flexicurity model. As for external flexibility, there are no 
regulations to prevent the hiring and firing of workers, and there is 
a wide variety of work contracts which are applicable depending on 
the type of productive activity involved. As for firing, in the absence 
of an open-ended contract, no costs are associated with termination 
of employment under normal circumstances. In 2006, 70% of wage-
earners were employed under such a contract, but there has been a 
decline, as in 1998 these contracts had made up 81.2% of the total.
The high level of flexibility is reflected in a turnover rate standing 
at 26.2% of total employment; in international terms, this falls into an 
intermediate bracket. Nonetheless, there is a tendency to replace open-
ended contracts with short-term ones. This may have negative effects in 
terms of protection, since it diminishes the number of workers having 
the kind of contractual arrangements that involve the strongest rights. 
It might be thought that this situation is partly due to a strategy of 
avoiding the costs related to dismissals, particularly if for operational 
reasons the business needs to modify some of the conditions of the work 
contract, and the worker does not agree. In this case, the only option 
would be to cancel the employment contract, pay the compensation 
and enter into a new contract; in practice, this leads to inflexibility.
The “Bustos law” obliges employers to complete social security 
payments in order to implement the dismissal of any type of worker, 
although the legislation permits the declaration and non-payment of 
pension contributions. In any case, there are no data concerning the 
impact of that law upon the capacity to dismiss workers.
Businesses may make use of outsourcing and temporary staff, 
which are extensive practices; some 42% of businesses use outsourcing 
(of those, 10% use temporary staff), and a third of companies outsource 
parts of their core operations. It would seem that outsourcing is not 
necessarily functioning as a tool of business specialization, but rather 
as a way of saving money on staffing. Labour legislation has recently 
been amended to rectify this type of distortion and regulate the 
provision of staff.
Recent years have seen a number of legislative changes in this 
area, although outsourcing is not a new practice; it often becomes 
difficult to identify the parties to an employer-employee relationship 
and, as a result, their responsibilities in terms of rights and obligations 
become unclear. Both employers and workers have consistently called 
for legal oversight of outsourcing, to determine whether workers 
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who are working together but are employed by different companies 
can negotiate collectively. There are similar issues in relation to work-
related accidents and illnesses.
Legislation was adopted in 2003 in this area, but it failed to cover 
certain essential aspects such as the employer’s residual liability. A 
new law came into force on 14 January 2007, requiring the principal 
employer to ensure compliance with the labour-law obligations of the 
subcontractor in respect of outsourced workers; if failure to comply 
is found, the principal employer is enabled to withhold payments 
to the subcontractor and even to fulfil those obligations in its place.2 
New requirements were also established in respect of safety and 
risk prevention. The principal employer must establish hygiene and 
safety rules in the workplace, compliance with which is compulsory 
for both sides.
The application of this law has led to improved levels of 
compliance with workers’ obligations and has restricted the use of 
personnel supply services. In sectors where outsourcing is high, such 
as mining, agriculture, fisheries and forestry, progress has been made 
in identifying functions performed by outsourced workers which are 
similar to those of the workers of the primary employer, but with 
different working conditions, demonstrating the primary employer’s 
obligation to hire workers directly.
Although primary employers accept direct hiring on the basis of 
identical functions, they defend their right to hire the worker of their 
choice; this may not be the person who was carrying out the functions 
while employed by the subcontractor. This has resulted in a jurisdictional 
dispute involving the Directorate of Labour and the employers, such as 
the Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (CODELCO). The dispute 
was submitted to the Supreme Court, which found in favour of the 
employer and restricted the authority of the Directorate of Labour to 
supervise, penalize and impose corrective measures,3 establishing that 
it did not have the authority to force the employer to hire a particular 
person or to be a party to the judicial process.
Compliance with employment-related obligations is provided for 
only in legislation, and the only references in respect of wages and 
other payments are the minimum wage and collective bargaining. That 
bargaining is required to take place at the level of each enterprise, but 
2 Act No. 20,123 regulates outsourced labour, the functioning of temporary work           
agencies and work contracts for temporary services.
3 A finding by the Directorate of Labour in December 2007 required CODELCO to hire              
directly 4,934 workers (equivalent to 27% of its personnel) who were working for 
subcontracting firms).
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in the case of outsourced workers this is prevented in practice by the 
fact that they have organized themselves by sector.
Another important factor is the decentralization of production 
and employment processes, which allows for greater efficiency and 
lower costs. As a result, there may be different wages and conditions 
for similar jobs. Although it is agreed that this situation should be 
remedied, this does not mean that uniform wage levels are accepted, 
or that collective bargaining can be forced at levels other than those 
allowed by the country’s labour laws.
Although some progress has been made, a much broader debate 
has opened up in respect of labour relations and the responsibilities of 
the various actors, including State institutions.
A further aspect relating to numerical flexibility is the fact that, 
although the public sector is characterized by stable employment, 
46.6% of its staff are labour or service contract workers. This shows 
that, at least in theory, there is some flexibility in terms of adjusting 
the size of the workforce.
The present analysis also shows that in general terms, there is 
flexibility in terms of wages. Two experiences have undergone much 
analysis owing to their undesirable side-effects; they are currently part 
of the learning experience in this area. The first is the rule on complete 
indexation of wages to past inflation which was in force in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. It proved to be highly dysfunctional at a time 
of deep recession, and played a large part in the job losses experienced 
at the time. The second, which is more recent, is the adjustment of the 
minimum wage which occurred in 1998-2000, leading to such a large 
real increase that not only was the minimum wage out of step with 
average productivity trends, but also that it influenced the overall 
adjustment in the labour market in the context of a recession resulting 
from the Asian crisis.
Analysis of the trend in average wages in the economy (see figure 
V.1) shows that there is still a close link to the increase in average labour 
productivity, as also occurred with the initial wage increase agreed 
during collective bargaining. This is significant in that it shows that 
wages have followed a sustained, stable growth trend, consistent with 
their linkages to productivity indicators in their variable components, 
as will be seen below.
Furthermore, future wage increases agreed during collective 
negotiations have stabilized at about 100% of the consumer price index 
(CPI), with an average periodicity of six months, indicating the presence 
of wage indexing for the duration of the contracts negotiated  (which
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Figure V.1
TRENDS IN WAGES AND AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY
Source:   Prepared by the author on the basis of information from Central Bank of Chile, Directorate of Labour 
and National Institute of Statistics.
is set at two to four years by law). This applies to a universe of workers 
which has diminished over the years, both because collective bargaining 
involves only 7.9% of employed people, and also because that rule has 
been applied to an increasingly small proportion of those concerned by 
bargaining (65.3% of the total in 2004).
No calculations are yet available as to the indirect effects that 
wage indexing might have on the remaining companies not affected 
by collective bargaining, but in the context of falling inflation, it 
can be assumed that the trend in wages negotiated under that rule 
would be higher than that experienced by the economy’s average 
productivity. In any case, it cannot be determined whether the 
above may constitute a cause of wage rigidity, because that would 
require knowing the relevant productivity and total wage trends, 
including variable components, which are generally associated with 
performance indicators.
Also, following the major recovery of the early 1990s, trends in real 
minimum wages have also been complementary to those of the growth 
of average labour productivity. Nonetheless, at the end of that decade, 
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owing to a three-year adjustment agreement, the real minimum wage 
recorded marked increases which did not take into account the impact 
of the Asian crisis on the Chilean economy. A balanced growth trend 
has been observed since then, and there has recently been a marked 
advance which ensures effective compliance, following the elimination 
of practices which had impeded it. At the latest negotiations, in 2008, 
a protocol was signed whereby the Government undertook to attach 
the highest importance to creating a law to equate the basic wage 
with the minimum wage, to put an end to the widespread practice of 
employment contracts with wages below the minimum wage, in which 
effective compliance was subject to workers’ efforts to achieve targets, 
generally associated with predetermined sales figures. The National 
Congress adopted that draft legislation swiftly.
Lastly, the trend in average public-sector wages, measured from 
the general adjustment applied each year, shows a rate of growth lower 
than that of average wages in the economy as a whole. This view is 
only partial, however; given the lack of data, the above figures do not 
take into account the effects of the incentives agreed yearly under the 
Management Improvement Programme (PMG); these are subject to the 
meeting of targets, which are usually achieved.
E.   Internal flexibility
Internal flexibility is also high; the available data show that the 
application of variable components is widespread in both public- 
and private-sector pay. Some 55% of businesses apply variable 
wages, rising to 80.2% in companies where a trade union is active. 
Furthermore, 36.4% of companies have created productivity bonuses, 
the use of which is even more common in large firms, 65% of which 
are using them (see figure V.2). The incentives are individual in the 
majority of cases, although some are associated with overall increases 
in a company’s output or productivity.
As for profit-sharing schemes, 69.2% of companies have opted 
for a system which guarantees 25% of annual pay; 8% have chosen 
a system which distributes 30% of profits. In the public sector, 
the use of performance-related pay increases has expanded, and 
growing numbers of institutions are covered by the Senior Public 
Administration System.
As for the capacity to adapt working hours and organize the 
working day, many alternatives and regulations are available to permit 
the adoption of different systems according to employers’ requirements. 
Maximum working hours have been reduced from 48 to 45 per week, 
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Figure V.2
BUSINESSES APPLYING SYSTEMS OF BONUSES, INCENTIVES AND AWARDS  
FOR INCREASED OUTPUT OR PRODUCTIVITY
Source:  Directorate of Labour, “Encuesta Laboral (ENCLA) 2006”, Santiago, Chile, 2007.
and employers can establish part-time working hours, although in 
practice only 22.8% of them have done so, and these are relatively small 
companies. These working conditions facilitate labour-market entry for 
women and are applied more in those companies which have a high 
proportion of female workers.
Some 46.4% of businesses use overtime work, although this 
proportion has fallen as a result of reforms designed to restrict overtime 
work to unusual tasks. Firms can also adopt different combinations of 
work and rest hours, and different working days and shifts. As for the 
rules on Sunday rest, many businesses are exempt; 30% of firms make 
use of those exemptions for technical reasons or because they serve the 
public directly. Legislation on shift work is also very flexible, and the 
largest corporations are the ones which take advantage of this (66.7%). 
The law also allows for working arrangements which alter the usual 
distribution of work and rest days according to special modalities, and 
this provides additional flexibility.
In sum, the current legislation enables businesses to deploy a 
variety of alternative adjustments to organize the number and structure 
of working hours. Integrated strategies are applied in large companies, 
which tend to use different types of flexible arrangements simultaneously 
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in a given process and to the same workers; this gives them an 
adaptability greater than the sum of all the authorized alternatives.
Recent reforms in this area have sought to correct certain distortions 
such as excessive use of overtime work without truly justifiable reasons. 
The staff and management sides have reached no consensus, however, 
on initiatives which would make possible the following: agreements 
between management and union representatives, in each company, 
on calculating working hours on a monthly or yearly basis; wage 
adjustments where appropriate; and the possibility of suspending the 
employment contract with guaranteed access to social protection and 
subsequent rehiring. To date, the Government has not persisted in 
this attempt.
It is paradoxical that the absence of an organized workers’ 
negotiating body and shortcomings in the full exercise of collective 
bargaining are factors which prevent better internal flexibility. This 
shortcoming makes it harder to achieve an optimal situation, since 
a collectively agreed flexibility within the enterprise, which by its 
nature would protect the interests of workers and employers, would 
be stronger than flexibility which is achieved only through legislation. 
This weakness, in turn, obstructs dialogue at the intermediate and 
enterprise levels and strengthens workers’ perception of vulnerability 
in relation to employers.
F.    Trade unions and collective bargaining
The existence of trade-union organizations whose membership 
represents a significant proportion of workers, the exercise and 
expansion of collective bargaining, and the practice of social dialogue 
as a permanent activity are central elements in the functioning of the 
flexicurity model; they have also been central in the design of democratic 
Governments’ employment policies since 1990.
Nonetheless, the data reveal a considerable weakness in this area (see 
figure V.3). Trade-union membership is currently equivalent to only 10% 
of the workforce, and collective bargaining concerns only 7.6% of wage-
earners despite the fact that a series of reforms have been implemented 
since 1990 to restore and expand collective rights and increase participation 
and extend the scope of collective instruments among the employed 
population. Furthermore, not only are the current indicators insufficient 
in relation to the proposed goals, but there has been a steady fall since the 
mid-1990s.
It is a complex issue, given that the reasons are varied: lesser 
trade-union activity in comparison with the period of restoration of 
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democracy, changes in the way in which production is organized, and 
high labour turnover (which would explain the reduction in enterprise-
level unions with negotiating authority) and persistent complaints 
of anti-union practices. As for collective bargaining, it is likely that 
factors such as the employer’s ability to extend benefits negotiated by 
the unions to the rest of the workers in an enterprise, the presence of 
replacement workers during strikes and the existence of parallel non-
union negotiating groups all serve as disincentives to the unionization 
of workers. Furthermore, these developments mean that the reforms 
that have been achieved are insufficient from the viewpoint of the 
expectations of the union movement.
Figure V.3
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, CHILE, 1985-2004
(Percentages)
Source:   prepared by the author on the basis of information from the Directorate of Labour and the National 
Institute of Statistics.
Low levels of unionization and the limited scope of collective 
bargaining not only are an obstacle to the viability of a flexicurity 
system but also entail a greater risk, since conditions are being created 
for disputes over workers’ claims to be dealt with on the margins of 
the regulations in force. In recent years, unions of temporary and self-
employed workers and those which involve several companies have 
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gained in importance, despite the fact that in practice they experience 
severe limitations regarding their ability to conduct collective 
bargaining. With growing frequency, workers’ unresolved claims have 
led to direct action such as official or unofficial strikes or workplace 
occupations in dynamic sectors, particularly export sectors, affecting 
groups of companies and moving labour disputes into the area of public 
order and security.
In the public sector, unionization and strikes are prohibited but 
the legislation is frequently infringed, with the signature of agreements 
and protocols which truly constitute collective contracts, and illegal 
strikes to put pressure on the authorities to meet workers’ demands 
have become frequent. The essential difference compared with other 
sectors lies in the fact that the negotiators belong to strong organizations 
which have a long history in the union movement, and that the State 
is the employer.
G.   Changes in social protection
The ability of the social protection system to provide appropriate 
coverage in terms of health care, unemployment benefits and pensions 
is a fundamental issue. Recent years have seen reforms to the health-
care system which have established a series of universal guarantees 
in case of serious illness, and the State has invested heavily in 
improving facilities for the poor. As for pensions, a structural reform 
was adopted in early 2008, leading to the creation of a solidarity-based 
pension system providing new benefits and rights for the poorest 
60% of the population, and ensuring that even those who have never 
paid contributions will receive a pension. In both cases, the changes 
are aimed at guaranteeing that even the loss of a job does not mean 
exclusion from the services and benefits offered of those two systems.
The unemployment protection system and the recent changes 
to it are of great importance; it plays a central counterbalancing role 
in a system in which employers enjoy great flexibility in hiring and 
firing. Until 2002, when unemployment insurance was created, the 
main instrument of protection was a severance payment by years 
of service, under which a month’s salary was paid for each year of 
seniority in the company up to the date of the lay-off. This type of 
instrument is generally intended to promote stable employment and 
worker protection and, in particular, greater importance is attached 
to the preservation of the job than to the protection of the worker’s 
income when he or she loses the job. The system’s effectiveness has, 
however, been questioned owing to its effects on the labour market.
153Regulation, Worker Protection and Active Labour-Market Policies in Latin America
This protection has limited coverage, restricted to workers with 
long-term contracts and lay-off which are due to the employer’s needs. 
Companies are not required to set up a fund to cover such contingencies, 
so the payments are subject to the availability of liquidity. Since the 
amount to be paid is proportional to the number of years’ service, 
employers have an incentive to shorten the duration of contracts.
In October 2002, unemployment insurance was implemented 
on the basis of an analysis which demonstrated the aforementioned 
shortcomings. The system combines workers’ individual accounts 
with a solidarity-based unemployment fund which functions as a 
distribution fund. The system provides benefits based on the average 
salary for the year preceding the date of separation and which are 
financed from accumulated capital (from the individual account) and 
supplemented by the distribution fund. Funding is from three sources, 
and benefits are generated in all cases, financed from the individual 
unemployment accounts. The novel characteristics of its design have 
made it possible to: increase coverage, extending it to workers with 
temporary or piece-rate contracts; provide benefits regardless of the 
reason for termination of the contractual relationship; improve the 
balance between the compensation paid by the former employer and 
the saving in case of unemployment; and establish a direct relationship 
between the system, training policies, and employment information 
and labour intermediation services.
Improvements are still needed in some areas, however, such as 
access to the solidarity-based unemployment fund, generating larger 
benefits and increasing the coverage of beneficiaries. New instruments 
must be created to overcome the limitations of conventional protection 
systems which, in the presence of segmented labour markets like that 
of Chile, produce situations of exclusion among wage-earners or own-
account workers in the informal sector, which includes almost 30% of 
the country’s workers. Despite the progress made in recent years, the 
protection provided by the system is still incomplete, although it has 
the potential to be improved in the medium term.
H.   Active policies
Active policies make it possible to cover the population segments 
excluded from conventional protection systems, since the conditions 
for participation are not dependent on formal waged employment; 
indeed, they are specifically designed to favour workers who do not 
have such employment. These policies are one of the three fundamental 
aspects of the flexicurity model used for reference.
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During the period covered, a series of labour-market policies 
were implemented, both active and passive, and considerable 
investments were made in institutional designs and the establishment 
of coordination among various Government bodies; jointly, they 
produced positive results and valuable experience for dealing with the 
difficulties imposed by low levels of employment growth.
The instruments were designed to strengthen the supply of 
labour (through job training), strengthen vulnerable groups (through 
programmes to support the unemployed), increase demand for labour 
(through direct employment programmes or subsidies for the hiring 
of workers), and improve the functioning of the labour market (by 
developing information and labour intermediation services). As for 
passive policies, during the same period the unemployment insurance 
system was put in place, and will eventually replace the former 
unemployment subsidy system.
Figure V.4 shows the volume of investments made in implementing 
the aforementioned policies. Total spending on labour-market policies, 
as a percentage of GDP, showed a countercyclical trend during the 
period; while unemployment was relatively high, spending rose from 
0.3% of GDP in 2000 to 0.44% in 2002, and declined to 0.34% of GDP 
in 2005. The latter was due to reduced spending on active policies, 
particularly the sustained falls in direct employment programmes 
and in investments in job training, through the use of tax concessions. 
Although total spending on those policies exceeds that recorded 
from 1995 to 2000, when it averaged only 0.17% of GDP, it remains 
well below the levels observed in industrialized countries, where it 
averaged 2.25% from 1990 to 2002, and in the economies in transition, 
where it stood at 0.66% in 1998.
The trend was different in terms of passive policies, with 
spending rising considerably from 2003 onwards; the launching of 
unemployment insurance was the main cause. This new instrument has 
had a considerable impact on coverage, compared with the slight level 
reached by the former unemployment subsidy; this, in turn, explains 
the slight increase in total spending recorded in 2005 compared with 
the previous year.
Despite the relatively satisfactory experience with the design and 
application of direct and indirect employment policies in recent years, 
there is no proper institutional framework to capitalize on the advances 
achieved. This relates to issues of design, coordination and, in general, 
development of appropriate technologies to improve effectiveness and 
efficiency in the administration of such a programme. Similarly, in relation 
to information and intermediation services, although their importance is
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Figure V.4
SPENDING ON LABOUR-MARKET POLICIES IN CHILE, 2000-2005
(Percentages of GDP)
Source:  Prepared by the author on the basis of Budget Department (DIPRES), Ministry of Finance, Chile.
agreed, coverage is somewhat below 10% of unemployed people, and 
there is no optimal design for improving its effectiveness, although there 
have recently been initiatives aimed at strengthening them, such as the 
programme linking them with private-sector services. Nonetheless, no 
political will has been seen in terms of promoting improvements in this 
regard, and this is clearly a significant disadvantage for the development 
of a flexicurity system in the country.
The most recent experience in this area, the pilot programme of public-
private intermediation promoted by the Subsecretariat of Labour —consisting 
of intermediation services providing for a State-funded incentive equivalent to 
50% of gross monthly wages for each worker placed, with a ceiling of 100,000 
Chilean pesos— has been a complete failure, demonstrating once again the 
need to establish a public intermediation network targeting those who are 
unable to choose a market-based or private-sector solution for the provision of 
services of this type.
Training policies, an essential element for labour mobility and the 
adaptability of the workforce, target three population groups: employed 
workers, through tax concessions; unemployed people and vulnerable groups, 
ECLAC156
through social training programmes in general; and workers with incomplete 
training, through the Chilecalifica programme and others of a general nature.
As can be seen in table V.2, the trend in total training investment as 
a proportion of GDP was upward until 2002, and thereafter it diminished 
successively until it stood at 0.14% of GDP in 2005. This behaviour was due 
to lessening use of the tax concession because of the new provisions applied 
since 2002, which aimed to ensure correct use in smaller enterprises. In any 
case, investment in training followed a procyclical trend, with employers, 
faced with situations of uncertainty, reluctant to invest in training; if, in 
addition, their sales fall, they will have greater liquidity problems and will 
therefore tend to postpone decisions on training.
Table V.2
COVERAGE OF PERSONS TRAINED AND INVESTMENT IN TRAINING
Programme 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Percentage of economically 
active population (EAP) 
(2005)
Workers trained (percentage of total)
Tax concession 92.2 94.1 95.7 94.4 93.1 93.8 58.6
Scholarship with tax concession 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.1 3.1 3.3
9.2
Social programmes 6.2 4.4 2.9 3.5 3.8 2.9
Investment in training (percentage of total)
Tax concession 82.8 82.1 83.0 86.8 84.4 86.7
--Scholarship with tax concession 2.5 7.0 7.5 3.8 4.7 3.9
Social programmes 14.6 10.9 9.5 9.4 10.9 9.4
- National Scholarship Programme 0.00 0.00 5.5 3.3 7.6 6.1
Total investment (percentage of GDP) 0.17 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.14 --
Source:   National Training and Employment Service (SENCE), Statistical yearbooks, various years.
The tax concession is the main programme in terms of both the 
number of persons trained and the amounts involved, and it benefits 
wage-earners in formal enterprises, especially medium-sized and large 
ones. The State encourages the implementation of training activities 
through that means, offering a discount on the annual amount of 
corporate income tax in accordance with the investments made in training 
workers, up to a maximum of 1% of annual payroll. This is therefore a tax 
concession for expenditure already incurred.
This tax concession also funds “tax concession scholarships”, 
financed with carry-overs from the contributions of companies affiliated 
to the intermediate technical training bodies (OTIC) that have not been 
used during previous financial years. The programme benefits workers 
who are relatively unskilled or unemployed and persons covered by the 
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public social network. There has been an upward trend in the coverage 
of beneficiaries, from 1.6% in 2000 to 3.3% in 2005, exceeding the number 
of persons trained under social programmes. Funds are also being 
reallocated through the programme for beneficiaries excluded from 
the normal use of the tax concession, particularly women. Its resources 
amount to around 4% of the total investment training of the National 
Training and Employment Service (SENCE), equivalent to less than half 
the total for social programmes.
Programmes designed to help the unemployed and vulnerable 
groups to reintegrate themselves into the labour market are funded by 
the National Training Fund (FONCAP), and come under the heading of 
social programmes. As can be seen in table V.2, the numbers of people 
benefiting from that programme have diminished and it represents less 
than 10% of total training investment. Only the National Scholarship 
Programme, designed to provide training in trades for waged or own-
account work, has shown signs of growing, although in absolute terms 
it is on a small scale.
It is also important to contrast the numbers of beneficiaries of 
training programmes with the target population. In 2005, 93.8% of those 
receiving training were waged workers in enterprises which used the 
tax concession, while the remaining 6.2% were trained under special 
programmes for the unemployed and vulnerable groups. Comparison 
of these proportions with the percentages of waged workers and 
unemployed persons in the workforce —58.6% and 9.2%, respectively— 
shows that the percentage of employed waged workers is too high, that 
of unemployed persons too low, and almost a third of the workforce is 
outside the target population of the training policies.
In fact, the reason why about a third of the workforce is outside the 
target population of the current programmes is they are self-employed 
workers or workers in the informal sector; this poses additional funding 
problems for the implementation of specific programmes. Extending 
the target population to include those groups is clearly a public-policy 
challenge, and the implementation since 2005 of the training programme 
for micro-entrepreneurs and own-account workers is an example of 
public policy in that area.
Seeking optimal and sustainable financial solutions is a central 
requirement, since the associated cost of training a worker in the 
social programmes is much higher than that obtained through the tax 
concession. The average cost of training through the National Scholarship 
Programme is 6.8 times higher than through the tax concession, owing to 
the low levels of human capital, general or specific, among the workers 
trained under the special programmes. Consideration should be given to 
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redesigning the training, first of all by reorienting it towards a competence 
approach, coordinating it with a national certification programme which 
is currently going through the legislative process. This initiative has great 
potential to promote investment in training and bring about a significant 
increase in levels of coverage.
There are two other approaches which may produce better results 
in the future, with the prospect of a training system which can offer 
opportunities for qualifications and continuing education. On the one 
hand, recent experience has shown that the impact of training in terms 
of employment and income is stronger when accompanied by systems 
such as hiring incentives. Thus, the integrated training policies for the 
beneficiaries of Chile Solidarity take on particular importance, since they 
are incorporated into the instruments designed to tackle the structural 
unemployment associated with poverty among particular groups.
It should also be noted that direct employment programmes are 
currently managed by SENCE, and a similar trend can be seen in indirect 
programmes. Given that SENCE is also responsible for most job training 
programmes and that information and labour intermediation services are 
also part of its mandate, this adds up to a picture in which coordination 
between complementary services can take place with greater facility than in 
the past, since the coordination will take place within a single institution.
I.    Actors and social dialogue
Since the restoration of democracy, social dialogue has been seen as 
both an objective of employment policy and a means of reaching staff-
management agreements. Following a long history of disagreements and 
disputes, it has been an essential task for every Government since 1990 
to achieve national social agreements leading to a climate of cooperation 
and understanding between workers and employers. The intention to 
create such a process, which had no precedent in Chile, was based on the 
belief that the institutional framework set up by the military regime had 
evident drawbacks in terms of labour representation, social protection 
and the promotion of equitable development. At the Government 
level, institutional reform in the field of employment clearly required 
commitment from both workers and employers and, on that basis, work 
began on negotiating agreements to promote cooperative relations, 
reform labour laws and strengthen enforcement, develop job training 
and improve the social-security system.
In 1990, the Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPC) and the 
Amalgamated Workers’ Confederation (CUT) adopted a Frame of Reference 
for Dialogue, stating that economic development meant growth, finding new 
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markets, increased savings and investment and rising levels of employment 
and wages. They added that the functioning of the labour market must 
be efficient and competitive and subject to regulations in order to achieve 
equitable and just distribution of wealth, protect the weakest groups, 
eradicate poverty and promote full employment. This led to the signing of a 
tripartite framework agreement entitled “Chile, a historic opportunity”, the 
impetus of which led to the adoption of further agreements on more specific 
matters between 1991 and 1993.
After four years, however, this process began to show signs of 
exhaustion. Business leaders became reluctant to take part in new agreements 
for the adjustment of the minimum wage, arguing that they were not 
relevant to their companies and that they were not prepared to recognize 
the trade unions as important negotiating partners. Trade union leaders also 
changed their attitude to negotiation. In 1994, when the second Concertación 
Government had just been formed, the unions called for new labour reforms 
and faster growth in wages and benefits. They argued that, although there 
had been advances during the first Concertación Government, they had not 
lived up to expectations, and that the inequalities in the model of economic 
growth meant that the trade-union movement must be strengthened before 
it could take part in new negotiating mechanisms, which the unions saw as 
imbalanced and unproductive.
In 1994, the new Government restarted the social dialogue, creating a 
new tripartite body at the national level, the Productive Development Forum, 
where a variety of issues could be discussed, including employment and social 
protection. Within that framework, the National Centre for Productivity and 
Quality (now known as Chile Calidad) was set up, with a tripartite structure 
and with the objective of promoting and strengthening dialogue, research 
and the sharing of information and experience in the area of competitiveness, 
but the participants failed to achieve consensus either on a new set of reforms 
in the area of collective bargaining and the expansion of trade-union rights 
and freedoms, or on the creation of unemployment insurance.
The next new Government established a Council for Social Dialogue 
in 2000, inviting the principal actors from the world of employment to 
take part in tripartite technical committees and, at the same time, to tackle 
the issue of creating unemployment insurance. The positions taken by 
the employers’ and the workers’ sides remained far apart in areas such as 
multi-company negotiations and the elimination of the use of temporary 
workers during strikes, which were fundamental issues for the trade-
union side. The Government decided that the draft law would deal with 
only those matters on which agreement was most likely to be achieved. 
In 2001, new labour reforms were adopted, and in 2002 unemployment 
insurance was instituted even though the employers’ organizations did 
not support it and the workers’ organizations remained unsatisfied.
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Since then, there has not even been any concrete initiative in this 
area through the tripartite national social dialogue body. In recent years, 
Governments have opted for presidential advisory councils (for instance, 
for reforms to pensions and education and in relation to employment and 
equity issues), made up of experts or representatives of various social 
groups and designated by the Government. Their recommendations are 
not binding on the executive branch of Government.
Social dialogue and consensus seem to have functioned well only 
in the early days of the restoration of democracy, when there was much 
uncertainty about the country’s economic and social future. The unusual 
agreements reached in the early 1990s are to a great extent explained by 
the recognition of social consensus-building as a collective good which 
would yield highly positive results for parties having different interests. 
It was considered that this would ensure stability in the economic 
system and give reality to postponed demands for greater protection and 
sharing in the benefits of growth, and that all this would permit the new 
authorities to ensure a successful transition process. That would also 
explain the emphasis on the medium term and the national characteristics 
attributed to the agreements.
Since that experience is basically due to the unusual circumstances 
of the early stages of transition to democracy, it is not surprising that the 
process lost its early vitality once the main uncertainties and nervousness had 
dissipated, particularly in terms of national agreements. All it takes to stop 
the process is for one of the parties to change its mind as to its usefulness.
Even if perceptions of social consensus-building remain positive, there 
is a further problem which arises out of the degree of decentralization and 
the competition for leadership among institutions which represent labour 
and business interests. In such circumstances, which do seem to prevail in 
the context of Chile, there is no guarantee that agreements reached at the 
leadership level will in fact be applied at the decentralized level. This can be 
even more significant if the terms of general agreements do not bring direct 
socio-economic benefits and if the authority of the signatories is doubtful.
J.   Gradual but steady progress towards flexibility     
      with protection
Nonetheless, progress has been made through gradual institutional 
reforms in the field of employment, new unemployment protection 
instruments have been created and active policies have been established, 
all of which are central to a flexicurity model. The determination of 
successive Governments to bring about change in that direction has 
been a decisive source of effectiveness.
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The Chilean experience shows objective changes in improvements 
to employment protection and the creation of new instruments designed 
to facilitate labour-market adaptation; this has made it possible to 
transform the regulatory framework inherited from the military 
regime. These transformations, which some consider insufficient and 
others inappropriate, have been characterized by their gradual and 
steady nature, but they have been no less effective for that, and they 
have avoided excessive or drastic changes.
As could be expected, changes in individual and collective 
employment regulations have been actively promoted by labour 
organizations, whereas the interests of workers and employers have 
coincided a great deal in the design of new employment-contract 
modalities. Businesses have also contributed actively in less controversial 
areas such as reform of labour justice and improvements to training 
systems, partly because those did not entail changes to employment 
legislation and because they are mostly State-funded.
The role of Government has not been neutral; all the reforms 
have been consistent with the design of employment policies oriented 
towards developing flexibility with protection; improving the protection 
of individual rights in labour relations and re-establishing basic 
guarantees for the exercise of collective rights strengthens the ability of 
the parties to conclude agreements; this also complements the existence 
of appropriate and effective labour justice. The reforms for the creation 
of new employment modalities seek to provide security in terms of the 
rights and obligations of the parties and, by improving employability 
and protection for those who lose their jobs, contribute to developing 
better adaptability among both workers and employers.
In Chile, the legislative initiative lies solely with the executive power 
when fiscal resources are involved, but in other cases also its support is 
decisive. Lack of consensus does not paralyse negotiations, however, 
since they are transferred to Parliament where the differences between 
the parties are reproduced and new agreements are reached, although in 
such cases a greater diversity of interests is taken into account.
All this helps to explain the limitations and the practical usefulness 
of social dialogue, since workers’ and employers’ organizations are 
aware that their differences will ultimately be taken up in Parliament. 
The accompanying risk lies in the fact that, if certain issues are not 
satisfactorily resolved or their consideration is constantly postponed, 
they will take on great significance and may encourage the parties to set 
aside existing institutions. This is the case, for example, of restrictions 
on collective bargaining or the exercise of the right to strike and, more 
recently, disputes arising out of new rules on outsourcing.
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K.   Conclusions and recommendations
The following is a series of proposals designed to eliminate the current 
obstacles to the development of a flexicurity system.
(a) To improve the relationship between flexibility and employment 
protection, progress could be made through improved protection 
in case of job loss, through two main approaches:
- Improvements to employment insurance. Through improved 
parameters relating to the design of the insurance, such as the 
requirement to pay 12 consecutive premiums in order to have 
access to the benefits of the solidarity-based unemployment fund 
(which is currently under-used), among other things, greater 
effectiveness could be achieved by increasing the current level 
of replacement of severance payments by greater employers’ 
contributions to the system. This would counteract the current 
tendency to move away from long-term contracts because of the 
cost of separation and, in turn, new resources would be made 
available to fund greater job-loss compensation or extend the 
duration of protection.
- Extend long-term unemployment coverage. The existing 
conventional unemployment protection systems, which 
are basically contributory, are particularly appropriate for 
situations of cyclical unemployment and restrict the duration 
of benefits to the average period of unemployment. For cases 
of longer-term unemployment there should be a State-funded 
unemployment assistance mechanism, which would come into 
play when the unemployment insurance benefits expired. The 
payments would be granted in return for regular participation 
in active labour-market programmes.
 In that regard, the Government has placed before Congress 
a proposed reform of the unemployment insurance system. 
Among the proposed changes are the inclusion of workers 
with temporary or piece-rate contracts among the beneficiaries 
of the solidarity-based unemployment fund, establishing 
new requirements for their access. The goal of reducing the 
conditions for access to benefits from the fund is also dealt 
with: it is proposed that workers with short-term and long-term 
contracts should both have to make 12 contributions in the last 
24 months, with the last three being consecutive and with the 
same employer. As for the benefits themselves, it is proposed 
that in cases of high unemployment, additional benefits should 
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be paid to the beneficiaries of the fund. In the case of workers 
with long-term contracts, the sixth and seventh months of 
benefits will be funded with replacement ratios of 25% and 
20%, respectively, and for workers with temporary contracts the 
replacement ratio for the additional payments will be 30%.
(b) There are three ways of improving the effectiveness of active policies. 
Given that direct and indirect employment programmes, information 
and labour intermediation services and the main job training services 
currently come under the authority of SENCE, priority should be 
given to investing in all aspects of its institutional development, to 
ensure efficient functioning based on objective quality standards.
- Information and labour intermediation services. Political will is 
needed in order to intervene decisively in their development, 
to eliminate ambiguities in relation to its administrative 
dependency and to invest in efficient design and management 
models, achieve close cooperation with the funding of 
unemployment insurance, establish systems for assessing its 
results in comparison with quantifiable goals and, on the basis 
of the above, to significantly increase the allocation of fiscal 
resources towards those goals.
 The recommendation that particular importance should be 
attached to the monitoring and assessment of new initiatives 
designed to encourage participation by private-sector entities 
in the provision of those services, such as the pilot programme 
in public-private intermediation promoted by the office of the 
Under-Secretary for Labour, has taken on great significance. 
That experiment was a complete failure, demonstrating once 
again the need for a public-sector intermediation network for 
those who cannot afford to use a market-driven or private-
sector means of obtaining services of that type.
- Employment and labour reintegration programmes. Such programmes 
not only are important in response to high levels of unemployment 
resulting from crises, but are also an effective tool for dealing with 
long-term problems of imbalance in the supply of labour. They 
also help to extend the scope of protection to segments of the 
workforce which are usually excluded from conventional systems 
of protection, such as workers in the informal sector and other 
groups which are highly vulnerable because they are difficult to 
employ. Optimal techniques of intervention must be developed, 
which could be achieved by establishing permanent mechanisms 
ECLAC164
and monitoring and assessment goals for their impact, and by 
creating budgets funded from the general State budget to allow 
for medium- and long-term planning, to boost efficiency in the 
use of resources by coordinating complementary programmes 
targeting properly identified groups of beneficiaries.
- Work training policies. Since training policies depend to a great 
extent on the use of tax concessions, which causes a bias in favour 
of workers in medium-sized and large enterprises, a incentive 
system is needed in order to expand the quantity and extend 
the use of tax-concession carry-overs, to help greater numbers 
of workers who are neither affiliated to nor contributing to the 
Intermediate Technical Agencies for Training (OTIC). This area 
has high potential for concluding national tripartite agreements 
—as in the developed countries— and this could help to 
rectify the current shortcomings in the coverage of vulnerable 
beneficiaries who are least well protected because they are the 
most difficult to employ. Activities funded by the National 
Training Fund (FONCAP) should be developed and, if justified 
by periodic impact assessments, they should be reinforced by 
more generous budgetary allocations.
(c) Given the setbacks identified in the coverage of the trade-union 
movement and in collective bargaining and, consequently, in the 
ability to collectively represent workers’ interests, new formulas 
are being sought to eliminate the obstacles to better exercise 
of the unions’ role, since they are the fundamental basis for the 
development of collective autonomy. This may make it possible 
to prevent future progress from being subject to the will of the 
Government in power.
(d) Social actors and dialogue. From the viewpoint of the flexicurity 
model, the advances achieved have taken place in the absence 
of an institutional framework to promote and develop tripartite 
dialogue at the national level, as a valued and permanent practice. 
Despite various initiatives taken by all Governments since 1990, 
the experience has not been a spectacular success. Nonetheless, the 
strategy of promoting dialogue concerning regional problems or on 
specific issues seems to have the potential to generate progress with 
the passage of time, although it is a very complex problem and the 
results will become clear only in the medium and short term.
(e) Lastly, the inflexible positions taken by the workers’ and employers’ 
sides, preventing consensus being reached on an effective flexicurity 
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system, is an obstacle which crops up regularly at the national level. 
That rigidity is reflected, for example, in repeated calls for measures 
to improve labour-market flexibility, which not only are recognized 
in current regulations but also are widely used. In addition, the 
failure to reach agreements on the institutional framework for 
social dialogue and the right of the unions to represent workers in 
collective bargaining, as well as recognition of its full exercise, an 
issue considered recently by the Presidential Advisory Council for 
Employment and Equity, only serve to reveal the magnitude of the 
challenges remaining to be dealt with.
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Chapter VI
Mexico: the dimensions of labour flexicurity 1
Clemente Ruiz Durán
A.   A flexible, segmented market under             
       demographic pressure
With an economically active population of 45.4 million people and an 
economically inactive population of 31.5 million, the Mexican labour 
market is the second largest in Latin America. Having grown at an 
average annual rate of 1.2% since 1995, the total population of the country 
reached 106.5 million in 2008. In the same period, the economically 
active population expanded 2.0% as the young people born during 
1 This document draws on the material presented at the seminars held in February             
and August 2008 at ECLAC headquarters in Santiago and the comments made by 
Jürgen Weller, Ruperto Patiño, Graciela Bensusán, Gerardo Fujii and Mateo Lejarza. 
Manuel Haro Zepeda, Carmen Hernández Lara, Marco Merino, Víctor Osorio and 
José Segura Álvarez also worked on the editing and preparation of the database. The 
Secretariat for Labour and Social Security provided essential support, and through 
the General Directorate of Labour Research and Statistics, headed by Roberto Fausto 
López Esquinca, processed the homogenized data of the National Occupation and 
Employment Surveys of 1995-2007 and the National Survey on Employment, Wages, 
Technology and Training in the Manufacturing Sector of 2005. Despite these valuable 
contributions, the author is solely responsible for the contents of this chapter. For an 
extended version, see Ruiz Durán (2009).
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the demographic explosion of the 1960s, when population growth had 
been over 3%, joined the workforce. The population aged 14 and over 
is expanding by 1,199,019 people each year. Of these, 863,740 enter the 
labour market, which obviously puts huge pressure on that market, 
while 157,622 join the ranks of the economically inactive population. 
Members of the economically inactive population are classified as 
either available (4.7 million people) or unavailable (26.7 million 
people). The available economically inactive population comprises 
people who neither work nor seek work because they do not believe 
they will be able to find a job. Although they do not refuse to work 
as such, their behaviour can be viewed as passive because they make 
no attempt to join the labour market. The unavailable economically 
inactive population consists of people who have absolutely no interest 
in joining the labour market or are unfit to work (INEGI, 2005, p. 10). 
It should be said that the line between the economically active and 
the economically inactive population is a thin one and is often crossed 
when seasonal changes in labour demand (such as the holiday season 
at the end of the year) encourage economically inactive members of the 
population to temporarily become economically active. 
In the last 50 years, population growth has been affected by the 
migration (primarily to the United States) of people who could not 
find quality jobs in Mexico that would enable them to attain adequate 
living standards. According to the National Population Council, about 
9.6 million Mexicans emigrated between 1990 and 2008, and a report 
published by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics states that 
19.8 million members of the civilian population in the United States in 
2007 were of Mexican origin and 14 million of them were members of 
the work force.2 Migration has altered the composition of the Mexican 
labour market. The economically active population currently faces a 
range of options: finding a job in the formal sector or in the informal 
sector; being self-employed, underemployed or unemployed; or 
emigrating abroad. The final decision usually depends on the social 
group to which a person belongs. 
In 2008, of the 45.4 million members of the economically active 
population, 43.8 million were employed, and 1.6 million were 
unemployed. Being employed has several different meanings in 
Mexico. The Political Constitution of the United Mexican States 
classifies workers into different categories according to the job they 
hold in the labour market and the economic sector in which they work.3 
Public- and private-sector workers are treated differently. Exceptions 
2 Estimates are based on the basic demographic indicators of the National Population 
Council available [online] at http://www.conapo.gob.mx/00cifras/00indicadores.htm.
3 See article 123 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States.            
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are established for those working for the State, while more general 
rules apply to labour relations in the private sector. 
Of the 43.8 million people employed, 22.1 million work in 
companies, 12.0 million in the informal sector,4 5.2 million in public 
institutions, 1.8 million in paid domestic service, 1.4 million in 
subsistence farming, and 876,000 in private institutions.5 Although the 
different segments of the labour market are classified and covered by 
regulations enshrined in constitutional law, the uneven application of 
the law has fragmented the institutional framework.
The employed are divided into two large groups according to the 
position they occupy in the labour market: subordinated workers and 
independent workers. Subordinated workers are in turn divided into 
paid and unpaid workers. Paid subordinated workers include wage 
workers and those who obtain some other form of remuneration. 
Unpaid subordinated workers (who are divided into family workers 
and non-family workers) are people who receive no payment (in 
money or in kind) although they might receive some type of benefit. 
Independent workers encompass both employers and own-account 
workers. In 2008, subordinated workers numbered 31.8 million, 
and independent workers 12 million. Between 1995 and 2008, the 
average annual growth of the segment of subordinated workers was 
2.6% compared with 1.7% for independent workers, this resulted in 
subordinated workers accounting for 72% of the employed population 
at the end of the period. 
Of the 31.8 million subordinated workers, only 14.8 million have a 
written contract, however, which further segments the labour market. 
Although workers without contracts can take employers to court in 
the case of a conflict, they are at a disadvantage when they try to do 
so because the non-wage benefits they may have received will not 
have been duly recorded. Articles 35, 36 and 37 of the current Federal 
Labour Law establish that, in principle, all labour relations, except 
those covered by temporary contracts or contracts for a specific job, 
are considered to be for an indefinite period. 
4 The National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI) defines the           
informal sector as all economic activities that operate out of the home without a 
company being set up that can be recognized as independent of the home.
5 INEGI defines private institutions as economic units devoted to the provision of            
educational, social assistance and health services (regardless of the type of organization) 
and any other institution that operates as a civil association, regardless of the type of 
service it provides. 
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Diagram VI.1 presents the segmentation of the Mexican labour 
market and shows that the situation of a large proportion of the 
employed population in that market is highly precarious even when 
article 26 of the Federal Labour Law stipulates that the non-existence 
of a written contract does not deprive the worker of the rights derived 
from labour regulations or the services provided because responsibility 
for the lack of a formal contract is imputed to the employer.
One of the most controversial issues in labour relations recently 
has been the redefinition of the place of work. One way to approach 
the issue it to examine the type of establishments in which people 
work. Data shows that two thirds of subordinated workers with 
written contracts work in medium-sized or large establishments or for 
the Government, while 60% of subordinated workers without written 
contracts work in microenterprises, which is where the informal labour 
market is largely concentrated. 
Diagram VI.1
MEXICO: BREAKDOWN OF THE EMPLOYED POPULATION BY EMPLOYMENT SITUATION, 2008













































171Regulation, Worker Protection and Active Labour-Market Policies in Latin America
Table VI.1
MEXICO: PAID WORKERS, BY CONTRACTUAL STATUS, PRODUCTION SECTOR                           
AND WORKPLACE, 2008
(Percentages)
With a written contract






  Unspecified 






Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agricultural sector 7.4 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.7 14.2 3.1
Unspecified 2.7 2.9 4.3 2.6 28.2 2.0 27.3
        
Non-agricultural sector 90.0 96.0 94.6 96.4 71.2 83.8 69.5
Large establishments 13.6 24.9 21.2 25.7 12.5 1.7 6.7
Medium-sized 
establishments 14.9 24.5 26.0 24.3 18.5 4.6 14.6
Small establishments 21.6 27.6 27.6 27.6 22.5 15.2 23.2
Microenterprises with 
an establishment 14.6 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.6 24.8 15.8
Microenterprises without  
an establishment 10.3 0.3 0.6 0.2 2.1 21.2 2.4
Government 7.5 13.2 13.4 13.2 9.9 1.4 4.8
Other 7.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.0 15.0 2.1
Microestablishments and 
small establishments 46.6 33.0 33.4 32.9 30.3 61.2 41.4
Source:   Prepared by the author on the basis of national occupation and employment surveys.
 
A breakdown of employment by workplace also reveals that 
although a large proportion of workers work in establishments, there is 
a subgroup of workers who work from home (14% of paid workers in 
2008) or are itinerant workers (5%) and another segment who work in 
the installations of other companies or institutions (this is the case, for 
example, of many subcontractors (3%)). 
Subcontracting is most common in the manufacturing sector, 
especially in the base metal, chemical, food and beverage, plastic, and 
non-metallic mineral industries. It is mainly used in large and medium-
sized industry and only to a lesser extent in small and microindustry 
(National Survey on Employment, Wages, Technology and Training in 
the Manufacturing Sector –ENESTYC, 2005). 
The Mexican labour market has thus become highly segmented, 
and only a limited number of workers have obtained quality jobs, while 
the rest find themselves in increasingly precarious situations. One of the 
reasons behind the increasingly precarious nature of employment is the 
inability of the institutional framework to provide broad social security 
coverage that guarantees all Mexicans a minimum standard of living 
throughout their lives. The shortcomings of the social security system 
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paved the way for informality, encouraged non-compliance with the 
law and generated structural problems in the institutions that were 
meant to provide coverage. This triggered a financial crisis which has 
been tackled with only modest reforms. 
In addition to the problems stemming from the structural weakness 
of the social security system, the low-wage-cost schemes adopted in 
the last few decades have kept wages down, which has weakened the 
domestic market and produced an economic slowdown. In the pursuit 
of a market solution to the employment problem, the concept of the 
workplace has been redefined, which has generated greater flexibility 
in the labour market. A wide array of working arrangements have 
emerged: microenterprises and small enterprises (and especially the 
new hiring schemes they use) have become increasingly important, 
and subcontracting has also increased. 
B.   Labour-market regulations: characteristics and   
       recent changes
Mexico’s labour legislation has been in force since 1970 and has never 
undergone any substantive reform. Inspired by social rights, its approach 
has been to defend the rights of workers. It is grounded in article 123 
of the Constitution, which states that: “Every person has a right to 
work in a dignified and socially useful way. In order to enforce such 
a right, both job creation and labour organization shall be promoted 
in accordance with the law”. The article has been modified thirty-one 
times since 1917. The Federal Labour Law, which regulates employment 
relations, classifies these relations into two broad categories: individual 
employment relations and collective employment relations. It also 
covers labour inspection activities, which are meant to ensure that 
companies comply with existing legal provisions. 
1.    Individual employment relations
The rules governing individual employment relations are set 
out under the second heading of the Federal Labour Law. The key 
elements are: 
• Article 20. An employment relationship is deemed to exist, 
irrespective of the act from which it originated, wherever a person 
renders personal services to another person or entity, subject to the 
authority and direction of the other person or entity, in exchange 
for remuneration. An individual employment contract is any type 
of contract whereby a person undertakes to provide services to 
another person or entity, subject to the authority and direction 
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of the other person or entity, in exchange for remuneration. The 
provision of a service as referred to in the first paragraph hereof 
and the contract that is entered into have the same effect.
The aspects of individual employment relations that have been 
modified at some point are presented below: 
• Child labour (article 22). The minimum working age was raised 
from 12 to 14 years. According to the National Occupation and 
Employment Survey for the second quarter of 2008, this meant 
that 4.5 million children were protected and would be able 
to complete the basic education cycle (six years of primary 
schooling and three years of secondary schooling). The goal 
of the reform was to redefine child labour. To date, however, 
some 2.4 million children are estimated to be working, which 
shows that although the law was reformed, no mechanisms 
were set up to enforce the law. 
• Written contracts (article 24). This article stipulates that the 
employment relationship and how it will be handled to protect 
the worker against abuse must be stated in writing. However, 
as mentioned in section A above, barely 33% of the working 
population have a written contract. 
• Job stability (chapter II of heading II). This chapter of the Labour 
Law is one of the most controversial because, in principle, article 
35 states that the duration of employment relations can be for 
as long as it takes to complete a specific project, for a specified 
period of time or for an indeterminate period of time, and that 
unless stated otherwise, the relationship shall be considered to 
be for an indeterminate period of time. In practice, however, 
workers are usually hired for specific periods of time (even 
though this is supposed to be the exception), and companies 
often hire new workers under “probationary contracts”, which 
undermine workers’ job security. Nor is it rare nowadays for 
subcontractors and outsourcing companies to evade their 
labour obligations and violate the principle of job stability. 
• It should be noted that “probationary contracts” are not 
enshrined in Mexican law, whether for a specific project, 
a specified period or an indeterminate period. There is an 
ongoing debate, however, about whether what is not explicitly 
prohibited is permitted. Some legal experts have used this 
premise to validate “probationary periods”. This not only paves 
the way for workers to be hired without being guaranteed the 
benefits to which they are legally entitled, it also undermines 
the principle of job stability. 
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 As regards subcontracting, the Federal Labour Law defines an 
intermediary as “a person who hires or intervenes in the hiring of 
one or more persons for the furnishing of services to an employer”. 
The Law also establishes the principle of shared responsibility, 
whereby the corporate clients of job placement agencies are 
jointly responsible for the labour obligations towards workers 
hired through such agencies. Not all workers’ rights are protected 
in this form of hiring, however, especially as regards job stability, 
because the workers are often moved from company to company 
and find themselves being hired under one temporary contract 
after another without ever having the security of a permanent 
job. According to the findings of the National Occupation and 
Employment Survey of 2008, of 28.9 million wage earners, 18.5 
million (in other words, 64.1%) remain in the same job for less 
than five years (see figure VI.1).
Figure VI.1
MEXICO: JOB STABILITY
(Years in the same job)
Source:   Prepared by the author, on the basis of data from the National Occupation and Employment 
Survey of 2008.
• New forms of individual contracting have emerged that do not 
establish any employment relations with the company. In the 
Petróleos Mexicanos service stations, for example, people can 
work under the “right to work the floor” modality whereby they 
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do not receive any wages for dispatching petrol or providing 
other services to the customers who come to the station and 
obtain their income solely from the tips they receive. 
• Wal-Mart de México has introduced another form of individual 
contracting whereby workers are associates of the company 
rather than employees, which means that the employment 
relationship is different from the one stipulated in the Federal 
Labour Law. 
• Working for honorariums that can be assimilated are a limited 
form of contractual hiring. Part of the wages or salary in these 
arrangements is paid in keeping with labour legislation and 
affords the full benefits established by law, while the largest 
portion of the remuneration is paid in honorariums, in other 
words, outside the employment relationship. 
• The same employment relationship can undergo a series 
of changes which, in terms of job stability, are at times more 
favourable for the parties involved than others. One of these 
changes is the temporary suspension of employment relations 
which ends the reciprocal obligation of the worker to provide 
the service and of the employer to pay the wage. Article 42 
of the Federal Labour Law establishes seven grounds for the 
suspension of employment relations, including the illness, 
arrest or detention and subsequent acquittal of the worker. 
Once the temporary causes of suspension have disappeared, 
the employment relationship is resumed and the principle of 
job stability is thus respected. On other occasions, employment 
relations are not just suspended, they are terminated because 
a situation arises which prevents the service from continuing 
to be provided. According to article 53 of the Federal Labour 
Law, grounds for terminating employment relations include: 
mutual consent; the death of the worker; the completion of the 
project; and the worker’s physical or mental incapacity, which 
renders performance of the work impossible. In these cases, 
the relationship is terminated owing to natural causes that are 
not imputable to either of the parties, and the principle of job 
stability is therefore not violated. 
• A worker may also rescind the employment relationship without 
liability. Article 51 of the Law establishes nine grounds for a 
worker to end the relationship without liability. In these cases, 
it is the employer who breaches the contract by violating the 
principle of job stability. The grounds include: lack of probity 
on the part of the employer; the lowering of the worker’s wages; 
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and the employer’s failure to pay wages at the established place 
and time. The worst and least desirable change in the employment 
relationship is dismissal. Dismissal is a unilateral act whereby 
the employer ends the employment relationship, citing serious 
non-compliance on the part of the worker as just cause. A 
worker can be dismissed when the worker fails to comply with 
the contract by incurring in one of the 15 faults established in 
article 47 of the Federal Labour Law, without the employer being 
responsible for the non-compliance. The following are some 
of the grounds for dismissal, in other words, for the employer 
to end the relationship: the worker disobeys the employer; the 
worker is absent without justification three times within a period 
of 30 days; lack of probity on the part of the worker; and showing 
up to work inebriated. Workers can be dismissed for economic 
reasons but only with the authorization of the labour authority. 
In the case of unfair dismissal, the worker is given three months’ 
wages plus 12 days’ wages for each year of service when the 
worker has the right to be reinstated but does not exercise that 
right, and three months’ wages plus 20 days’ wages for each 
year of service when the worker does not have the right to be 
reinstated (the worker receives accrued outstanding wages). In 
the case of dismissal for economic reasons, the indemnity is four 
months’ wages, 20 days’ wages for each year of service and a 
seniority bonus of 12 days’ wages per year of service (this bonus 
cannot exceed twice the minimum wage).
2.    Collective employment relations
Collective employment relations are covered under heading seven 
of the Federal Labour Law, which regulates the relations of organized 
workers. The key elements are: 
• Level of unionization. A key problem in this area has been 
the lack of encouragement for the organization of workers; 
hence the low level of unionization in Mexico. According to the 
National Occupation and Employment Survey, only 4,507,154 
of the country’s workers (10.3% of the occupied workforce) 
are members of a union. In the manufacturing industry, union 
membership is highest in large enterprises (70% had unions in 
2004) and practically non-existent in microenterprises (National 
Survey on Employment, Salaries, Technology, Wages and 
Training in the Manufacturing Sector (ENESTYC), 2005). 
• Ineffectiveness of collective bargaining. The unions’ passive 
attitude is reflected in extremely low wage increases. The agreements 
signed between 2000 and 2006 achieved an accumulated real wage 
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increase of only 3% over the whole period. Wages in real terms 
actually fell in the case of workers in the public sector. 
• The right to strike and economic stabilization. One of the 
key elements of collective bargaining is the use of the right to 
strike as a means of enforcing workers’ rights (heading eight 
of the Federal Labour Law). In Mexico, strike action has been 
an extremely important mechanism when companies refuse 
to acknowledge workers’ rights to better standards of living. 
In Mexico, inflation topped 100% after the external debt crisis 
and was only reigned in as of 1987 with the establishment of 
a tripartite agreement, known as the Economic Solidarity Pact, 
among workers, the business sector and the Government. The 
Pact stipulated that companies would not raise prices if workers 
did not ask for wage increases above the expected level of 
inflation. This policy successfully brought down inflation but 
did so at the expense of the improvement of workers’ purchasing 
power, which debilitated the domestic market. In fact, the 
policy constituted a new mechanism for controlling collective 
bargaining and consequently constrained strike action because 
the possibility of striking was left in doubt in the successive 
pacts that were entered into as well. Table VI.2 shows that the 
number of strikes fell gradually between 1989 and 2007 first as a 
direct result of the Pact and subsequently thanks to the increased 
stability of the Mexican economy. 
• Work-related risk. The provisions under heading nine on work-
related risk constitute a key aspect of Mexican labour legislation. 
They were used as the basis for drawing up a detailed risk scheme 
and setting up occupational health and safety commissions in 
companies. The incidence of work-related illness, accidents and 
deaths has fallen in the past few years as a result.
• Negotiation of sectoral contracts to increase the flexibility of 
labour. In legislative terms, the union movement has made labour 
more flexible because it has not established specific sectoral 
agreements. Gabriel Pérez (2002) notes that the new forms of 
labour organization that have emerged and the maximum and  
moderate flexibility, which are found in different regions of 
the country. Maximum flexibility is characteristic of the export 
companies of the North that have introduced unilateral policies 
and new forms of organizing labour and have passive unions. 
Only a small proportion of the workforce belongs to labour 
unions or works under collective contracts in this region because 
industrialization is a relatively recent phenomenon there. State 
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 passivity of the unions in general are fundamental aspects of 
labour flexibility. He also identifies two types of flexibility, 
the basis of low wages and labour flexibility. Moderate 
flexibility can be found among the old industrial sectors 
that underwent reconversion and the para-State sector and 
is based on passive and independent unions. State policy in 
these regions is less rigid than in the regions of maximum 
flexibility because the workforce is more experienced and 
more involved in union activity. The automobile industry and 
banking are two clear examples of this type of flexibility. In 
the automobile sector the transformation of labour relations 
was accepted relatively easily. The changes involved the 
cheapening and intensive use of the workforce, the reduction 
and flexibilization of collective bargaining, the flexibilization 
of the market and de-unionization. It has been impossible 
to enhance productivity through the union-employer 
relationship in the banking sector, however (Pérez, 2002).
• The unions play a key role in labour flexibility. Companies 
and unions need to enter into pacts that encourage the 
active participation of workers in decision-making and the 
organization of the company’s work. Without agreements 
between companies and workers, it will be impossible to 
change the conditions and structure of the workforce. Labour 
flexibility requires restructuring the organization of capital 
and labour. As far as the structure of labour is concerned, 
new forms of contracting are needed, as well as new types 
of remuneration schemes and a more open attitude among 
unions towards negotiations. Article 386 of the Federal 
Labour Law defines a collective agreement as an agreement 
concluded between one or more workers’ unions and one 
or more employers or one or more employers’ unions, for 
the purpose of establishing the conditions under which 
work should be carried out in one or more companies or 
establishments.6 Collective agreements do not usually contain 
specific clauses on the organization of labour as they tend to 
focus on topics such as wages, benefits and working hours. 
One negative aspect of the collective agreements in Mexico 
is that they are often negotiated by the large central labour 
organizations and do not, therefore, take into account the 
differences between one branch of industry and another. If 
the contracts were signed on the basis of the activities of the 
6 The contracts of Petróleos Mexicanos, the Federal Electricity Commission and the           
Autonomous University of Mexico are exceptions. 
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companies involved, they would better respond to the needs of 
each sector and labour flexibility would increase. In addition to 
changing the organization of work, labour flexibility requires 
the modification of relations within unions and between 
unions and the central labour organizations. At the moment, 
the decisions taken by the central organizations do not take 
into account the relationship between workers and where they 
work, and unions adhere to the central organizations’ rulings 
without being able to negotiate directly with the companies, 
which limits labour flexibility. It should be pointed out that 
some unions do not abide by the decisions taken by the central 
labour organizations, as is the case of the telephone operators’ 
union and the union of Petroleos Mexicanos. 
• Attaining numerical flexibility. This consists of making 
changes in the organization in order to increase the quota of 
variable capital mobilized in the production process. If there 
is numerical flexibility, a company can adjust the number of 
workers in line with demand for its products. The variation 
in the number of permanent and occasional workers in an 
industry determines the numerical flexibility of that industry. In 
the manufacturing sector, for example, the textiles and apparel 
segment has the greatest numerical flexibility, while the food, 
beverages and tobacco segment has the least. This difference 
reflects the type of demand there is for each sector’s products: 
in relation to income, demand for food and beverages is more 
rigid, while demand for textiles and clothing is more elastic. 
• From numerical to functional flexibility. Companies take 
advantage of the functional flexibility of their employees to 
have them work in different stages of the production process. 
Having functional flexibility means that a worker can function 
in different shifts, schedules, departments and positions. 
Just as numerical flexibility responds to final demand for 
the company’s products, functional flexibility depends on 
technological changes. Changes in the scheduling of the 
working day and in the number of workers that can perform 
each job in a company are indicators of functional flexibility. 
Constant man-hour levels in the manufacturing sector reflect a 
lack of functional flexibility.
3.     Labour inspection
The Federal Labour Inspectorate was set up as a core institution 
for enforcing labour justice, and a chapter is devoted to this subject 
in the Federal Labour Law. The chapter in question specifies that 
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the mission of the Labour Inspectorate is to: ensure compliance with 
labour standards; facilitate technical information; advise workers and 
employers on how to effectively comply with labour standards and 
notify authorities of any non-compliance or infringement of labour 
standards in companies and other places of work; and perform 
studies and collect data as requested and deemed convenient by the 
authorities for ensuring harmonious relations between workers and 
employers. The Labour Inspectorate was established in Mexico in 
1931 for the specific purpose of overseeing compliance with labour 
and occupational health and safety standards and providing training 
to workers. 
The Inspectorate’s responsibilities are divided between the 
Federal Government and the state governments. The Federal 
Government is responsible for inspection in key industries (textiles, 
electricity, cinema, rubber, sugar, mining, metallurgy and iron and 
steel, hydrocarbons, petrochemicals, cement, quarries, automobiles, 
chemicals, pulp and paper, fats and vegetable oils, food, beverages, 
railways, basic wood, glass and tobacco), as well as for inspecting 
compliance with occupational health and safety standards, while 
state governments are responsible for training and, in some cases, 
occupational safety. The main problem facing the Labour Inspectorate 
is that although the Federal Government has set national labour 
standards, the same parameters have not been instituted at the 
individual state level (especially in the relatively less-developed 
states), which means that inspection capacity is extremely limited. 
This has resulted in huge disparities in the enforcement of labour 
standards within the country. 
In addition to disparate standards, Mexico has only a small 
number of labour inspectors: 0.8 inspectors per 1,000 workers 
(Romero Gudiño, 2008). Inspection activities are further weakened by 
the low budget that they are granted at the federal level. According 
to a study conducted by the Secretariat of Labour and Social Security, 
the budget for 2007 was around US$ 500,000, which reflects the 
low priority awarded to labour inspection. Table IV.3 shows that 
inspection has decreased in the last few years, as a result, it would 
seem, of the introduction of two programmes under the 2000—2006 
administration: the Occupational Health and Safety Self-Management 
Programme (PASST) and the Electronic Employment Declaration 
Programme (DECLARE). Both of these initiatives aim to promote 
self-regulation although the declared objective is not to eliminate 
traditional inspection but to complement it and thereby increase 
inspection coverage, which at the moment is barely 3%. 
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Table VI.3
















2000 35 879 1 388 474
2001 35 203 7 798 7 676 14 965 4 764 1 422 594
2002 32 818 6 001 5 879 16 456 4 482 2 504 976
2003 31 211 6 551 6 453 14 956 3 251 2 532 969
2004 28 635 5 221 5 251 14 737 3 426 2 232 624
2005 26 122 4 643 4 440 13 666 3 373 2 378 699
2006 23 976 4 234 3 911 12 748 3 083 2 398 573
2007 24 981 … … … … 2 291 691
Source: Secretariat of Labour and Social Security, Mexican Social Security Institute, on the basis of data 
obtained from the Coordinating Office for Occupational Health and the Safety and Social Services Institute.
C.   Characteristics and recent changes in active    
       labour-market policies
This section examines active labour-market policies in Mexico, 
which range from employment services (such as assistance in finding 
employment and job brokerage services) to training and job creation 
through wage subsidies, direct hiring programmes and loans to 
microenterprises. According to the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), active labour-market policies refer to specific, selective 
government intervention aimed at increasing the efficiency and/or 
equity of the labour market by acting directly or indirectly to provide 
jobs and increase the possibilities of certain disadvantaged groups of 
people finding employment (Auer, Efendioglu and Leschke, 2004). 
The amount spent by industrialized countries on active labour-market 
policies has remained relatively constant, but the strategies, design and 
implementation of active labour-market policy measures have changed 
substantially over the past decade. These changes obviously vary from 
country to country, but the three presented here are common to most.
• Growing emphasis on support for jobseekers. This support has 
involved greater control over, and stricter requirements regarding, 
job seeking for those receiving unemployment benefits.
• Integrated services (one-stop windows) so that clients can 
obtain information, advice and services from a single source.
• Heavier dependence on the private sector to provide employment 
support services (for example, training, employment services and 
public services). The State’s role has been limited to establishing 
priorities, guaranteeing quality and providing financing, especially 
to ensure equity.  
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Table IV.4 shows that although the structure of spending on labour- 
market programmes is similar in the industrialized countries, the 
amount devoted to active labour-market policies varies considerably 
from one group of countries to another. The European countries spend 
more as a proportion of GDP, while the countries of Asia and North 
America (and most notably among them, Mexico), allocate only a small 
budget to labour-market policies. The European labour market also 
tends to provide more protection to its members, possibly as a result 
of the more comprehensive social policies adopted by the European 
countries. How resources are channelled also differs considerably from 
one group of countries to another. The emphasis on training found in 
most countries contrasts sharply with the support given to direct job 
creation programmes in others, and this contrast is notable among and 
between the Asian and the European countries and between Canada and 
the United States. Mexico is the only country in which microenterprises 
have much weight, while the United States, the Republic of Korea 
and Sweden allocate a significant portion of resources to employment 
programmes for the disabled or similar programmes. 
Table VI.4
SPENDING ON LABOUR-MARKET PROGRAMMES












jobs for the 
disabled




Mexico 42.28 8.80 0.00 40.50 7.82 0.61 100.00 0.03
United States 23.08 38.46 0.00 7.69 7.69 23.08 100.00 0.13
Canada 50.00 26.67 3.33 6.67 6.67 6.67 100.00 0.30
Europe
Spain 16.67 20.51 42.31 10.26 7.69 2.56 100.00 0.78
Germany 31.76 38.82 7.06 10.59 10.59 1.18 100.00 0.85
France 26.37 31.87 13.19 20.88 0.00 7.69 100.00 0.91
Sweden 16.79 24.09 42.34 0.00 2.19 14.60 100.00 1.37
Asia
Japan 66.67 19.05 4.76 0.00 0.00 9.52 100.00 0.21
Republic of 
Korea 20.00 33.33 20.00 6.67 6.67 13.33 100.00 0.15
In Mexico, active labour-market policies target people participating 
in the formal labour market, as well as job seekers and the 
unemployed. People in the informal market, especially youth, are 
sometimes included among the jobseekers and the unemployed. This 
scheme forms part of a global job placement and permanence strategy 
Source:   Prepared by the author on the basis of data from OECD Employment Outlook 2008; for Mexico, 
on the basis of the 2007 Federal Public Finances Account, the Information Bank, Secretariat of Labour and 
Social Security.
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promoted by the National Employment Service, which was set up 
in 1978 under the reform of the Federal Labour Law. The Secretariat 
of Labour and Social Security, through the General Employment 
Directorate, provides the State-Level Employment Services with 
standards, manuals, methods, procedures, technical assistance and 
resources for their activities, and controls, monitors and evaluates 
the programmes. The National Employment Service has two main 
lines of action: the job placement service and employment support 
programmes. Two million people participate in these schemes, and 
approximately one quarter of them find jobs, especially those who use 
the job placement service. The proportion is smaller in the case of the 
programmes for the unemployed. 
The job placement service is based on the thinking derived from 
the work of Jan Tinbergen (1969) on the role played by information gaps 
(what in neoclassical literature is known as asymmetric information). 
Various job placement services have been set up to address this issue.
The National Employment Service has organized a number of 
initiatives to match jobseekers to jobs in the labour market. In addition 
to creating the labour exchange, it has set up: job fairs and workshops for 
jobseekers; state-level employment systems, as well as the Chambatel 
telephone and Chambanet Internet job information services (“chamba” 
means job or work in Mexican Spanish); various job brokerage centres; 
the employment programme for the disabled entitled “Opening up 
spaces”; and a labour observatory for regional markets that consists 
of a system of information on demand for jobs. Tables VI.6 and VI.7 
Table VI.5
MEXICO: NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT SERVICE
Year     Total, National 
    Employment Service
        Employment 
        support programme
      Local development 
      programme 
      (microregions)
  Job placement service
     Persons
    served
    Persons
    placed
        Persons
        served
        Persons
         placed
        Persons
       served
      Persons
      placed
   Persons
  served
     Persons
     placed
1989-1994 2 429 498 283 650 459 762 … 1 969 736 283 650
1995-2000 7 071 898 2 190 685 3 172 017 962 506 3 899 881 1 228 179
2001 1 382 903 510 626 396 974 229 240 985 929 281 386
2002 1 549 201 540 820 312 897 193 274 1 236 304 347 546
2003 1 908 443 531 249 308 255 195 762 1 600 188 335 487
2004 2 037 827 587 094 300 550 199 293 13 498 7 011 1 723 779 380 790
2005 2 111 177 591 438 386 981 211 932 11 557 4 366 1 712 639 375 140
2006 2 086 140 549 437 301 285 165 428 12 362 6 262 1 772 493 377 747
Source:   Secretariat of Labour and Social Security.
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show that the most successful job placement instrument has been the 
National Employment Service’s labour exchange, which manages to place 
over 50% of the people served by the job placement services. The job fairs 
have also been effective; they help about 90,000 people find a job each year.
Training is provided under the employment support programme to 
all the State-Level Employment Services so that they can point jobseekers 
towards vacancies, help companies cover their staffing needs and provide 
guidance and training to the unemployed and thereby improve their 
possibilities of finding work or becoming own-account workers. The State-
Level Employment Services address the following in their activities (in 
order of importance): the volume and characteristics of the unemployed 
and underemployed population that meet the job and skills requirements 
of the corporate sector; investment and the creation of new sources of 
employment; opportunities for own-account work; and the characteristics 
of available training supply. 
Even though the number of subprogrammes increased during the 2000-
2006 administration, the number of people served and the number of people 
placed fell. The BECATE (grants for job training) programme (the Spanish 
acronym also means “get a grant”) achieved the most permanent placements 
in different fields; however, its impact waned after 1995-2000, and the other, 
low-profile programmes never managed to offset this decline. 
All the programmes have been redesigned, especially the job training 
programmes, with a view to increasing their effectiveness. BECATE 
was altered to change the programme from a general training scheme 
to one that targets specific groups. This change has meant a long period 
of adjustment because in the 1990s the programme was fundamentally 
training-based, while now it provides seven types of grants and has 
introduced a new training voucher system that is currently being piloted. 
The outcome of these changes is presented in table VI.8.
The 2006-2012 administration has also implemented the so-called 
First-Job Programme, which aims to create permanent, well-paid jobs in 
the formal sector and which functions alongside support programmes for 
young entrepreneurs and small and medium-sized enterprises. Under this 
programme, the Federal Government will help people and companies to 
create new, permanent jobs by subsidizing part of the obligatory payments 
that employers must make when registering workers with the Mexican 
Social Security Institute (IMSS). This government incentive stems from 
the idea of creating jobs by lowering costs for companies in order to 
encourage them to hire more people. The mechanism also increases the 
number of workers covered by social security and fosters the creation of 
formal jobs. In 2007, the First-Job Programme had a budget of 3 billion 
Mexican pesos for subsidizing, for a period of up to 12 months, part of 
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the payments that companies have to make to IMSS when they hire new 
workers. The size of the subsidy is calculated according to the base salary 
rate of the new worker: ranging from 100% for workers with a base salary 
rate of less than 10 minimum wages, and then progressively downwards 
to 10% for workers with a base salary rate of over 20 minimum wages. 
In order to participate in the scheme, the workers must be hired for at 
least nine continuous months. When this criterion has been satisfied, the 
subsidy is received for 12 months.


















1985 27 540 … … …
1990 64 139 61 581 2 558 2 558 
1991 49 203 45 966 3 237 3 237 
1992 42 136 38 282 3 854 3 854 
1993 46 612 37 266 9 346 9 346 
1994 198 864 160 779 38 085 38 085 
1995 412 318 205 455 58 507 58 507 74 104 72 257 1 995 
1996 544 026 166 187 70 155 70 155 65 090 235 960 6 634 
1997 563 652 189 924 95 964 15 478 80 486 90 694 174 999 12 071 
1998 506 660 125 388 181 857 103 999 77 858 69 647 116 278 13 490 
1999 552 186 121 533 230 686 136 254 94 432 48 892 142 848 8 227 
2000 593 175 133 723 267 228 167 598 99 630 34 113 137 576 20 535 
2001 396 974 68 707 183 503 106 476 77 027 45 890 98 874 0 
2002 230 185 136 722 62 359 74 363 62 355 14 222 16 886 
2003 214 931 139 633 70 180 69 453 54 736 3 040 17 522 
2004 207 239 129 915 61 936 67 979 62 627 14 697 
2005 214 185 109 425 64 032 45 393 85 547 19 213 
2006 106 551 56 558 33 035 23 523 41 355 8 638 
Source:  Prepared by the author. 
Table VI.8
THE BECATE PROGRAMME: GRANTS BY TYPE
Months Base salary rate a Maximum subsidy 
(Percentages)1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Nine continuous months  
in order to be eligible for  
the subsidy
Payment of the subsidy in 12 
monthly quotas
Less than 10 minimum wages
10 to 14 minimum wages
15 to 19 minimum wages




Keep the eligible workers’ social security payments up to date 10
Know the fiscal obligations assumed under article 32D of the 
Fiscal Code of the Federation
Source:   Prepared by the author.
a Minimum wages refer to the minimum wages in the area in question.
Table VI.9
SUBSIDY PAYMENT MECHANISM OF THE FIRST-JOB PROGRAMME
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This support did not fulfil expectations because businesspeople 
thought the mechanism was too bureaucratic and very few companies 
applied to participate in the scheme. In 2007, the programme promoted 
the creation of 7,000 jobs, and the corresponding subsidies used the 
equivalent of 16% of its budgeted resources. The Federal Government 
has insisted that this mechanism can work and issued a decree at the 
end of 2007 whereby people who have already been employed and 
registered with IMSS will also be able to participate in the First-Job 
Programme, provided that the period during which they have been 
employed previously does not exceed nine consecutive months with the 
same employer.7 
An examination of the country’s active labour-market policies 
shows that a new approach needs to be adopted to guarantee the 
transition of the Mexican labour market from a segmented one to an 
integrated one.
• It should be borne in mind that active labour-market policies 
affect only a small proportion of the economically active 
population as they are not geared towards regularizing the 
informal markets; they are designed to lower unemployment. 
In the last few years, approximately 4.25% of the economically 
active population has received support through these policies 
at a time when the informal labour market accounted for over 
27% of jobs. 
• The unemployment programmes were designed along the 
same lines as the programmes implemented in countries 
with structured labour markets. Those aiming to help people 
find new jobs, however, have not managed to bring the open 
unemployment rate below the historically high levels it has been 
at thanks to the combination of a rapidly expanding economically 
active population and slow growth in labour demand. 
• The instruments used to reduce open unemployment need to 
be revised and the more successful job placement instruments, 
the labour exchanges and job fairs, need to be strengthened and 
developed. They should also be allocated more public resources. 
• To date, the shift from a broad training-based grant system to a 
decentralized one has not proved to be more effective. The existing 
schemes need to be evaluated with a view to identifying which form 
7 According to the decree published in the Official Gazette on 17 December 2007, which              
modified the decree establishing the general directives for compliance with the First-
Job Programme published on 23 January 2007. 
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of training is the most effective and would make it possible to reach 
more people.
• Making small adjustments will not transform the labour market 
because the critical problem in Mexico is the informal labour 
market which creates economic, political and social problems, 
hampers the development of the domestic market, foments anti-
democratic processes and generates conflict among the various 
agents operating in the labour market. 
• The only solution that will be sustainable in the long run, as far as 
reducing informality is concerned, is to establish clear operating 
rules for the labour market and to increase its capacity to 
generate jobs. Policymakers must realize that the low generation 
of productive jobs stems from the low level of investment in the 
country compared with its main competitors. Mexico’s active 
labour-market policies must therefore be framed within a the 
context of high levels of gross fixed capital formation. Mexico’s 
goal should be to raise the level of investment to at least that of 
Spain, even though in order to remain competitive its investment 
levels should approach those of the Asian countries. 
• From the public-policy perspective, a programme to regularize 
the informal market needs to be implemented, and labour-market 
programmes in general need to be adequately funded. To 
date, little effort has been made to ensure that labour policy is 
sufficiently backed by resources to be able to improve the job 
situation for subordinated and own-account workers. Only 28 
Mexican pesos (two United States dollars) for each member of 
the economically active population were allocated to labour 
policy in the 2007 budget. 
• The structure of the Mexican labour market will only be changed 
if the real political will to make the changes is there because 
the characteristics of the market are largely determined by 
developments in other areas, especially in production. Reform 
must therefore modify and expand the notion of the workplace. 
The main task is to bring about changes in companies so that 
the generation of value added is increased. For that to happen, 
microenterprises need to become small enterprises, small 
enterprises need to become medium-sized enterprises, and 
medium-sized enterprises need to become large enterprises. This 
will require the support of an industrial policy that assembles and 
develops a science- and technology-based production platform. 
If production is headed in that direction, consideration needs 
to be paid to the technical training of the workforce. Different 
191Regulation, Worker Protection and Active Labour-Market Policies in Latin America
skills will be needed, and random training programmes will 
not suffice; instead, permanent training mechanisms that can 
transform the skills of labour will have to be established. 
• It short, it could be said that the future of active labour-market 
policies in a country like Mexico will depend on the country’s 
capacity to transform the production apparatus because each 
country’s basket of products determines its competitiveness 
in the global market, which in turn determines the quality of 
its production. This hypothesis has been defended by several 
authors, including Dani Rodrik (2007), who argues that in the 
case of China, for example, the success recorded in employment 
and its redistributive effects are the result of the change in the 
basket of goods the country produces. What is needed then, 
according to this line of thinking, is a strong industrial policy 
because the market, on its own, is incapable of bringing about 
change. Moreover, if the market is left to its own devices, the 
proportion of informal labour will increase and the segmentation 
of the market with it. 
D.   Analysis of the position adopted by the most   
      important actors
In the past 15 years, the different stakeholders in the labour market 
have all fought for comprehensive labour reform. The main elements 
of the debate are presented below together with a comparison of the 
position adopted by the Government of President Felipe Calderón and 
that of other sectors. 
1.    The Government’s position: introduce more flexibility
The Government has sought to flexibilize individual contracting 
by legalizing some of the actions that companies currently take illegally: 
allowing probationary contracts; reducing training requirements; 
flexibilizing collective bargaining; and curtailing the mechanisms 
that workers may use to pursue equity (such as the right to strike). A 
summary of the Government’s proposal (known as the Sector Initiative) 
is presented below. This proposal was endorsed by the Labour 
Congress, the umbrella association of the unions that generally support 
the Government’s position.8 
8 This summary is based on the presentation made by Dr. Álvaro Castro Estrada, Deputy              
Secretary of Labour, Safety and Social Security of the Secretariat of Labour and Social 
Security at the seminar on the Panorama for Labour in 2007-2008, held in Mexico City on 
21 November 2007. 
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• New types of individual employment contracts. New types 
of individual employment contracts, such as probationary 
contracts and initial training contracts, would be established. 
Seasonal work, whose existence is only inferred in current 
legislation, would be regulated. Probationary contracts could 
have, in general, a maximum duration of 30 days, and in the 
case of managerial posts or specialized professional or technical 
positions, a maximum duration of 180 days, which would 
expand hiring possibilities. Through initial training contracts, 
workers would be able to acquire the skills or knowledge needed 
to perform a particular job while receiving a wage in keeping 
with the position held. Initial training contracts would be able 
to have, in general, a maximum duration of three months, and 
in the case of managerial or administrative posts or specialized 
professional or technical positions, a maximum duration of 
six months. The aim of these kinds of contracts is to break the 
vicious circle of “no job without experience, no experience 
without a job”. 
• Distribution of the working day. Employers and employees 
would be able agree to extend the working day and arrange for 
the monthly accumulation of hours (in other words, set up an 
“hours bank”) to allow workers to take the accumulated rest 
days as a continuous period, without this constituting a violation 
of article 123, section XXVII, paragraph a, of the Constitution.
• Simplification of employers’ training obligations. The chapter 
on worker training and skills-building would be completely 
revised and renamed “on worker productivity, training and 
skills-building”. Only companies with over 20 employees would 
have to participate in the mixed productivity, training and skills-
building commissions. Several obligations would be rescinded, 
including most notably: the obligation for training and skills-
building programmes to be registered with the Secretariat of 
Labour and Social Security; the obligation for institutions and 
schools wishing to provide training to be authorized by, and 
registered with, the Secretariat; and the obligation for labour 
skills certificates to be registered.
• Measures to increase the country’s productivity and 
competitiveness. Promotion on the basis of seniority would 
no longer be automatic. Skills and training as opposed to 
seniority would be the main criterion for promotions to vacant 
or newly created posts. Workers with multiple skills would be 
able to receive higher wages. In other words, arrangements 
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could be made for workers to perform tasks that are related or 
complementary to their core job, provided that they receive the 
corresponding salary adjustment. 
• Union registration. The Sector Initiative includes the possibility 
of union registration being cancelled if the union does not 
notify labour authorities of its activities and of changes in its 
membership on a six-monthly basis. Upon the request of one 
or more members of the union or of any interested party, the 
corresponding Conciliation and Arbitration Board would 
examine the cancellation of the union’s registration.
• Requirements for the signing of collective employment 
contracts. Under the proposal, if a union intended to sign 
a collective employment contract, it would have to submit a 
written request to do so that contained the signatures of the 
union representatives and the represented workers. The request 
would have to be accompanied by valid registration certificates 
issued by the registering authority. Otherwise, the collective 
contract could not be legally filed and registered.
• Improving the justice system for labour. The principle of 
conciliation would be specifically incorporated into the handling 
of labour-related proceedings. Throughout a legal procedure 
and right up to the moment the verdict is issued, Conciliation 
and Arbitration Boards would try to have the parties settle the 
conflict through conciliation. Conciliation officers would be 
appointed to provide assistance in this task as part of the legal 
staff of the Conciliation and Arbitration Boards. Members of the 
legal staff would have to hold a recognized law degree and be 
certified to practice law, have specialized in labour law, and have 
a good reputation. The transitory articles of the Sector Initiative 
stipulate that members of the legal staff of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Boards who do not hold a law degree and are not 
certified to practice law would have five months in which to 
obtain these qualifications commencing on the date in which 
the reforms enter into force. 
2.    The position of the independent unions and some      
       political parties
The independent unions and some political parties presented an 
alternative proposal to the Government one. This proposal focuses on 
the strengthening of collective bargaining; the removal of the discretional 
nature of some aspects of labour law; the elimination of the divide 
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between the labour regulations for public-sector workers and the labour 
regulations for private-sector workers; the preservation of the right to 
strike; and the modernization of agencies such as the National Public 
Registry of Union Associations and Collective Contracts and the National 
Institute of Minimum Wages, Productivity and Profit Sharing. The basic 
elements of this alternative proposal are:9 
• Preservation of existing guarantees and guaranteed 
participation of workers in collective bargaining processes 
through meetings at which at least one third of workers are 
present. This proposal is being channelled through the National 
Public Registry of Union Associations and Collective Contracts, 
a neutral, professional organization headed by prestigious 
figures who review proposed collective contracts and guarantee 
that the rights of other union organizations that also wish to sign 
the collective contract are respected. In the case of a dispute, 
the workers are consulted to determine which of the contracts 
represents the largest number of workers. These consultations 
take place in very short and specific deadlines and culminate 
with the notification of the call to strike. The intention of the 
proposed modification is twofold: to prevent the signing of 
the so-called “protection contracts” that do not reflect the will 
of the workers; and to ensure that the will of the majority and 
of those who do not wish to belong to a union are respected, 
which would prevent unsupported calls to strike action being 
made that jeopardize jobs. The goal is, above all, to strengthen 
legitimate collective bargaining as a fundamental instrument 
for achieving consensuses between employers and workers. 
The Public Registry occupies a key position in this proposal 
because a neutral and effective body for settling union disputes 
is necessary to guarantee that collective bargaining works as it 
should from the beginning, as this will benefit both employers 
and workers.
• Preservation of the right to strike. The proposal aims to establish 
a procedure whereby strike action can be taken provided it has 
the real support of the workers and the call to strike is first 
submitted for consideration by a labour judge. The right to strike 
as it stands today is upheld, with the guarantee that it may not 
be used to blackmail companies or simulate strikes, as happens 
in practice when employers sign collective contracts without 
the knowledge or support of workers (the so-called “protection 
9 These basic elements are taken from the legislation proposed by the National Union             
of Workers and a group of parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies to reform 
various provisions of the Federal Labour Law. 
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contracts”) simply by buying off a union leader who signs 
the contract or the call to strike without the knowledge of the 
workers. This proposal aims to establish an efficient procedure 
for recognizing the right to sign contracts as belonging to those 
who represent the majority and to improve upon current practice 
which results in lengthy court proceedings and often involves 
violent incidents during the consultation processes as well as 
blatant partiality in the Conciliation and Arbitration Boards 
where the defending employers and union leaders tend to be 
both judge and party to the dispute.
• Cancellation of union registration. No new grounds are 
established for annulling the registration of a union. The right of 
association is respected through a simple registration procedure 
at the National Public Registry of Union Organizations and 
Collective Contracts thus sidestepping the current requriement 
that unions must have a legal personality. Only in the case of a 
dispute does it become established procedure to consult workers 
through a universal secret ballot held under the impartial 
supervision of the National Public Registry. 
• Right to determine unions’ scope of action. Article 470 of the 
Federal Labour Law stipulates that unions have the right to 
determine freely their scope of action, as recommended by ILO. 
This is in accordance with the right to freedom of association 
established in article 123 of the Constitution.
• Severance of labour relations. The proposal consists of 
upholding current dismissal regulations and establishing the 
sexual harassment as additional grounds for dismissal. It is 
important to note that current regulations in this regard were 
drafted in keeping with the protective goals of the Federal 
Labour Law, and any modification would therefore be against 
workers’ interests.
• Establishment of working hours. Current regulations would be 
upheld. They are already sufficiently flexible for working hours 
to be distributed across various days to allow workers to take the 
required rests. Article 65 of the Federal Labour Law would be 
expanded to include the possibility of a labour judge intervening 
to prevent working hours and days being established that might 
be harmful to workers’ health.
• Labour standards. A rewording of the current text is proposed to 
improve upon the current definitions with a view to regulating all the 
different labour relations that employers currently establish through 
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service companies or subcontractors or similar arrangements in an 
attempt to evade their responsibilities as employers.
• Labour stability. The established principles regarding job 
stability are upheld, including the stipulations in article 38 of 
the Federal Labour Law that employment for an indeterminate 
period can be continuous or not, and if not, such employment 
is permanent, seasonal or for certain periods of year, depending 
on the nature of the work in question. In these cases, workers 
employed for indeterminate periods will have the same rights 
and obligations as workers employed for determinate periods 
on a continuous basis, in proportion to the time worked.
It is clear that these two proposals do not complement one 
another and in fact point in different directions. One aims to strengthen 
individual employment relations as a means of flexibilizing labour; the 
other aims to strengthen collective employment relations. The debate 
has been under way for some time, and an agreement may still be a long 
way off. In the meantime it is hoped that neither party will try to impose 
its position by force. 
E.   Conclusions: moving towards the point where    
       the flexicurity philosophy improves the dialogue     
       in labour relations
The Mexican labour market has suffered from low levels of job creation, 
and the number of jobs available is insufficient to absorb the expansion 
of the economically active population and provide it with decent work. 
The lack of demand has made the domestic labour market increasingly 
precarious and has fuelled emigration to the United States. The low level 
of job creation can be attributed to two basic factors:
• The low level of investment in the economy, which resulted 
in slow growth in the production sector and consequently in 
employment. This has been the situation for the past 20 years. 
No scheme has managed to boost economic growth since the 
unfolding of the debt crisis, which put an end to the profit-making 
arrangements that had driven economic growth prior to then.
• A weak institutional framework, which generates uncertainty 
in the labour market because employers do not have rules that 
allow them to benefit from flexible contracting and workers do 
not have rules that guarantee them stable incomes. 
These two factors mean it would be possible to develop a labour 
programme around the concept of flexicurity. After all, without more 
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job creation, it will be impossible to reorder the labour market; and 
without a suitable institutional framework, too much flexibility might 
be introduced and end up harming workers’ interests. Some elements 
that could be included in such a programme are presented below:
• New job creation policies. Up till now, public labour policies 
have consisted of establishing job placement and training 
programmes and providing support for entrepreneurs and 
small subsidies to lower initial hiring costs, as outlined in 
the section on active labour-market policies. To all intents 
and purposes, however, these policies have been inadequate, 
and the labour market has, as a result, become increasingly 
segmented, with the informal sector now accounting for 30% 
of the employed population. The job creation problem cannot 
be solved in the labour market because it is the product of 
what happens in the whole economy. What is needed is 
high aggregate demand, a certain level of integration in the 
domestic market, technologies that favour the use of human 
capital and institutional agreements in the labour market that 
encourage job creation. Employment subsidies are irrelevant 
if there is no aggregate demand to make businesspeople 
invest and create jobs. The best job creation policies are those 
that stimulate the sustained growth of the economy as has 
been shown in the emerging economies of Asia which have 
recorded the highest levels of job expansion in the world. The 
Asian countries implemented industrial policies that made it 
possible to construct growth scenarios for periods of up to at 
least twenty years which provided the business sector with the 
certainty it needed in order to invest: hence the high level of 
job creation. Job creation is a task that should be undertaken by 
the State, and the whole public apparatus should be focussed 
on coordinating policies to promote investment and jobs. The 
public sector needs to become the major coordinator of the 
various activities involved and to use its budget to generate 
new jobs. The State is the best-equipped agent to achieve this. 
In industrialized countries such as the United States, companies 
are encouraged to carry out projects for the Government. This 
induces small businesses to become State suppliers, and some 
US$ 300 billion a year is spent on Government contracting in 
addition to funds spent on a host of incentives for setting up 
new companies and supporting those already in existence.10 




MEXICO: THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM OVER THE COURSE OF LIFE
Source:   Prepared by the author.
• Redesigning social security. The institutional framework needs 
to be overhauled in countries with segmented labour markets 
because informality is the result of non-compliance with the 
law. In order to be enforced, the law needs to be coherent and 
be designed to create a sense of security for the participants in 
the market. This requires rethinking and modernizing the social 
security system and the protection is provides from cradle to 
grave. Social security reform should encompass an overall view 
of the life cycle, family benefits from childhood, a poverty line that 
determines the income supplements that need to be provided, an 
insurance system that covers occupational risk, illness, maternity 
and disability, housing support, unemployment insurance and a 
citizens-type pension system. 
• Strengthening of workers’ organizations. A disperse labour 
market generates few agreements on productivity, and unionization 
of workers therefore needs to be promoted. 
• Establishment of an economic and social council to promote 
dialogue among stakeholders. An economic and social council 
could promote dialogue leading to agreements that further a 
defined set of social policies to safeguard living standards. This 
could replace the mechanism whereby agreements used to be 
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established through pacts among the different sectors of society, 
which in their moment managed to stabilize the economy. 
The current institutional setup seems to have outgrown its 
usefulness: the role of the Secretariat of Social Development has 
become limited to the implementation of targeted schemes, and 
the Secretariat of Labour and Social Security seems to be mainly 
in charge of maintaining social calm. There is a patent need 
for a more extensive institutional framework that is capable of 
performing an ongoing assessment and classification of living 
standards and of reforming the whole social security system. 
• Combination of public and private schemes for establishing 
minimum living standards. The modification of the labour 
market will require a collective effort. The shift from non-
compliance with the law to total compliance will not occur by 
decree. Alliances need to be forged and new instruments need to 
be designed that are in keeping with a new culture of welfare, the 
basic component of which is social solidarity that manifests itself 
in public-private agreements that guarantee minimum living 
conditions for all. One way to promote this would be through the 
creation of a citizens’ pension scheme that is complemented by 
personal pension funds which encourage citizens to save more, 
something that is not promoted by the current system. 
• Strengthening of public finances to address the problems of 
the labour market. In Mexico, the leading role of the public 
sector has been undermined by the lack of resources. With tax 
revenues accounting for only 12% of GDP, the State’s capacity 
for social management has ended up being a good intention 
that can not be put into practice. The fiscal reforms approved 
in 2007 are patently insufficient for meaningfully restructuring 
the institutional framework, and the State now limits itself to 
managing a segmented society without pursuing a clear vision 
for the welfare of its citizens in the future. 
• New legislation for the new institutional arrangement. If a new 
institutional framework is to be constructed, current legislation 
will have to be adapted according to the principles of labour 
flexicurity, which would be in keeping with the new paradigm of 
economic, political and social development. 
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Chapter VII
Challenges involved in the introduction            
of flexicurity in Peru 1
Jorge Toyama Miyagusuku
with Victoria Rosas Chávez and Marta Tostes Vieira 
Introduction
Peru shifted from a highly protective system of labour relations with job 
security and worker participation in enterprises, in which management 
did not have much say (1980s), to a less protective system with a 
corresponding increase in managerial authority (1990s).
There were two high points in the process of labour deregulation 
in Peru —which the International Labour Organization (ILO) actually 
described as fierce— as two waves of legislation aimed at flexibilizing 
labour relations so as to provide a suitable framework for private 
investment. Between 1991 and 1992, a series of reforms were introduced 
in the existing labour legislation, and the changes in the labour model 
reached a climax in 1995 and 1996. The Peruvian labour flexibilization 
process involved deregulation (as opposed to a reform consisting of 
adaptation with social dialogue and arrangements to offset government 
withdrawal from the regulation of labour relations), introduction of 
flexibilization mechanisms both of form (withdrawal of heteronomous 
1 For a fuller version of this chapter see Toyama Miyagusuku, Rosas Chávez and Tostes              
Vieira (2009).
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legislation) and of substance (significant lack of labour oversight) 
and, lastly, both internal flexibilization (with implications for working 
conditions) and external flexibilization (affecting hiring procedures and 
termination of the employment contract).
In other words, the labour reforms followed a trend towards 
flexibilization or deregulation starting in the early 1990s and peaking in 
1995 and 1996. Reforms then continued until early 2001. Unfortunately, 
the result was not optimal. Rates of suitable employment fell steadily and, 
while the unemployment rate did not fall much, levels of social protection 
(workers with labour and social coverage) and staff earnings did.
Partly in reaction to this result, a trend started in 2001 towards 
more labour regulation (although of course nowhere near the levels of 
regulation found in the 1980s).
This chapter reviews the options for implementation of a system 
of flexicurity in Peru. It first considers active labour-market policies, 
as well as the legal system governing individual and collective labour 
relations. The second section contains an analysis of the impact of the 
labour reforms, the positions of the social actors and the effectiveness 
of the legal system, in the context of a high degree of informality. This 
is followed by a discussion of actions pending for the establishment of 
an institutional framework for labour that combines an efficient labour 
market and greater social protection, and the fourth section presents the 
conclusions of this chapter.
A.   Policies and regulatory framework
1.    Labour-market policies
The labour-market policies pursued have not achieved significant 
progress, except for the Programa de Capacitación Laboral Juvenil 
- PROJOVEN (Youth Labour Training Programme), which made great 
strides in the training and advancement of young people in Peru. The 
other programmes have not made a big difference and have not had an 
important impact on labour relations in Peru.
As regards policies affecting the labour market, under the third 
strategic policy in the National Human Rights Plan, 2006-2010, entitled 
“Ensuring full respect for comprehensive human rights”, the Peruvian 
State is adopting measures concerning work, labour rights, trade union 
rights and social security. In addition, Supreme Decree No. 027-2007-PCM 
adopted the ninth National Policy on employment and micro- and small 
enterprises, concerning: (a) pursuit of policies geared to the creation of 
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decent work; (b) promotion and strengthening of managerial capacities 
in micro- and small enterprises; and (c) promotion of participation by 
micro- and small enterprises in government procurement. 
The programmes created by the Peruvian State include:
• Programmes for the creation of temporary jobs through public 
works such as Construyendo Perú, and those resulting from direct 
action by the Peruvian State, such as ProEmpleo (active job-
creation measure), PROJOVEN, Red CIL ProEmpleo (providing 
vocational training, labour-market information and placement), 
elder centres (positive State action to help the elderly), and 
vocational rehabilitation centres (positive action by the State to 
help persons with disabilities).
• The Mi empresa programme, promoting new ventures and 
competitiveness, and formalization and development of micro- 
and small enterprises.
However, these programmes have not had a major impact on 
workers as regards access to social benefits and social security.
2.    Private sector: the legal system
        (a)     Individual labour relations
(i) Sphere of application of the protection system
In accordance with Supreme Decree No. 003-97-TR, Single Amended 
Text of Legislative Decree No. 728, Labour Productivity and Competitiveness 
Act (LPCA), the sphere of protection governed by labour standards 
covers all subordinate workers providing personal services and receiving 
remuneration in return, whether under an indefinite, fixed-term 
or part-time contract. In the latter case, there are some restrictions on 
benefits. It also covers cases in which none of these contracts exist or 
others (of a civil nature) exist and these three elements are verifiably 
present, in accordance with the primacy of reality principle. 
(ii) Job security as regards hiring and firing (atypical contracts). 
Job security (hiring)
For direct labour hiring, the work contract may be indefinite, fixed-
term, temporary or part-time (averaging less than four hours a day).
As a general rule, hiring should be for an indefinite period and may 
be effected orally or in writing. It is assumed, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, that an employment contract for an indefinite period exists 
for any remunerated and subordinate services rendered personally.
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Temporary work contracts must be in written form and must be 
registered with the Labour Authority. These are: 
• Contracts for start-up or expansion of activities: required for 
the commencement of a productive activity, for the subsequent 
creation or opening of new establishments or markets, for the 
launch of new activities or for the expansion of existing activities. 
Their maximum duration is three years.
• Contracts to meet market requirements: concluded for the purpose 
of dealing with cyclical increases in production, duly verified and 
caused by substantial variations in market demand, including 
regular work that is part of the normal activity of the enterprise 
and that cannot be performed by permanent staff. Their maximum 
duration depends on the specific need, and they may be renewed 
for successive periods not exceeding a maximum of five years.
• Contracts for restructuring of the enterprise: concluded when 
the activities performed by the enterprise are replaced, expanded 
or modified and, in general, when there is any alteration of a 
technical nature in machinery, equipment, facilities, means of 
production, systems, methods and productive and administrative 
procedures. Their maximum duration is two years.
• Casual contracts: concluded for the purpose of meeting temporary 
needs different from the normal activity at the work site. Their 
maximum duration is six months per year.
• Replacement contracts: concluded for the purpose of replacing 
a permanent worker whose labour relationship is suspended 
for some legally justified reason or because of contractual 
provisions applicable at the work site. They last for as long as 
they are required.
• Emergency contracts: concluded to meet needs created by 
an unforeseen event or force majeure. Their duration is that of 
the emergency.
• Contracts for the performance of a specific piece of work or 
service: concluded for a predetermined purpose and for a 
duration that depends on the requirements for completion of the 
piece or work or the required service.
• Intermittent contracts: designed to meet the needs of enterprise 
activities which, by their nature, are ongoing but not continuous.
• Seasonal contracts: concluded to meet needs specific to the line 
of business of the enterprise or establishment, to be met only at 
certain times of year.
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Indefinite and temporary contracts give workers the same rights and 
benefits as are provided for labour relationships, except that temporary 
contracts may be validly terminated upon their expiry.
Part-time employment contracts must be written, although the only 
requirement for their validity is that the average time worked daily must 
not exceed four hours, taking into account the regular workday at the 
work site concerned. Such contracts do not confer entitlement to certain 
legal benefits enjoyed by other workers. Part-time workers are entitled to 
only six vacation days and receive no Compensation for time of Service 
(CTS) or severance pay. They may be concluded for an indefinite period 
or a fixed term and must be submitted to the Ministry of Labour and 
Employment Promotion for approval and registration.
Training agreements are another hiring possibility. Although 
personal, subordinate and remunerated services are provided, these are 
viewed as being outside the sphere of labour because of the emphasis on 
vocational training, as shown below:
Table VII.1
WORKER TRAINING SYSTEMS
Benefit Labour contract Training system
Minimum monthly salary 550 nuevos soles; for a shorter workday, 
the salary is proportionately less
550 nuevos soles; for a shorter workday, 
the salary is proportionately less (Labour 
reinsertion: 1,100 nuevos soles and 
interns have a special reduced 
workload) 
Maximum workday 8 hours per day or 48 hours per week 8 hours per day or 48 hours per week 
(pre-professional practicum: 6 hours per 
day or 30 hours per week). Internships: 
special workload
Vacations 30 days 15 calendar days (no fractions)
Weekends Yes Yes
Official holidays Paid leave Subsidized leave
Bonuses One month’s salary every six months One half month’s subsidy per six months 
completed
Compensation for Time of 
Service (CTS)
1.17 months’ salary per year No
Family allowance 10% of the minimum wage (MW) No
Profit sharing Yes, varying percentages No
Severance pay 1.5 years’ salary (maximum 12) No
Life insurance Premium paid to insurance company No
(EsSalud law) 9% of monthly salary Illness and accident insurance: EsSalud 
or Health Providers (EPS)
EsSalud subsidy Yes No
Pension Fund Administration 
(AFP) /State Pension Fund 
(ONP) 
Compulsory Optional
Income tax withheld Yes, if over seven Tax Levy Units 
(TLUs) a year
No
Source:   Prepared by the author
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Job security (firing)
Under Peruvian law, workers enjoy job security: they are 
entitled to keep their jobs and cannot therefore be dismissed without 
just cause expressly provided by law (article 27 of the Political 
Constitution of Peru).
The LPCA implements this constitutional provision by regulating 
cases in which the employment contract is terminated. An employer 
may dismiss a worker by following the procedure established by law 
(written advance notice of serious misconduct, with at least six days for 
rebuttal and written notice of dismissal) if just cause exists for this under 
Peruvian law. In such cases of dismissal with cause, the worker has no 
right to compensation or to any reinstatement.
Dismissal without cause or arbitrary dismissal occurs when the 
worker is not alleged to have committed any misconduct, when the 
alleged misconduct is not covered under the law, when the legally 
prescribed procedure for dismissal has not been followed or when the 
alleged misconduct cannot be proved. 
If an employer dismisses a worker on grounds prohibited by the 
labour standards (such as race, gender, trade union activity), the dismissal 
is invalid. In this case, the worker may initiate judicial proceedings in order 
to seek reinstatement at the work site and payment of wages owed.
The Constitutional Court has completely overhauled the legal 
system described above, with the following result:
Table VII.2
SYSTEMS OF PROTECTION IN CASE OF DISMISSAL
Type of dismissal Description Existing law Constitutional Court
Dismissal without cause Oral or written dismissal without 




Fraudulent dismissal Abusive dismissal on a pretext Arbitrary dismissal: 
compensation
Reinstatement
Invalid dismissal Discriminatory or retaliatory dismissal Invalid dismissal: 
reinstatement
Reinstatement
Dismissal with violation of 
a fundamental right 
Privacy, religion, expression, etc. Arbitrary dismissal: 
compensation
Reinstatement
Dismissal for serious 
misconduct
Commission of serious misconduct; 
due process is respected but the labour 




Source: Prepared by the author
(iii) Labour intermediation and outsourcing
In Peru, labour intermediation and outsourcing are governed by special 
regulations. Their main features are described in the following table:
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Table VII.3
INTERMEDIATION AND OUTSOURCING
Topic Intermediation Outsourcing 
Type of service Only provision of workers Full service (may include staff)
Management authority The user enterprise retains management 
and oversight of staff
Only coordination. There is no 
management authority over the 
outsourcing entity’s staff
Type of activity subcontracted Complementary (totally accessory)
Temporary principal (replacement or 
occasional)
Highly specialized activity
Any activity: principal or 
complementary, temporary or 
permanent
Type of personnel Only workers of the intermediation entity May or may not be workers of 
the outsourcing entity
Organizational arrangements Activity strictly limited to labour 
intermediation
Assets, services and/or 
financial movements 
supporting enterprise activity
Liability Joint and several liability Joint and several liability
Laboralization in the main 
enterprise
In the event of non-compliance with 
regulations
In the event of non-compliance 
with regulations
Source:   Prepared by the author.
So far the Government has placed considerable limits on outsourcing 
(subcontracting) in Act No. 29245 of 24 June 2008 governing outsourcing, 
Legislative Decree No. 1038 specifying the scope of Act No. 29245 on 
outsourcing services and the Regulations enforcing that Act approved 
by Supreme Decree No. 006-2008-TR of 12 September 2008, as indicated 
in the following table:
Table VII.4
NEW OUTSOURCING STANDARDS
Outsourcing entities providing staff on a continuous basis
Requirements Features
Autonomy and independence: they act on their own 
behalf and at their own risk, assuming responsibility for 
the results of their operations
Have several clients (exceptions may be made in some 
cases)
Have their own material, financial and technical 
resources
Equipment owned or rented by them or managed by the 
main enterprise
Have people working under their exclusive organization, 
direction and supervision
Pricing arrangements
Registration + written contract indicating the purpose 
and place of the service
Capital investment
Specialization, scope of services, remote site, skills, 
know-how
Source:   Prepared by the author.
(iv) Workday, working hours, and vacations
Workers have a normal workday of eight hours or a work week of forty-
eight hours. Overtime is voluntary for workers and for the employer and an 
extra 25 per cent of the normal hourly wage is paid for the first two hours 
ECLAC208
of overtime and an extra 35 per cent for the remaining hours. Atypical or 
extended workdays may be established provided that the limit of 48 hours a 
week is respected. 
This workday limitation does not apply to persons in managerial, 
unsupervised posts and to those providing intermittent, surveillance and 
standby services. In the case of continuous work, the meal break may not 
be less than 45 minutes and is not counted as part of the working hours 
or workday.
With respect to time worked, there are two additional formal 
obligations. The employer must, firstly, keep a record of overtime 
worked and, secondly, announce on notices prominently displayed in 
the establishment or by any other appropriate method the starting and 
finishing times of the workday and the time of the meal break.
Workers in Peru have 30 days’ vacation per calendar year starting 
in the first year of employment, and the timing of vacations is decided 
by the employer. If there is no opportunity to take vacation, the worker 
is entitled to two months’ wages.
(v) Salaries and minimum wage
Wages include the totality of what workers receive for their services, 
in cash or in kind, in whatever form or denomination, provided that it is 
freely available to them, except as expressly excluded by articles 19 and 
20 of the Act on Compensation for Time of Service. In addition, workers 
receive the following benefits:
• Profits: workers in enterprises engaged in third-category revenue-
producing activities (including trade, mining, industry) which are 
subject to the private sector labour regime are entitled to a share of the 
annual revenue before tax under a system of profit sharing. Enterprises 
employing less than 20 workers are not obliged to make this payment.
• Family allowances: private sector workers whose wages are not set 
by collective bargaining are entitled, if they have dependent children 
under 18 years of age or children up to 24 years of age receiving 
higher education, to a monthly family allowance equal to 10 per cent 
of the minimum wage (550 nuevos soles).
• Bonuses: workers subject to the private sector labour regime are entitled 
to two additional months’ wages a year, one in July and one in December, 
as bonuses for Independence Day and Christmas respectively.
• Life insurance: employers must purchase life insurance for their 
employees with more than four years of service and pay the related 
premiums (0.53 per cent of the monthly wage for office workers and 
0.71 per cent for manual workers).
209Regulation, Worker Protection and Active Labour-Market Policies in Latin America
• Vacations: workers are entitled to 30 calendar days of statutory 
annual vacation with pay.
Minimum wage
Under the 1993 Constitution, the minimum wage is regulated by the 
State. Until September 2007, the minimum wage was 500 nuevos soles. 
However, it has been increased by 50 nuevos soles, of which 30 were to 
be paid starting in October 2007 and the remaining 20 were starting in 
January 2008, making a total of 550 nuevos soles.
(vi) Leave with and without pay
The legislation provides for absolute suspension of labour (leave 
without pay) and relative suspension of labour (leave with pay). 
According to the legislation, possible causes of suspension are:
• temporary disability;
• certified illness and accident;
• maternity (pre- and post-natal);
• vacation;
• performance of civic duties and compulsory military service;
• performance of trade union functions;
• disciplinary measures;
• exercise of the right to strike;
• arrest of the worker, except when there is a sentence of deprivation 
of liberty;
• administrative or judicial disqualification for a period not 
exceeding three months;
• leave granted by the employer;
• accident and force majeure (absolute suspension for up to 90 days 
without prior authorization);
• other causes expressly established in regulations.
(b)     Collective labour relations
(i) Legal regime governing trade unions
The 1993 Constitution deals with trade union rights in article 2.13 
on the fundamental rights of the individual and article 28 on social 
and economic rights. 
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By including trade union rights among the fundamental rights of 
the individual, the Constitution shows that trade unionism is a type of 
association. A minimum of 20 workers is required to form a trade union 
and 9 per cent of the economically active population in the formal sector 
is currently unionized.
(ii) Collective bargaining regime
Collective bargaining has not yet reached the stage of providing 
adequate coverage to workers in a situation of government deregulation.
The range of demands goes beyond the traditional requests 
concerning salary increases and better working conditions. To an 
increasing extent, requests concern participation in the management of 
services to workers, correct treatment of staff of labour intermediation 
enterprises, social investment, productivity and vocational training. 
The Ministry of Labour and Employment Promotion receives a growing 
number of trade union requests for financial reports on enterprises in 
bargaining processes.
Collective bargaining in Peru usually takes place at the corporate 
level and also in smaller units, such as categories (office staff/manual 
workers) or the establishment. Currently, the only active collective 
bargaining other than that conducted at the corporate level is by branch 
of activity in the construction industry. However, a recommendation of 
the Ministry of Labour and Employment Promotion (currently under 
discussion by the Judiciary) and a draft law would require collective 
bargaining by branch of activity in the port sector.
In the private sector, Peruvian legislation provides that the outcome 
of the process of collective bargaining will be the conclusion of a collective 
agreement or the handing down of an arbitral award. Exceptionally, 
there will be no outcome when no agreement is reached or when the 
workers decide to strike but, despite the strike, no collective agreement 
is concluded and the employer does not agree to arbitration. 
In most cases, collective agreements simply improve the content of 
the workers’ agreed financial benefits. Bargaining seldom deals in any 
detail with the financial situation of the enterprise or its productivity on 
the market. It is also unusual to find clauses on training or benefits other 
than financial benefits for union members. 
The regulatory reform of the 1990s resulted in the replacement of 
a highly protective system, with job security and worker participation 
in the enterprise, by a system characterized by stronger managerial 
authority. As a result and because of other social factors and of the 
failure of trade union organizations to adapt to new production systems, 
workers’ individual and collective bargaining ability declined steadily. 
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It is to be hoped, however, that Congress, the Judiciary, the 
Constitutional Court and the Government itself will continue to provide 
more space for collective bargaining, with a view to meeting workers’ 
expectations and claims that have their immediate origin and basis in the 
reform of the 1990s.
(c)     Social security
Peru currently has no unemployment insurance providing financial 
benefits. The possibility has been studied of providing this social benefit 
(envisaged in ILO Convention No. 102 [Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention]) ratified by Peru but there was no favorable decision, mainly 
because of Peru’s large informal labour sector.
However, as part of the labour relationship, the employer is required to 
deposit in a banking or financial institution selected by the worker a percentage 
of the remuneration approximately equivalent to 1.17 times the monthly wage 
for each year of service. This benefit is known as Compensation for Time of 
Service (CTS) and is equivalent to the worker’s regular monthly wage plus the 
six-month average of the most recent legal bonus for each year of service.
Although CTS may be discontinued only when the worker leaves his 
job, its purpose is not to cover situations of unemployment, as it has been 
distorted over the years, since workers have always been able to access up to 
half of the funds, which can be used for repayment of debts and for housing.
(d)    Occupational safety and health
Since October 2007, Supreme Decree No. 009-2007-TR has provided 
general regulation of occupational safety and health, requiring phased 
compliance with the obligations and working conditions to which 
workers are entitled. Previously, only certain sectors such as mining and 
industry had been regulated. This Supreme Decree adopts a preventive 
approach, seeking to promote a culture of prevention of occupational 
risks, with the participation of the State, employers and workers.
(e)     Micro- and small enterprises (MSEs) 
Prior to the entry into force of Act No. 28015 (Act on the Promotion 
and Formalization of Micro- and Small Enterprises), enterprises were 
classified according to the number of workers employed. Micro-
enterprises had between two and nine workers; small enterprises 
between 10 and 49 workers; medium-sized enterprises between 50 and 
99 workers; and large enterprises 100 or more workers.
Following the entry into force of this Act on 4 July 2003, a combination 
of two special characteristics determines whether productive units are 
considered as micro- or small enterprises: number of workers and annual 
sales turnover. 
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Thus a micro-enterprise has between one and ten workers and a 
maximum annual sales turnover of 150 Tax Levy Units (TLUs)2 and 
a small enterprise employs up to 50 workers and has an annual sales 
turnover of between 150 and 850 TLUs.
Peru has recently had a second wave of legal reforms. By Legislative 
Decree No. 1086, the Executive Branch radically modified the definition 
of micro-enterprises (up to 10 workers and maximum sales of 150 
TLUs) and small enterprises (up to 100 workers and maximum sales 
of 1,700 TLUs). There are two major changes. Firstly, the State partially 
subsidizes contributions to the social security schemes (health and 
pensions), creating a system of basic or minimal insurance. Secondly, a 
new labour system is created for enterprises employing between 1 and 
100 workers, with an average reduction of 50 per cent in the employment 
benefits established for the general system.
There are thus three categories of enterprises: micro-enterprises 
(employing up to 10 workers), small enterprises (employing up to 100 
workers) and other enterprises:
Individual and collective labour rights were treated differently 
in the first and second periods. In the first period, a special temporary 
labour regime3 was created for micro- enterprises and in the second 
period this was replaced by a special permanent regime4 for micro- 
and small enterprises. Thus the situation has changed and it is now 
possible to identify substantial differences for micro- and small 
enterprises, as shown below:
2 Currently 3,500 nuevos soles (approximately US$1,186.45).     
3 The temporary regime was established for a period of 10 years as from the entry into                
force of the law, i.e. until 4 July 2013.
4 Article 7 of Legislative Decree No. 1086.
Enterprise size Number of workers Maximum sales
Micro 1-10 150 annual TLUs
Small 1-100 1,700 annual TLUs
Medium-sized and large Over 100 No limit
Source:   Prepared by the author.
Table VII.5
DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF ENTERPRISE ESTABLISHED UNDER LEGISLATIVE DECREE Nº 1086
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1½ remuneration per 
complete year












































2 remunerations per 
year
No maximum.
For workers covered 
by the general labour 
regime who have 
been replaced by 
workers covered by 
the special labor 








Minimum wage 550 nuevos soles Same Same Same Same
A lower monthly 
wage may be 
set with the 





Workday 8 hours per day or 48 
hours per week
Same Same Same Same
Payment of 
overtime
25% over and above 
the hourly rate for the 
first 2 hours of overtime.
35% over and above the 
hourly rate for additional 
hours of overtime.
Same Same Same   Same
Night work Minimum wage 
plus 35%.
Same Not applicable at 
work sites where 
the normal working 
day occurs during 
night hours
Not applicable   Not applicable
Weekends and 
public holidays
24 consecutive hours 
of rest each week
Same Same Same   Same
Table VII.6
HIRING CONDITIONS AND EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL BENEFITS UNDER                                
DIFFERENT LABOUR LAWS
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Labour and social benefits
Paid vacations 30 calendar days for 
each complete year.
Sale of vacation days: 
15 days
Same 15 calendar days 
for each complete 
year.
Sale of vacation 
days: 8 days
15 calendar 
days for each 
complete year. 
Legislative 
Decree No. 713 
applies, where 
relevant.
Sale of vacation 
days: 8 days.
 15 calendar days
  for each complete
  year. Legislative
  Decree No. 713
  applies, where
  relevant.
  Sale of vacation
  days: 8 days.
Family allowance 10% of minimum wage Same No No   No
Bonuses 1 month’s wages in 
July and December
Same No 1/2 month’s 
wages in July 
and December
  No 
Profit sharing Applicable to 
enterprises with over 
20 workers which 
make a profit.
Not applicable to 
small enterprises 
with 20 workers 
or fewer
No Not applicable to 
small enterprises 





Equivalent to one 
month’s wages for each 
complete year. 
No maximum. Fractions 
paid in tenths and 
thirtieths.
Same No Equivalent to 15 
days’ wages for 
each complete 
year, with a 
maximum of 90 
days’ wages.
  No 
Life insurance For workers with 
4 years of service 
(between 0.53% and 
1.46% of wages)




Variable percentage for 
high-risk activity






0.75% of monthly 




with 20 or fewer 
workers
No provision Not applicable 
to enterprises 




Collective rights Trade unions may 





















Health insurance 9% paid by the 
employer (EsSalud)
Same Same Same Micro-enterprise 
workers and 
managers 
covered by this 
legislation will be 





to the priority list 
of health care 
interventions.
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In addition to the three schemes described above, the government 
payroll is being formalized. Starting in the early 1990s, the Government 
began to employ workers without any social protection. The situation of 
these workers has recently been formalized, but only with access to social 
security benefits and 15 days of vacation, with no other rights or fringe 
benefits, so that these are the workers with least protection in Peru (even 
the staff of micro-enterprises have more rights). The Government has again 
created a system providing peculiar treatment: hardly any labour costs and 
very few social rights and benefits.
These arrangements are summarized in the following table, showing 
monthly costs:
Table VII.7
SOCIAL BENEFITS AND TAXES UNDER DIFFERENT LABOUR LAWS
Social benefits and 
contributions
General regime Micro-enterprises
(10 workers + 150 
annual TLUs)
Small enterprises 





Contributions to EsSalud 9.00 % 15 nuevos soles a 9% 9% (maximum 94.50 
nuevos soles)
Compulsory life insurance b 0.53% 0% 0.53% 0%













an amount that varies 
depending on whether 
they are affiliated with 
the national scheme 
(13% of monthly wage) 
or the private pension 
scheme (variable rates 
with an average 
close to 13% of their 
monthly wage).
Same Same Workers in 
small enterprises 
are required to 













with any of 
the following 
schemes: 









order to join 
this scheme, 
they must not 
join another 
scheme).
Source:   Prepared by the author.
The employer 
pays half of the 
contribution and 




Contribution to the National 
Apprenticeship and Labour 
Service (SENATI) c
0.75% 0% 0.75% 0%
Statutory bonuses (2 
salaries)
16.67% 0% 8.4% (15 days) 0%
Compensation for time 
of service (CTS) (1.17 
salaries)
9.72% 0% 4.17% (15 days) 
with a maximum of 
90 days
0%
EsSalud on bonuses 1.50% 0% 0.75% 0%
Vacations (30 days) 8.33% 4.17% (15 days) 4.17% (15 days) 4.17% (15 days)
EsSalud on vacations 0.75% 0.38% 0.38% 0.38%
Dangerous work insurance d 1.89% 0% 1.89% 0%
Profit sharing Variable 0% Variable 0%
Severance pay (on monthly 
wages)
1 1/2 per year, 
with a maximum 
of 12 months
1/3 per year, with 
a maximum of 3 
months
2/3 per year, with a 
maximum of 4 months
0%
Other: family allowance (55 
nuevos soles) and night 
differential (35%)
Applicable No No No
Enterprise subtotal 49.14% + 
variables
4.55% + EsSalud 
contribution
29.98% + variables 13.55%
Category 5 tax (worker) Variable Variable Variable Variable
Pension Fund Administration 





Optional, half of it 
paid by Government
Compulsory, 13% Compulsory, 13%f
Totals 62.14% + 
variables
4.55% + 15 nuevos 
soles + variables
42.98% + variables 26.55% with 
maximum limits
(f)     Social dialogue
In the outline of social and labour policy for 2008-2011, the 
Ministry of Labour and Employment Promotion gave priority to the 
promotion of dialogue between the social actors most representative 
of Peruvian society in the sphere of labour and State employment, 
with participation of social organizations. The social dialogue in 
Peru has been institutionalized by the creation of official forums for 
consultation such as the National Labour and Employment Promotion 
Council, Acuerdo Nacional, the National Competitiveness Council, the 
National Council for the Development of Micro- and Small Enterprises, 
and the Social Covenant.
Table VII.7 (concluded)
Social benefits and 
contributions
General regime Micro-enterprises
(10 workers + 150 
annual TLUs)
Small enterprises 





Source:   Prepared by the author
a  The State pays a subsidy of 15 nuevos soles a month to cover the cost of full health insurance.
b  From the fourth year. For manual workers, 0.71 per cent. 
c  Applicable to manufacturing industries.
d  Average applicable to hazardous activities.
e  Average for AFP. For ONP, 13 per cent.
f  Voluntary for existing staff.
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B.   Impact, efficiency and positions regarding the   
      regulatory framework
1.    Evaluation and impact of labour reforms
The labour reforms described above did not have a significant impact 
on the labour market. Informality and underemployment figures are 
alarming (among the highest in the region) and, despite the efforts being 
made, no improvement is foreseen in the medium term. The following 
figure shows the complex situation of the Peruvian labour market:
Figure VII.1
LIMA: ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION (EAP) IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
BY TYPE OF CONTRACT, 1987-2005
(Percentages)
Source:   Prepared by the author, on the basis of official figures.
The labour reforms introduced since 2001 for the purpose of 
regulating labour relations have had no impact on the recovery of formal 
employment levels, as shown in the preceding figure, or on access to 
social rights and benefits, as can be seen from the following figure:
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Figure VII.2
LIMA: ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION (EAP) IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR BY COMPLIANCE 
WITH CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS, 1992-2005
(Percentages)
Source:    Prepared by the author, on the basis of official figures.
Earlier and current labour reforms did not bring any major 
improvement in working conditions and levels of employment: 
underemployment reached unusually high levels among the countries 
of the region and labour productivity declined in the period under 
consideration. Consequently, and contrary to expectations, labour reform 
has not made the labour market more dynamic.
Two clear trends are apparent: (i) a movement towards informalization 
of the formal sector (a stable post is replaced not by another in a similar 
category but by a temporary post or other contractual arrangement); 
and (ii) an increase in flexible hiring systems, i.e. temporary contracts. 
The second trend reflects enterprises’ staff reduction policies, high staff 
turnover (on average, a person changes jobs in Peru every four years), the 
preference for systems of decentralization and externalization of labour 
services (labour intermediation, outsourcing, subcontracting). 
2.    Efficiency of formal rules
The main obstacle to more institutionalized formal labour is 
precisely the highly informal character of Peru’s productive structure 
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and labour market. Few workers have access to social and employment 
benefits. People have work but do not enjoy welfare benefits such as social 
security (health and pensions), minimum wages, extra work (overtime) 
and social benefits (Compensation for Time of Service, bonuses, etc.). 
After the reform of the 1990s, not enough was done to improve the low 
rates of access to social and labour benefits.
According to the National Household Survey for the fourth quarter of 
2002, persons working in enterprises not legally registered or not having 
an accounting system, or unpaid family workers, were considered to be 
working in the informal sector. Of a total of 4,301,132 informal workers, 
only 4.2 per cent have health insurance and 4.7 per cent are covered by 
the pension system (Gamero, 2004, p. 23).
The urban informal sector is composed mainly of micro-enterprise 
workers and non-professional self-employed workers (79 per cent of 
this sector), whereas the rural informal sector is composed mainly of 
unpaid family workers and non-professional self-employed workers 
(82 per cent).
The effectiveness of the formal rules in the formal sector itself 
depends on three factors: (i) at the administrative level, the supervision 
and oversight function performed by the Labour Inspectorate; (ii) at 
the judicial level, the action by courts and labour chambers to resolve 
disputes that could not be settled using other individual or collective 
mechanisms; and (iii) the effects of the Free Trade Agreement with the 
United States.
The Government’s greatest achievement in recent years was 
probably the upgrading of the labour inspection process. There are 
now inspection regulations providing for a fast procedure and giving 
inspectors important functions; the number of inspectors and the budget 
for inspection have been increased. In addition, the involvement of the 
Ministry of Labour and Employment Promotion in almost all economic 
sectors is encouraging the trend towards labour formalization.
 There is currently a heavy workload preventing prompt attention 
to labour demands, although the Judiciary has adopted administrative 
rules designed to reduce this workload. 
Peru and the United States have concluded a Free Trade Agreement, 
which contains a social clause. Such clauses are usually part of trade 
agreements and are an indirect way for States to undertake to respect 
certain social rights. This is a way of harmonizing regulations so as to 
avoid comparative advantages that might result from low production 
costs connected with less favorable working conditions.
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3.    Positions of the main actors in the labour market
The position of the employers’ associations was influenced by the 
regulations of the 1970s, particularly the labour stability law and the 
system of sharing in the ownership, management and profits of the 
enterprise. They have thus been supportive of the reforms geared to 
employment flexibility and labour cost reduction.
The trade union organizations never fully recovered from the crisis of the 
1990s. The principal union leaders have a confrontational approach designed to 
demonstrate their drawing power and promotion of social mobilization, with 
the aim of tipping the balance of power in their favour during bargaining. 
The political parties have expressed their views on the proposals for 
flexibilization of labour institutions. However, participation by political 
organizations is limited to current issues. 
Civil society has not been – and still is not – very involved in the 
formulation of labour proposals at any level (regulations, policies, etc.). 
The social demand is clear. The country’s main problem is unemployment 
(according to 53 per cent of those surveyed by APOYO Consultoría), 
although what is being called for is the “decent work” advocated by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) (since the unemployment rate 
is 8 per cent) – in other words, inclusion on payroll, enjoyment of social 
benefits and social inclusion.
C.   Flexicurity and pending actions
1.    Flexicurity as a strategy for preventing sectoral     
       distortion of the reforms and for offsetting ideological     
       shifts in market policies
Situations such as those described require a proactive approach by the 
social and democratic State, in which the rule of law prevails. This includes 
adopting measures to ensure appropriate investment in the individual, so 
as to enable him to remain in the labour market and so as to develop a 
comprehensive strategy for reducing and eliminating the negative effects 
caused by the flexibility introduced or the deregulation scenarios.
Flexicurity should therefore be a strategy for developing rules to 
modify certain rigid aspects of labour legislation and to enhance basic 
labour protection by means of oversight, thus mitigating the effects of 
market segmentation and the negative consequences of flexibility.
The four basic components of flexicurity to be incorporated are: 
(i) reforms of the rules relating to the labour regime; (ii) a reliable and 
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adaptable system of vocational training; (iii) flexible social protection 
schemes meeting the needs of people who change jobs or leave the labour 
market temporarily; and (iv) active labour-market policies.
2.    Pending debates
(a)     Sufficient flexibility, sufficient security 
A comprehensive approach requires a combination of flexibility and 
security, in a relationship of interdependence. Both must be part of the 
solution – each to the appropriate extent – so that enterprises can adapt 
efficiently to market needs, without leaving workers bereft of security. In 
our view, a reform of this type, unprecedented in Peru, could enhance the 
quality of the labour market.
The flexible component would focus on allowing individual 
dismissals for financial reasons, modifying certain labour benefits (which 
are comparatively generous) for new workers and granting an amnesty for 
payrolling of informal workers, with lower labour costs that will gradually 
reach the level applicable to all labour relations (solution proposed by the 
Government for the formalization of the public sector).
Protection, for its part, would concentrate on improving the 
geographical coverage of labour oversight, reducing the tax burden 
when enterprises recruit for an indefinite period and on a full-time basis, 
favouring procurement bids from good employers, granting advantages 
to enterprises that focus on labour productivity and training and 
establishing social protection systems for self-employed workers.
In other words, the goal is regulation geared to balance and equity 
in labour relations (in which workers, employers and the Government 
derive more advantages than disadvantages), based on technical and 
objective studies of the labour market that benefit from the experience of 
other countries and the important social dialogue in the National Labour 
and Employment Promotion Council. 
Flexicurity ultimately involves opting for normative regulation and a 
government role that differs from the traditional vision: not the flexibility 
of the 1990s alone and not only the protective regulation of the 1980s. 
(b)    Critical evaluation of collective bargaining as             
                an instrument of change
In the 1990s, the flexibilization policy, the bargaining power of 
employers’ associations and the internal fragmentation of the trade 
unions as a balancing social force weakened the strength of collective 
bargaining as an instrument of change. 
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Although it is important for trade unions to resume the role of balance 
and counterweight in promoting negotiated and lasting solutions, there 
is also a need for them to rethink their ideology, organization, goals and 
unity, because of the need for “a mechanism that is useful in processes 
of trade union unity in its various possible forms, ranging from unity of 
action on specific goals to processes of reconciliation of differences and 
of contradictions between unions. Trade union unity must therefore be 
viewed as a form of pluralism” (Mariucci, 2005).
Without strong trade unions with legitimacy and capacity, 
collective bargaining cannot be used to introduce long-term changes. 
Unfortunately, the present situation of trade unionism is the result of 
the individualization of labour relations in pursuit of the flexibility 
which it was thought would solve the labour-market problems, causing 
the effective dismantling of the collective relations subsystem. Thus the 
employer’s decision-making authority was enhanced, at the expense 
of the balance which should exist in collective bargaining, since the 
increase in the employer’s regulating powers reduced the demand 
for services in the area of collective relations. However, trade union 
membership increased (in 2007, slightly over 5,000 workers were 
unionized); trade unions have ways of exerting commercial pressure 
and are better organized to promote their interests and even adopt 
policies of social responsibility.
The importance of collective bargaining must therefore be recognized, 
in order to enhance it and promote its use. Collective bargaining can 
regulate and establish suitable measures in the existing context, in 
which enterprises operate in more than one country, labour migration is 
increasingly frequent and government regulation is losing ground.
3.    Viability and tools for ensuring flexicurity
Before describing the actions based on this strategy, four aspects 
should be mentioned:
• The Peruvian social, political, economic and cultural reality must 
be recognized.
• Work must be done with vulnerable groups needing access to 
employment.
• Obstacles to competitiveness, and particularly formalities and 
red tape, must be eliminated or reduced.
• Policies must be introduced to deal with the social pressures 
affecting labour relations. 
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Informality concerns all sectors of the working population, and 
affects 50 per cent of services, construction, industry and transport. It can 
be deduced from this structure that levels of social protection such as 
health and pensions and access to labour benefits are minimal. Only 25 per 
cent of the economically active population (EAP) are on payroll and have 
access to social and labour benefits. In addition, in the urban sector, levels 
of informality are alarmingly high, as shown in the following figure:
Figure VII.3
PERU: URBAN DEPENDENT EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR AND TYPE 
OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, 2006
(Percentages)
Source:    National Household Survey, 2006 and APOYO Consultoría.
(a) Social dialogue
Social dialogue is an essential instrument that must be promoted 
more forcefully by the State and by labour authorities, so as to ensure 
that any rule or general policy adopted has been the subject of prior 
discussion, notification or negotiation with enterprises and workers.
However, the National Labour and Employment Promotion Council 
has still not fully imposed itself as the body defining the general directions 
of labour policy and as the meeting point for all sectors involved. In the 
present circumstances, all bodies participating in this Council – and other 
sectors that may become involved, with the support of the Ministry of 
Labour and Employment Promotion – must make every effort to ensure 
that the Council becomes an influential institution to be consulted before 
any decision is taken.
The question is whether labour dialogue is possible in this situation 
and whether the social dialogue can result in labour standards. The parties 
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involved of course have opposing interests; however, by following specific 
guidelines and directions, it is possible to reach general agreements that 
can subsequently be moved through Congress and Government. For 
example, the validity of the observations of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) on the Act on Collective Labour Relations was more 
or less accepted by the parties, as was the need to bring the employment 
situation in Peru into line with the ILO observations in order to meet the 
concerns of Democratic Party members of the United States Congress 
as a prerequisite for conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement. These and 
other examples can be followed in order to achieve more agreements as 
tangible results of the social dialogue.
In any case, it is important to bear in mind the basic distinction 
between political and technical issues. Although regulations are part of 
the political structure of the State, they cannot exist without a favorable 
technical analysis.
This shows that there are challenges to be faced, such as involving 
truly representative organizations of employers and workers on an 
equal footing, giving them the necessary support to access ongoing 
training and expressing a strong interest on the part of Government 
in making social dialogue a reliable tool for establishing and enforcing 
rules with flexicurity.
(b)     Actions to guarantee the durability of reform
(i) Reforms of regulations concerning the labour regime
Labour reforms must embody flexicurity and have a suitable 
combination of flexibility to promote formal hiring and protection to 
reassure workers that labour regulations will be respected.
First of all, there must be a viable social, labour and technical plan 
that has the support of society. Labour reform must envisage, on the 
one hand, an increase in labour compliance, oversight and supervision 
mechanisms (the country’s labour compliance levels are among the 
lowest) and, on the other, a review of costs that create distortion in a 
globalized market (according to the World Bank, Peru is one of the 20 
most protectionist countries in the world) and promotion of investment 
in education, technology and innovation.
The debate on the need for labour reform should no longer be based 
on labour law (regulation of those who have work) but should concentrate 
on the right to employment (access to decent work), since the former 
governs workers on payroll, while the latter covers all workers regardless 
of whether they are subordinate (on payroll) or not (fees), as well as 
persons in neither of these categories (self-employed, underemployed 
as regards hours and earnings). The right to employment also involves 
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mechanisms for the creation, promotion and preservation of suitable 
employment, labour insertion, encouragement of best labour practices 
and creation of suitable conditions for a minimum level of compliance 
with and oversight of labour obligations.
Reforms should focus on the following aspects:
• Allowing enterprises (after certification by a report from an 
authorized auditing firm) to process individual lay-offs for 
economic reasons. Today an enterprise in financial difficulty 
cannot use this as a reason to lay off a worker, unless it dismisses 
ten or more workers (Toyama and Yamada, 2007, p. 22). 
• Adapting some benefits for new workers (for example, reducing 
vacations), in such a way that the acquired rights of existing 
workers are not affected.
 • Using atypical contracts without committing fraud or violation 
of social and labour regulations.
• Introducing measures of two-way flexibility (Almeda Castillo, 
2007, p. 123) that allow workers to choose from a larger number 
of options with regard to working hours, such as time banks, 
production demands and compensatory time off, and to achieve 
a better balance between family life, work and education.5
• Encouraging further debate on the draft General Labour Act, 
which is designed to balance labour relations following the 
reforms of the 1990s.
(ii) Components to be provided for training
• System of vocational training.
• System of standardization, certification and accreditation.
• Measures to link education supply with labour demand. 
• Measures to encourage private investment in worker training 
and thus enhance productivity and employability.
• Suitable targeted rules on training arrangements so as to provide 
skills training for work, in the context of the rights recognized by 
the Constitution.
5 It should be noted that in Europe the share of total employment represented by workers 
differing from the classic contractual model and own-account workers increased from 
over 36 per cent of workers in 2001 to almost 40 per cent of EU-25 workers in 2005. For 
more information, see Commission of the European Communities, 2007a, p. 8.
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Lastly, the main obstacle is that training is considered as a cost to 
enterprises, since the benefits are always reaped in the long term. In 
order to overcome this obstacle, a strategy of lifelong training should be 
devised for persons with jobs and unemployed persons. 
• The State must play the role of trainer for the unemployed or 
subemployed sector either directly or indirectly (by delegating to 
vocational training centres), engage in regional training activities 
in the light of the needs, attitudes and aptitudes of applicants, 
and devise labour reconversion programmes.
• The employer bears the main responsibility for providing training 
as a means of increasing productivity and thus improving the 
enterprise’s competitiveness. If campaigns are conducted on the 
importance of human capital as a value added for the enterprise 
and if training is considered as an investment, enterprises will 
be supportive. The State can help in this regard by giving bigger 
tax breaks for existing programs or granting certifications to 
enterprises which provide training that sets an example to others.
(iii) Social security
Because social security is so inadequate, a radical reform is needed to 
achieve social inclusion in Peru, concentrating on the following aspects:
• Development of social protection systems to support potential 
worker mobility, ensuring workers’ advancement and versatility 
in the labour market.
• Implementation of suitable social protection measures for atypical 
labour relations, in which payment of monthly contributions is 
impossible because of the nature of the labour provided, so that 
protection is geared to the worker as a person providing labour 
and not to the actual occupation.
(iv) Active labour-market policies 
Policies must be devised to tackle the problems caused by the 
amount of informality, underemployment and unemployment. These 
should include:
• Policies on informality that achieve the gradual objective of 
formalizing employment already existing.
 In the labour sector, the goal is primarily to show the benefits of 
formality as regards training, financing and technical assistance, 
not forgetting the role and presence of inspection staff. 
• Policies to expand full and dignified employment, designed to 
create employment opportunities in regional zones and groups, 
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taking into account the added value of each region (for example, 
in Ica, provide creative opportunities for agroexports).
 Information on labour supply and demand must be upgraded. 
Each region of the country must have information media and 
technologies providing accurate information on needs and 
opportunities in the zone, so that education supply can be geared 
to these aspects. If the education supplied reflects regional needs 
and opportunities, it will be possible to link these to labour 
demand by considering the level and quality of professionals 
and technicians needed by enterprises. With appropriate and 
clear labour-market information, it will be possible to link supply 
with labour demand.
 The public sector, by means of employment agencies, should 
adopt a proactive approach and open communication channels 
between enterprises and unemployed or underemployed persons, 
as well as visiting enterprises and providing real vocational 
guidance from a regional perspective.
• Positive employment policies for vulnerable groups such as 
young people, disabled persons and women.
The goal is to promote measures that make it attractive to hire these 
social actors, for example:
- Regulatory reforms giving tax breaks to enterprises which can 
prove that they have hired such people on an indefinite basis.
- Higher labour quotas than those already existing in public 
corporations. 
D.    Conclusions
The economic diagnosis of Peru’s labour situation shows that the country 
is forging a growth economy in which labour segmentation still exists, 
since few people enjoy the benefits of the labour regulatory system. The 
macroeconomic figures are encouraging: in general terms, the indexes 
show very satisfactory results, boosted in particular by growth in 
consumption, domestic demand and private investment.
However, currently only one in four workers – five, in other studies 
– has access to labour rights and social security (health and pensions). 
Underemployment is the most striking characteristic of the population 
and labour productivity levels are still quite low compared with other 
countries. The consequence of this reluctance to implement reform is a 
paradox: Peru is one of the countries with the lowest levels of compliance 
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with labour regulations but, at the same time, it is among the 20 most 
protectionist countries in the world.
The Peruvian labour regime has been an example of the ideological 
swings of labour-market policies. It has moved from protective regulation 
in the 1980s to application of a range of regulatory actions aimed at 
introducing flexibility in the 1990s.
Since 2001, labour reforms have concentrated on bringing Peruvian 
legislation into line with the observations of ILO and of the United States 
within the framework of the Free Trade Agreement negotiations with that 
country, modifying specific aspects originating from trade union pressure 
—especially in the mining sector— and introducing a labour regulation 
system in micro- and small enterprises, which has had no major impact 
on labour relations or the formalization of such enterprises and has not 
improved access to labour and welfare benefits.
A recent reform in micro- and small enterprises has reduced levels 
of social protection. For micro-enterprises (up to 10 workers and sales not 
exceeding 150 Tax Levy Units), the State is subsidizing access to a new 
social welfare system (health and pensions) and workers have hardly any 
labour rights (all related to working time: halving of vacations, breaks 
and overtime payment). For small enterprises (up to 100 workers and 
sales up to 1,700 Tax Levy Units), a new labour regime has been created 
which is equivalent to half the social benefits of the general regime and 
the same system of social security. Lastly, for other enterprises the general 
regime applies. 
It should be noted that the situation of government workers who 
had no labour rights has been formalized. However, the Government has 
given them only social rights and vacations, in a fourth labour system 
notable for the fact that it provides less labour protection.
This labour reform, focused on reducing labour costs and 
subsidizing enterprises to encourage them to become formalized, will 
not have a big effect on the labour market. The focus has been solely on 
cost reduction and flexibilization and not on market-based incentives, 
real advantages for enterprises opting for formality, special treatment 
for investment in training or a framework for improving productivity 
and competitiveness.
Flexibility and security are not contradictory terms. For the 
implementation of a comprehensive strategy such as flexicurity, both 
elements are interdependent.
Flexicurity is a balanced strategy with four components: (i) reforms 
of regulations relating to the labour regime; (ii) a reliable and adaptable 
system of vocational training; (iii) flexible systems of social protection 
229Regulation, Worker Protection and Active Labour-Market Policies in Latin America
meeting the needs of people who change jobs or leave the labour market 
temporarily; and (iv) active labour-market policies.
In order to be effective and lasting, strategies such as flexicurity 
require sources of financing, elimination of obstacles and implementation 
of actions with all their components. Another prerequisite is consolidation 
of the social dialogue and participation of the four social actors: 
Government, employers’ associations, trade unions and civil society.
So far, Peru has not implemented a flexicurity labour reform. Studies 
on this subject note that a phenomenon of “flight from labour law” has 
occurred. In other words, this is a labour market in which it is easy to 
find occult or disguised labour relations, with a proliferation of receipts 
for fees, hiring of independent services or work, weak outsourcing (to 
enterprises whose only expense is payroll), atypical labour hiring (part-
time, intermittent) and a whole process of outsourcing of labour functions 
for the sake of commercial and civil relations.
 In addition to informality, another problem is underemployment 
– a labour category that includes over half of Peruvians earning less than 
enough to pay for the basic family basket of goods. Other recurring issues are 
the figures on workforce training, for which Peru is among the continent’s 
least successful countries and which aggravate the phenomenon of flight 
from labour formality that has been current in recent years. A stable and 
well-paid job with a good employer has been and still is a luxury, a scarce 
good according to Professor Alonso Olea of Spain. 
In view of this phenomenon, what is needed is a comprehensive 
and urgent reform of the labour relations system, aimed primarily at 
labour inclusion: each Peruvian worker must have basic labour and 
social coverage and the number of persons excluded from the system 
must be drastically reduced. In order for this to happen, regulations will 
have to flexibilize conditions of access to employment (gradual access 
to labour and social rights is the best option for new workers) and the 
State should guarantee minimum social and labour protection for all (for 
example, nobody should be without formal earnings, health and pension 
insurance and annual vacations at the very least). At the same time, 
collective bargaining should become the instrument for improving basic 
standards and a solid system of labour oversight should ensure that the 
system is equitable both for workers and for employers. 
In the current context, in which Peru is in a stable and growing 
economic situation and will be concluding a Free Trade Agreement with 
the largest market in the world, there is an excellent opportunity to reform 
and modernize labour relations, so as to improve levels of protection and 
security and enact provisions to make labour more formalized.
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This is a huge task for the Government. Its activity to regulate the 
informal and uncompetitive labour market and its role as monitor of 
compliance with the rules in force and those to be enacted in a concerted 
market are vital. Regarding the latter, with the implementation of the 
Free Trade Agreement plus the trend existing since 2007 in labour 
inspection (larger budget, more inspectors with greater authority, 
electronic payrolling), there will probably be an increase in inspections 
and fines and, as a result, greater compliance with rules by enterprises. 
This oversight role —and, above all, its effectiveness— as well as the 
ability of inspectors to detect violations not only in quantitative but 
also in qualitative terms (outsourcing, anti-union actions, labour 
intermediation, professional fees, calculation of social benefits) may 
encourage complaints by workers, who may finally discover that the 
labour authorities can indeed protect their rights.
However, the Government must spearhead the labour reform, with 
rules and policies of social and labour inclusion. Here the challenge is to 
implement reforms which, on the one hand, flexibilize mechanisms for 
access to decent employment (gradual access to labour rights) and, on 
the other hand, guarantee effective compliance with legislation. 
From a macroeconomic standpoint, the major challenge is to halt 
the trend towards informalization and low labour force productivity, 
showing an extremely low level of protection. Such informality means 
not only that a worker does not receive benefits but also that there is 
lower fiscal revenue, as well as low wages. In this connection, the big 
reform is pending: regulatory proposals and measures by the authorities 
geared to reducing the labour informality gap and raising the level of 
labour productivity and competitiveness. 
The labour world is in constant flux and the responses of Government 
are still slow, timid or isolated. It is urgent to implement the comprehensive 
reform of Peru’s public and private labour market. However, this must 
be done with greater social dialogue, with technical and comprehensive 
studies and with attention to the experience of other countries.
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Chapter VIII
Flexicurity with informality: options                 
and restrictions 1
Víctor E. Tokman
A.   Reconciling flexibility with protection: flexicurity
Improvement of the ability to compete in open and expanded markets 
assumes the existence of flexible labour relations. This flexibility 
results in greater insecurity and less protection and introduces social 
cohesion tension, as well as weakening the support of workers and 
their organizations for the process of globalization and integration. The 
experience of the developed countries seems to indicate that there are 
different combinations of protection arrangements in employment and 
social and labour security, with varying results as regards their economic 
effects and effects on employment, and as regards the public perception 
of security (ILO, 2004a and Boyer, 2006).
In the northern European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and 
the Netherlands), usually associated with a successful flexicurity strategy, 
employment law producing a low level of job security is combined with 
public spending on labour-market policies that provide considerable 
protection and promote the rapid reinsertion of workers in the labour 
market. The result of this combination is a perception of high security 
1 For a fuller version of this chapter, see Tokman (2008a).         
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on the part of the public. This model is not unique. The Mediterranean 
countries (Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal) have greater job security 
(the result of stricter employment law) and less generous spending on 
labour-market policies, which creates a perception of high insecurity. 
There are also countries in the middle, with different degrees of 
success and also different perceptions of security. On the one hand, 
Germany, France and Sweden have high levels of both job security 
and labour and social protection. The perception of security among the 
public is high, but lower than in the northern European countries. On the 
other hand, in the United States and the United Kingdom, the perception 
of security is low, owing to more flexible employment law and lower 
spending on protection policies. 
Perceptions are the result of subjective appreciations and objective 
factors, so that the combination of high employment stability and limited 
protection may lead to a perception of insecurity for many people: 
while they know that there is little likelihood that they will lose their 
job, they also know that if they do their replacement income will be less 
than they were receiving in the former job and that their unemployment 
will probably last longer because of the slower adjustment of the labour 
market. On the other hand, greater labour instability and the resulting 
greater probability of unemployment, associated with more support 
as regards income and reinsertion, will result in a shorter and more 
protected period of unemployment.
B.   Flexicurity in Latin America
Flexicurity can be useful for the Latin American countries, most of which 
are small and have very open economies. They are also more vulnerable 
and have less possibility of alleviating the intensity of economic cycles 
before their consequences spread internally and require an improvement 
in conditions of competitiveness on international markets. The diversity 
of developed countries’ experiences in reconciling flexibility with 
protection can be useful, but it is important to recognize the limitations 
created by a different structural framework.
Based on the way in which the instruments of job security and 
labour and social protection are used, as well as public perceptions of 
the resulting security, the countries of Latin America can be divided into 
four groups according to the strictness of their employment law and the 
amount of government resources devoted to labour protection. At one 
extreme, and this is similar to what happens in developed countries, there 
are countries where employment law is less strict but is accompanied 
by high spending on protection and where the public perception of 
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security is the highest in the region. This group consists of Argentina, 
Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay. At the other extreme, we have Mexico, 
Panama and the Andean countries, which have strict employment laws 
ensuring greater employment stability by making it expensive to dismiss 
workers but which spend little on protection. As a result, there is as high 
perception of insecurity in these countries.
Brazil and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are in the middle. 
In these countries, strict employment laws are combined with a high 
level of protection. As a result, there is a high perception of security. 
However, this perception is less than that found in the Southern Cone 
countries and Costa Rica. Similarly, in small and open countries such as 
the Central American countries, Plurinational State of Bolivia and the 
Dominican Republic, employment law is less strict but stricter than in 
the Southern Cone and there is less spending on labour protection. As 
a result, the perception of insecurity is high, but less than in Mexico, 
Panama and the Andean countries. 
Table VIII.1
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): LEVELS OF SOCIAL AND LABOUR PROTECTION      
AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION













High Brazil and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Employment law: second strictest
Social protection spending: second highest
Perception of security: second highest
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay 
and Peru
Employment law: strictest
Social protection spending: second lowest
Perception of security: lowest
Low Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay 
Employment law: least strict
Social protection spending: highest
Perception of security: highest
Bolivia (Plur. State of), El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic
Employment law: second least strict
Social protection spending: second lowest
Perception of security: second lowest
Source:   Employment law classified by strictness on the subject of layoffs, including flexibility of hiring and 
firing: World Bank, Doing Business, 2004, Washington, D.C.; social protection spending as a percentage 
of GDP includes pensions: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social 
Panorama of Latin America, 2005 (LC/G.2288-P), Santiago, 2005; perception of insecurity: Latinobarómetro, 
2005, Santiago, 2005.
The summary classifications reveal the heterogeneity of the countries 
of Latin America and of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), demonstrating the existence of different 
combinations of policies of social and labour protection and employment 
policies, as well as their results in terms of perception of security. The 
developed countries have policies for reconciling employment protection 
with unemployment social insurance, with increasing components of 
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“activation”.2 The differences between the countries of the two regions 
concern the use of employment law as an instrument for providing job 
security and the allocation of resources for labour and social protection. 
While the cost of regulation to provide job security in the Latin American 
countries is on average more than triple the cost for the OECD countries, 
the situation is reversed as regards contributions to social security. In 
OECD, the resources allocated for this purpose are 1.5 times higher than 
those allocated in Latin America (Heckman and Pagés, 2005).3 
Monetary payments are the preferred and established method used 
in Latin American countries to compensate workers who are laid off. It is 
simple and provides protection and strong incentives to seek work, but there 
are problems of capacity to pay when enterprises are in financial difficulty 
because of bankruptcy or closure. For this reason, supplementation with 
insurance or mechanisms that separate funds for compensation from 
corporate funds may provide greater security and could reduce layoff 
costs. However, as correctly noted by Blanchard (2003), these two methods 
are not ideal substitutes, firstly because of the legitimacy of workers’ 
compensation and, secondly, because of the limitations associated with 
insurance in general. Workers are faced with situations of unemployment 
early in the labour cycle, when they have not accumulated sufficient 
funds to face long periods without work. Consequently, these funds must 
be supplemented with public insurance, provided by an agency that is 
sufficiently generous but focused on people finding and accepting work. 
C.   Flexicurity and limiting structural factors
The various flexicurity arrangements show that opportunities exist for 
promoting the creation of productive and protected employment. These 
policies are potentially less effective in Latin America, firstly because there 
is an extensive informal economy involving most of the people excluded 
from the formal labour market and secondly because fiscal resources are 
insufficient to finance a system of social and labour protection that is 
sufficiently generous to provide security to the entire population. The 
first aspect is related to the progress made in formalization of the labour 
market, as regards the importance and the nature of labour relations, as 
well as the size of productive units. The second concerns the level of the 
2 Following the European Union policy adopted in Lisbon, countries are devoting 
additional resources to active labour policies (intermediation, employment 
programmes for vulnerable groups, and training) and at the same time making passive 
labour policies (unemployment insurance) stricter.
3 A more recent estimate by Loayza, Oviedo and Servén (2005) states that labour             
regulation in Latin America is on average 27% higher than in OECD and higher than 
the estimate for all the developing regions.
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tax burden and the amount of public spending on active and passive 
labour policies and on social security.
Labour heterogeneity in Latin America is very marked within and 
between countries. Around 2005, on average 30% of the region’s labour 
force was working in agricultural zones and wage earners represented 
64% of those employed in urban areas. In addition, 63% of the non-
agricultural labour force was working in the informal economy.4 This 
heterogeneity reduces the impact of labour policies and results in low 
coverage of social and labour protection. Social protection coverage 
extends on average to 38.7% of all employed persons and to 45.4% of 
urban employed persons.5
There are significant differences between countries with regard to 
each of these indicators. In some countries, less than 10% of workers are 
employed in rural areas, as is the case in Uruguay and Argentina, but in 
other countries, including Nicaragua, this percentage is as high as 54%. 
Three out of every four employed persons in Chile and Argentina are 
urban wage earners, but only 48% in Guatemala. The informal economy 
varies between 38% in Chile and 87% in Plurinational State of Bolivia,    
and urban protection coverage between 67% and 68% in Costa Rica and 
Chile, but only about 20% in Paraguay, Peru and Plurinational State of   
Bolivia (Tokman, 2006).  
Despite this diversity of situations, countries tend to fall into 
categories similar to those mentioned in connection with the flexicurity 
models analyzed. The countries with greater security are also the most 
urbanized, with a high proportion of wage earners and less informality. 
These are usually the countries with more protection coverage for the 
nation and for urban areas. At the other extreme, the greatest insecurity 
is found in the less urbanized countries, with fewer wage earners, greater 
informality and low social protection coverage. This seems to indicate 
that, in the countries where there is a greater perception of this security, 
there is more likelihood that the effects will spread to the population 
as a whole (Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica and Uruguay). On the other 
hand, countries where there is a high perception of insecurity also have 
significant structural limitations, which alter the potential effect of the 
4 Including own-account workers, unpaid family workers, domestic servants and         
employers and workers in micro-enterprises with less than five employees and all 
workers without a recognized labour relationship or whose relationship is not 
recognized and whose labour rights are not respected, wherever they are employed 
(Tokman, 2008b).
5 Percentage of employed persons making pension contributions (ECLAC, 2006 and 
Tokman, 2006). If one uses the percentage of employed persons in urban areas 
making contributions for pensions or health or both, coverage increases to about 
60% (ILO, 2007a).
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policies analyzed.6 In the middle, we have Brazil and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, and perhaps also Mexico and Panama.
Less tax revenue is available in Latin America than in the OECD 
countries and this is an additional limitation. The average tax burden in 
the Latin American countries was 15.7% of GDP in 2000, whereas in the 
OECD countries it was 2.3 times greater and in the European Union (15 
countries) it was over 40%. In the period 1990-1995, the figures varied 
between 30.9% in Brazil and less than 9% in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Guatemala and Haiti. The countries with a higher tax burden 
are those which also have fewer structural limitations on the introduction 
of labour and social security policies. In Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina 
and Chile, the tax burden during that period was around 25% (Gómez 
Sabaini, 2006).7
Allocation of public spending is another difference between Latin 
American countries and between those countries and the developed 
ones. Countries with higher tax revenues not only have greater 
spending capacity, but also allocate more of such expenditure to labour 
policies. These policies in turn have more impact when applied to more 
homogeneous and formalized labour markets. On average, OECD 
countries devote 2.14% of GDP to labour policies and European Union 
countries devote 3.25%. The countries with a greater perception of 
security are those which devote more resources to such policies —over 
3% and a maximum of 4.5% of GDP in Denmark. Germany, France and 
Sweden, where there is also a high level of security, devote 3% of GDP 
on average to active and passive labour policies. The Mediterranean and 
Anglo-Saxon countries spend less: on average 1.6% and 0.8% of GDP 
respectively. This compares to the Latin American countries with higher 
tax revenue, which allocate 0.46% (Brazil) and 0.27% (Argentina), with 
Chile in the middle (0.32%).8 
It is also noteworthy that all the OECD countries devote a greater 
share of GDP to passive labour policies (unemployment insurance) than 
to active ones, with the exception of the United Kingdom. However, 
as the figure for public spending on labour policies decreases, the gap 
between the two types of measures narrows. In Brazil, Argentina and 
Chile, on the other hand, more is spent on active than on passive policies. 
6 These include the smaller and more open countries such as the Andean countries             
(Colombia, Ecuador and Peru).
7 In the case of Chile, the tax burden includes contributions made to individual retirement 
accounts. Since they constitute compulsory savings, they are equivalent to taxes.
8 Data on distribution of public spending in Latin America (including social security            
and labour policies) show that the more secure countries are those with higher rates of 
investment (9.4% and 8.1% of GDP on average). The less secure countries have rates 
below 2.8% and the most insecure have an average of 1% (ECLAC, 2005).
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In fact, apart from those three countries, unemployment insurance exists 
only in Ecuador, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Uruguay and 
coverage as a percentage of unemployed persons varies between 9% in 
Uruguay and 2.8% in Ecuador (Velásquez, 2005).9 
D.   Informality: a concept in a state of flux
The existence of labour informality, particularly in developing countries, 
is widely recognized but its definition and origin are constantly evolving. 
The “informal sector” concept was first used in the report of the ILO 
Employment Mission to Kenya in 1972, which recognized that, unlike 
the situation in the more developed countries, the problem in developing 
countries is not unemployment but primarily employment that does 
not provide workers with enough earnings to survive.10 This is the case 
of “poor workers” performing activities which characterized by their 
low productivity, as opposed to formal activities, and which result in 
exclusion from access to markets and productive resources.
In Latin America, the analysis has benefited from various inputs. The 
logic of survival in the context of the process of insufficient job creation 
was incorporated. This approach is based on the structuralist theories 
developed by Raúl Prebisch and ECLAC and leads to the conclusion that 
the informal sector emerges as a result of pressure exerted by surplus 
manpower and insufficient creation of jobs, especially good jobs. In order 
to survive, people are obliged to seek low-productivity and low-wage 
work (Souza and Tokman, 1976). These activities (production or sale of 
something) are easy to take up, require little capital and skill and have 
no marked division of tasks and hierarchies. The manpower employed 
in such activities consists of the employer, who is also a worker, unpaid 
family members and wage earners, usually without contracts. It is a 
highly flexible employment alternative allowing efficient use of available 
family time and sharing of resources between the enterprise and the 
home. This type of production is characterized by low productivity and 
lack of protection, but it does provide an option for using capital that is 
available but difficult to transfer outside the home.
In both of these approaches, the basic element of analysis is the 
production unit, but there is as link with the rest of the economy 
and with labour-market segmentation. The first link is observed 
directly in the sale of goods and, particularly, of services, as well as in 
9 On average, existing insurance covers only 0.66% of the labour force in these countries. 
10 The ILO Mission was headed by R. Jolly and H. Singer. There is also an acknowledgement                
of the influence of little-known earlier work by Hart (1973), who was also a member of 
the Mission.
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subcontracting. Labour-market segmentation is observed in the limited 
mobility and inter-sectoral wage differentials, even for workers with 
similar human capital.11 
This conceptual theory was not universally accepted: even 
within ILO, various researchers questioned the autonomous character 
attributed to the informal sector and emphasized the disguised and 
subordinate labour relationship of wage earners and even of own-
account workers (Lubell, 1991). These observations led to the conclusion 
that there was exploitation and extraction of surplus manpower by the 
more organized sectors.
In the late 1970s and the 1980s, these interpretations gained ground 
by being linked to the need to increase the large enterprises’ profit margins 
by means of decentralization of the production process and, primarily, 
of labour. Nineteenth-century subcontracting arrangements (textile 
and garment industry) are being updated and replaced by a number 
of subordination relationships ranging from direct subcontracting 
to activities that appear to be performed independently but in fact 
help to lower manpower costs (garment industry, staff placement by 
intermediaries, informal distribution) or provide raw material at lower 
prices (including waste recycling). According to this theory, linking 
of informal enterprises with organized enterprises fills a need for 
decentralization in order to adapt to globalization and to changes in the 
international division of labour (Portes, Castells and Benton, 1989). A 
dual role is assigned to the informal sector: cost reduction and erosion of 
trade union power. It is also recognized to be universal, because it exists 
both in developing and in developed countries.
Three decades after the introduction of the informal sector concept 
in ILO, that Organization, mindful of the numerous dimensions that 
emerged in the analysis, recognizes that preoccupation with the informal 
sector as a structural erosion of protection capacity cannot be viewed in 
isolation from the increasing precarization of labour. This process was 
first observed in the 1980s and affects not only people working in the 
informal sector but also those working in formal enterprises. It culminated 
in the adoption of the “informal economy” concept at the 90th session of 
the International Labour Conference in 2002.12 This expands the informal 
sector concept by adding to the production unit labour relations that 
are not legally regulated or protected. Thus, under the new definition, 
11 Tokman (1978) analyzes the type of existing inter-sectoral relations and considers a 
balance of payments between the informal and the formal sectors.
12 Mention must be made of the significant contribution of Women in the Informal             
Economy: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), in support of this change to add to 
the original definition certain types of precarious jobs mainly performed by the poor 
(Chen, Vanek and Carr, 2004). 
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persons employed in the informal sector include all workers, regardless 
of their place of work, whose employment relationship is not subject to 
the standards of employment law.13 
At the same time, more attention is being paid to an interpretation 
derived from a liberalizing theory that legislation and regulation are 
basically responsible for the existence of informality. The inadequacy of 
these regulatory frameworks gives rise to informal activities and also 
restricts their productive expansion (De Soto, 1986). This inadequacy is the 
result of a colonial legacy reflected in costly regulations and bureaucratic 
structures which stifle the development of small productive activities. 
More recently, this approach to informality led to a broader interpretation 
emphasizing the voluntary character of informality, particularly for self-
employed workers, who prefer to be informal because they earn more 
outside the legal frameworks. This is also true in countries where the 
benefits of social protection derived from formality are limited and 
there are universal trade-offs or non-contributory programmes that 
offset the lack of protection. “Escape” as a deliberate decision makes 
sense in a context of inadequate and costly regulations and coexists with 
the “exclusion” resulting both from labour-market segmentation and 
from the difficulties of conducting business on a small scale (Perry and 
others, 2007). With a diagnosis similar to this one but a different strategic 
approach, it is proposed to modify legislation, streamline procedures 
and empower informal workers. This legally-based empowerment must 
be accompanied by the possibility for these workers to make their voice 
heard and to organize themselves.
E.   Informality: dimensions, structure and diversity   
       among countries
In Latin America, the informal economy accounted for 63.3% of non-
agricultural employment in 2005. The informal sector accounted for 50.7%, 
and 12.6% consisted of wage earners without protection employed in 
formal enterprises. The informal sector accounted for 80% of employment 
in the informal economy, but the remaining 20% were informal workers 
in formal enterprises.14 The informal economy expanded between 1990 
and 2005 from 57% to 63.3% of non-agricultural employment, as a result 
of the growth of the informal sector and of the number of precarious 
formal workers. Although both groups contribute in a similar manner to 
13 This definition also means that the informal economy concept can be applied universally, 
given the existence of “non-standard” labour relations in OECD member countries.
14 The number of workers in formal enterprises whose labour rights are not fully respected              
was considered to be the percentage of workers employed in such enterprises who do 
not contribute to any pension scheme.
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the expansion of the informal economy, the rate of growth in the number 
of unprotected formal wage earners is almost five times the growth rate 
for the informal sector. In 2005, the informal sector consisted of unskilled 
own-account workers (55%), workers in micro-enterprises with less than 
five employees (33%) and workers in domestic service (12%) (see table 
VIII.2 and figure VIII.1).
Table VIII.2
INFORMAL ECONOMY IN LATIN AMERICA, 1990-2005
(Percentages of non-agricultural employment)
1990 2005 a
Informal economy 57.0 63.3
Informal sector b 47.5 50.7
Precarious wage earners in the formal sector c 9.5 12.6
Source:   Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of household 
surveys conducted in the relevant countries; and V.E. Tokman “From the consensus reforms to reforms for 
protected and inclusive employment”, IDS Bulletin, vol. 39, No. 2, 2008.
a  The percentage for 2005 does not significantly differ for 5 or 16 countries.
b  Data for 16 countries are included in the informal sector. 
c  Data for five countries are included for precarious wage earners in the formal sector.
Figure VIII.1
STRUCTURE OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY, 1990-2005
(Percentages of non-agricultural employment)
Source:   Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of household 
surveys conducted in the relevant countries, and V.E. Tokman, “From the consensus reforms to reforms for 
protected and inclusive employment”, IDS Bulletin, vol. 39, No. 2, 2008.
The situation differs from country to country. In Chile, 38% of non-
agricultural employment was informal in 2005, whereas in Plurinational State  
of Bolivia and Peru the figures were as high as 87.4% and 83.4%, respectively.             
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Countries fall into at least three groups: (i) those where employment in the 
informal economy is over 65%, which are mainly the Andean and Central 
American countries (Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador,       
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela); (ii) those where employment in the informal economy was 
between 55% and 65%, which include Argentina, Brazil and Mexico; and (iii) 
those where there is less than 50% informality, such as Uruguay, Panama and 
Costa Rica and even less than 40%, such as Chile (see figure VIII.2). 
Figure VIII.2
INFORMAL ECONOMY, BY COUNTRY, 2005
Source:    Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of household 
surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
Differences in intensity of the informal economy are also observed 
in relation to the informal sector, with the exception of the middle group, 
which includes the three largest Latin American countries. The first group 
consists of the countries with higher informal economy levels, in which 
there is also a larger informal sector and more labour precarity in the 
larger formal sector. Similarly, the group of more formalized countries 
also has lower informal sector levels and, in particular, more formality 
for wage earners in formal enterprises. On average, about 93% of wage 
earners in formal enterprises have a formal labour relationship and 
have access to labour and social protection. The countries in the middle 
group, which include Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, are more similar to 
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the former group as regards informal sector size, but the proportion of 
unprotected wage earners employed in formal enterprises is about 15% 
(see table VIII.3 and figure VIII.2).
Table VIII.3
INFORMAL ECONOMY, BY COUNTRY, 2005 a
Country Informal sector Precarious workers Informal economy
Chile 30.6 7.4 38.0
Costa Rica 39.9 5.7 45.6
Panama 40.5 8.5 49.0
Uruguay 44.3 6.0 50.3
Argentina 41.2 15.2 56.4
Mexico 42.9 13.7 56.6
Brazil 43.6 15.0 58.6
Dominican Republic 49.3 9.8 59.1
Latin America 50.7 12.8 63.5
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 52.0 12.5 64.5
El Salvador 54.6 10.1 64.7
Guatemala 57.6 14.2 71.8
Nicaragua 59.9 13.6 73.5
Ecuador 57.9 16.7 74.6
Paraguay 61.3 18.0 79.3
Peru 64.6 18.8 83.4
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 70.9 16.5 87.4
Source:   Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of household 
surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a  Percentages of urban employment; arithmetical mean for Latin America.
The importance of own-account workers not included in informality 
is an additional distinguishing feature to be taken into account in policy 
formulation. As noted above, on average about 55% of persons employed 
in the informal sector are own-account workers; this figure drops to 44% 
for the entire informal economy. The differences from one country to 
another are also significant. 
In general, two groups of countries can be identified according to the 
number of self-employed compared with informal wage earners, either 
in micro-enterprises, domestic service or even in a precarious situation in 
formal enterprises. The first group includes countries with more informality, 
where participation of self-employed workers in the informal sector 
averages 60%, with higher figures of about 70% in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and the Dominican Republic and 65% in Peru, Plurinational 
State of Bolivia and Ecuador. The Central American countries which can         
also be included in this group have a participation slightly lower than 
the average for the group, which in turn amounts to 50% of the informal 
economy. The remaining group consists of countries with less informality, 
in which the participation of own-account workers in the informal sector 
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averages 46% and in the informal economy drops to 38%. Costa Rica has 
less participation by such workers, with percentages of 40% and 35% 
respectively, but in Argentina the figure for the informal sector is 52%, 
dropping to 33% if the informal economy is considered. This illustrates the 
importance of precarious wage earners in formal enterprises. 
F.    Exclusion or exit: earnings differentials in the   
       informal sector
The various definitions of informal employment recognize that it is 
the result of the exclusion of workers from the better paid and more 
protected jobs in the formal sector. This is due both to the inadequate 
rate of job creation and to the segmentation existing in the labour 
market, to the unsuitability of legislation which discourages the start-
up of new production units and to the strategy of decentralization of 
enterprises to reduce taxation and regulation. A consensus exists that 
this affects informal wage earners, but it also argued (Perry and others, 
2007) that self-employed persons and micro-enterprise employers opt 
for informality because they see no potential benefit in switching to 
formality, in view of the poor quality of the services provided by the 
State and its limited enforcement capability. According to this study, in 
these groups a non-wage view predominates, so that informality is an 
option of flexibility, autonomy and skills development that produces 
greater benefits, in both monetary and non-monetary terms. This is 
“exit”, occurring voluntarily. 
The family micro-enterprise can match available family time with 
the scarce resources available and represents an efficient option in view 
of the shortage of resources and jobs suited to needs (Tokman, 1978). 
It also represents a family enterprise option which allows manpower 
to be mobilized by juggling duties, as in the case of housewives 
and working mothers and children between school and work. In 
addition, family property can be used since the home also functions as 
commercial premises, and family means of transport are used by the 
micro-enterprise. This arrangement introduces a degree of flexibility 
allowing roles and resources to be matched. However, the most recent 
interpretation, mentioned above, also notes that “exit” results in higher 
earnings than would be obtained by joining the formal sector. For this 
reason, self-employed workers and micro-enterprise employers have no 
incentives for inclusion. 
A study of earnings differentials by sectors and occupational 
category provides more information on these issues. In Latin America, 
persons employed in the formal sector have average earnings that are 
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80% higher than those of workers in the informal sector. This is due to 
differences in productivity between productive units of different sizes 
and to human resource differences and collective bargaining capacity, 
which is non-existent in informal enterprises. The average earnings of 
self-employed workers and informal micro-enterprise employees are 
28% higher than those for the sector as a whole and 57% higher than 
those of informal wage earners. However, these earnings are 13% less 
than what they would earn if they were employed as wage earners 
in enterprises with more than five workers, which is an incentive to 
become formalized even though the higher earnings are offset by a loss 
of independence. 
The differences between self-employed workers and informal 
micro-enterprise employers are, however, very significant. An unskilled 
self-employed worker could on average triple his income if he were to 
become a micro-enterprise employer, even an informal one. His earnings 
are 16% higher than those of informal wage earners, meaning that he 
would have no incentive to change his status, but a change to paid 
work in the formal sector would mean an expected average earnings 
increase of 36%. “Exit” does not seem to be justified on the basis of the 
information available. Informal micro-enterprise employers, on the other 
hand, would have no incentive to switch to a wage-earning job, even a 
formal one, because the move would mean a reduction of earnings to 
one third of what they earn informally. Their options would be to grow 
in micro-enterprises by becoming formalized, since there is a direct 
link between formalization and establishment size. This is observed in 
micro-enterprises and, to a greater extent, in larger enterprises. 
Since averages may not show the particular situation of each 
country, earnings differentials must be analyzed by country (see table 
VIII.4). Firstly, it is confirmed that in the countries analyzed self-
employed workers could actually triple their earnings if they become 
micro-enterprise employers, even informal ones. In the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, this gain is apparently even larger. Secondly, self-
employment is a valid or at least a neutral option compared with wage 
labour in the informal sector in most countries. Only in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela do informal wage earners have earnings that are 
one third higher than those of self-employed workers. Thirdly, in Chile, 
Argentina, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Brazil, the 
earnings of self-employed workers far exceed those of informal wage 
earners. Lastly, only in Argentina, Chile and, to a lesser extent, Mexico 
does there seem to be no incentive to switch to formal wage-earning, so 
that being an informal self-employed worker is apparently a conscious 
choice rather than an exclusion. 
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Table VIII.4
EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BETWEN SELF-EMPLOYED WORKERS AND WAGE EARNERS, 2005
Country SE/WE<5a SE/WE>5b SE/E<5c SE/E>5d
Argentina 2.17 1.35 0.38 0.21
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 0.86 0.40 0.31 0.11
Brazil 1.27 0.70 0.32 0.16
Chile 2.36 1.30 0.32 0.15
Costa Rica 0.89 0.53 0.50 0.29
Ecuador 1.00 0.60 0.36 0.17
El Salvador 0.96 0.62 0.33 0.28
Guatemala 0.82 0.37 0.26 0.10
Honduras 0.59 0.30 0.24 0.13
Mexico 1.74 0.93 0.35 0.09
Nicaragua 1.05 0.59 0.33 0.05
Panama 0.84 0.45 0.30 0.14
Paraguay 0.83 0.47 0.27 0.07
Peru 0.89 0.40 0.30 0.09
Dominican Rep. 1.53 0.79 0.38 0.25
Uruguay 1.29 0.64 0.34 0.21
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 0.67 0.42 0.14 0.08
Arithmetical average 1.16 0.64 0.32 0.15
Source:   Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special 
tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a  SE / WE < 5: Self-employed workers compared with wage earners in micro-enterprises with less than 
five workers.
b  SE / WE > 5:Self-employed workers compared with wage earners in enterprises with more than five workers.
c  SE / E < 5: Self-employed workers compared with employers in micro-enterprises with less than five workers.
d  SE / E > 5: Self-employed workers compared with employers in enterprises with more than five workers.
G.   Informality, labour relationship and social protection
Employment and legal recognition of the existence of a labour 
relationship are essential prerequisites for access to social security 
coverage. The unemployed in countries such as the Latin American 
countries generally face a double exclusion: lack of employment and 
lack of social protection, resulting both from the virtual non-existence of 
unemployment insurance and from the inadequacy and poor coverage of 
non-contributory pensions (when they exist). The form of incorporation 
in the labour market also plays a role, resulting in important differences 
in levels of social protection.15 
Persons employed in the informal economy have less access to 
social protection coverage, because the self-employed have no labour 
relationship, and wage earners employed in micro-enterprises have 
only partial access. Even in the case of wage earners working in formal 
15 In view of the information available for this analysis, contribution to a pension scheme              
is used as the indicator of access to social protection.
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enterprises, the partial compliance with labour and social protection 
obligations is one factor of employment precarity. In the case of wage 
earners, although a labour relationship exists, it is not usually recognized 
or confirmed by an employment contract, or this contract does not 
provide for full coverage, or the responsibility for contributions is spread 
because of subcontracting.
Self-employed workers and micro-enterprise employers have the 
lowest levels of social protection coverage: on average in Latin America 
only 13.5% of them were making contributions around 2002 (ECLAC, 
2006 and Tokman, 2006). None of them are in a labour relationship and 
in most countries they are not required to contribute to the pension 
scheme. Among micro-enterprise wage earners, 21.7% have access to 
protection, while among informal wage earners in formal enterprises 
this figure is only 29%. On average, for persons working in the informal 
economy coverage is about 20%.16 Insertion through employment in 
informality results in a lack of protection, although the degree varies 
from one country to another. Countries which have lower levels of 
informality and greater protection coverage have fewer differences 
between coverage depending on the type of labour insertion. In Costa 
Rica, Chile and Uruguay, between 35% and 38% of persons working in 
the informal sector have coverage, whereas in Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Peru and Paraguay coverage is found to vary between 2% and 3.5%. If 
one also considers that informal workers in formal enterprises account 
for only 6% of urban workers in the former case, whereas in the latter 
case they account for three times this percentage, the differences between 
countries with regard to coverage of persons employed in the informal 
economy are even greater.
Another factor affecting access to social protection is the existence 
or non-existence of an employment contract and the type of contract 
concluded. Of all wage earners, 63% have an employment contract. 
Of those who have a contract, 78% have indefinite contracts and the 
remainder have other types of contract. If wage earners who have no 
written contract are added to those who have fixed-term contracts, over 
half the wage earners in Latin America are in a situation of informality 
(Tokman, 2007c).17 This proportion varies from a low of 21% in Argentina 
to a high of 74% in Plurinational State of Bolivia. The employment 
contract provides legal recognition of the labour relationship and is a 
requirement for access to social protection.
Social protection covers 85% of wage earners with formal contracts 
and 15% of those not in a recognized labour relationship. Coverage of 
16 Estimate based on information for 16 countries (ECLAC, 2006 and Tokman, 2006).           
17 Arithmetical mean for 16 countries in 2002 (ECLAC data).        
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persons with indefinite contracts is as much as 89% but for persons with 
other contracts it drops to 65%. Coverage among wage earners in micro-
enterprises is only 50% for those with contracts and 10% for those without 
contracts. Coverage depends on the duration of the contract and drops 
from 63% for indefinite contracts to 35% for other types of contract.
It is also noteworthy that 68% of wage earners in micro-
enterprises have no labour contract and that those who do mainly have 
indefinite contracts. On the other hand, 74% of wage earners in formal 
enterprises have a recognized labour relationship, but just over half 
have permanent contracts.
H.   A strategic option for social inclusion    
      and competitiveness
Flexicurity, as defined at the beginning of this analysis, consists of 
a combination of flexibility and security (needed in a more open and 
globalized world), as a tool for improving the ability to compete. Even 
in the more developed countries, there is no one strategic recipe for 
achieving consistency between the two components. Indeed, employment 
and labour and social protection policies reflect the specific features of 
each country, so that the mix is variable, although the goal is to meet the 
common challenge of increasing competitiveness in more volatile and 
uncertain markets.
The developing countries, particularly in Latin America, still have 
structural restrictions that limit the potential effects of these policies. 
The existence of a significant informal economy requires a strategy of 
economic and social inclusion. Lack of such a strategy is an obstacle to 
the pursuit of generally recommended policies and makes it impossible 
to tackle the problems of employment, instability and lack of labour 
protection. Moreover, a strategy that does not adequately address 
informality may result in greater informality. The informal economy is 
partly a structural imbalance and partly also the result of labour policies 
designed to increase competitiveness which create growing insecurity 
and lack of protection.
A sense of belonging is central to social cohesion. It is acquired 
through entitlement to civil, economic and social rights, so that all 
citizens are included in the dynamics of development and the well-
being it implies. The countries of Latin America have made considerable 
progress on civil and political rights with the establishment of democracy, 
after a long period of authoritarian government and restricted freedoms. 
Today the focus has shifted to economic citizenship and particularly 
social citizenship, which are the prerequisites for addressing existing 
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inequalities and for ensuring that everyone is treated as a full member of 
society (ECLAC, 2007b). Poverty, informality and exclusion reflect poor 
access to resources, low incomes and high vulnerability and represent a 
failure of citizenship in that many people are denied entitlement to rights. 
This situation runs counter to a sense of belonging, which is acquired 
through inclusion associated with recognition and participation.
This could be the context for a strategic reorientation designed to 
incorporate informality into modernity (Tokman, 2004). What is needed 
is a global strategy complemented by specific strategies and policies in 
various spheres, exercise of the right to engage in productive activities 
and labour rights, including the right to protection.
The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, an international 
body created within the framework of the United Nations, proposes a 
strategy to enable the poor in a situation of informality to progress in 
the full exercise of their rights and interests vis-à-vis the State, markets 
and other citizens.18 The goals are access to opportunities and protection, 
which it is hoped to achieve through exercise of the legally recognized 
rights of access to justice and ownership, as well as labour rights and 
the right to engage in productive activities. Legal recognition of identity 
and of the right to organize and express oneself would enable the poor 
to participate directly in the promotion of the reforms and legal actions 
needed to correct the shortcomings of the market, public policies and 
regulatory institutions (Chen, 2006). 
A more limited proposal to incorporate the informal sector in 
modernity reflects the approach described above (see Tokman, 2004, 2006 
and 2007b). This strategic reorientation is based on three fundamental 
principles. Firstly, social inclusion must be sought initially by means of 
enforcement of the economic and social rights of the excluded instead of 
through the usual approach of promoting compliance with obligations. 
Secondly, greater “formalization” is justified not from the point of view 
of those included but principally because of the benefits that formality 
can provide to persons working in the informal sector and to the work 
they do. Thirdly, the desired effects will not come about automatically 
but require changed behaviours and attitudes from those involved, 
so as to create a more favourable atmosphere for their activities. This 
requires a cultural transformation of those working in the informal 
economy. Ultimately formalization paves the way for economic and 
social citizenship and these, in turn, are a requirement for belonging and 
being fully incorporated into a more inclusive society.
18 See Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (2008).        
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The informal economy embodies two main types of exclusion. The 
first is the existence of a significant informal sector that is not declining. 
This is where most of the jobs are and where most of the poor and 
medium-low income groups earn their living. These are employers and 
workers (and many of them are both simultaneously), belonging to the 
world of the excluded, since they have low earnings and suffer from a lack 
of protection and stability. The second type of exclusion affects workers 
in formal enterprises or production lines with various subcontracting 
arrangements who do not enjoy labour security or full protection. They 
all need a comprehensive strategy to promote social inclusion based on 
recognition of entitlement to civil, economic and social rights. They also 
need both production and labour reforms including at least five pillars: 
productive development and the regulation of informal activities, labour 
rights in informal enterprises with limited ability to pay, measures to 
combat insecurity and lack of protection among informal workers in 
formal enterprises, regulation of diffuse labour relations and, lastly, 
social protection for informal workers. 
I.    Five strategic pillars for the informal economy
1.    Productive development and the regulation of           
       informal activities
This involves recognizing the right of micro-enterprise employers 
and self-employed workers to engage in productive activities that enable 
them to earn a living and at the same time decreasing the vulnerability 
created by their informal status. To this end, existing regulations must be 
adapted to informal workers’ possibilities of compliance by modifying 
a regulatory system designed for larger enterprises and more organized 
sectors with no heed for the capacities of those who are not in a position 
to comply with the requirements laid down. As part of this reorientation 
giving priority to recognition of formality, mechanisms are proposed 
which include the right to initiate and conduct business, to legitimize 
ownership, to distinguish between the assets of the enterprise and those 
of the informal employer and to trade in private and public spaces 
equipped for that purpose.
It is also necessary to adjust and streamline the process of recognition 
to facilitate compliance with obligations. The red tape involved in opening 
or closing activities takes up considerable resources and time because of 
the numerous laws and regulations to be followed and State bureaucratic 
inefficiency.  A number of measures have been adopted to streamline 
registration systems by standardizing them and reducing administrative 
formalities and it has been proposed to streamline procedures by 
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introducing a “single registry and single window” regime, reducing 
formalization costs. As noted in an ILO study (2006), these regulations 
apply generally to all enterprises, but smaller ones are most affected 
because they do not have the means and information to comply.
According to another study (Loayza, Oviedo and Servén, 2005), in 
Latin America there are 2.6 times more regulations than in the OECD 
countries and more than there are in the Asian countries. Only Africa 
and the Middle East have more regulations. There has been marked 
progress in commercial openness and financial sector modernization, 
but the largest backlogs have occurred in the regulations governing 
trading licences. In this connection, it is suggested that authorizations 
for individual or family businesses should exist automatically with the 
identity cards. 
Recognition of property title must be simplified. De Soto proposed 
that certification of ownership should be simplified and reflect situations 
of de facto ownership. There would be no contractual prerequisites or 
submission of proof of ownership and alternative methods of recognition 
would be used such as long-term usufruct, calling on witnesses and 
having boundaries recognized by third parties that might have conflicting 
interests. In addition, certification of title to assets owned by informal 
workers would create opportunities for access to credit.
The separation of assets of the individual from those of the employer 
is also an important factor legally empowering micro-enterprise employers 
to do business and avoiding a situation in which asset losses associated 
with the result of the productive activity are transferred to the family. In 
order for this to be achieved, there must be types of companies suited 
to the needs of micro-enterprises, such as the individual limited liability 
companies already existing in several countries.
The situation of street traders deserves special attention, because 
of the need to reconcile the right to use public spaces and the right of 
traders to have an income-generating occupation. These activities must 
be regulated within a unified framework that covers legal, fiscal and 
labour issues. For this, the persons concerned should have access to 
urban spaces that they can lease or own for the purpose of engaging in 
commercial activities complying with existing municipal regulations. In 
addition, available spaces must be chosen in the light of the availability 
of public transport to ensure access by potential buyers. Lastly, if traders 
were organized, both at the level of specific markets and on a larger 
scale, they would be better able to negotiate with local authorities and 
with suppliers. 
Adaptation of these regulations will create more opportunities 
for the productive development of informal activities. The likelihood 
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of progressing towards formal sector status is determined mainly by a 
productive unit’s capacity for growth. There have been experiments with 
productive support for these activities, improving access to productive 
resources (capital and credit, skills and training, and technology) and to 
markets (organization and location). However, the greatest potential for a 
major impact throughout the system lies with the regulatory framework. 
Expanded access to credit requires legal recognition of capital, while the 
ability to take commercial risks without involving the family assets can be 
improved by better legal arrangements for the creation and development 
of enterprises. New accounting and administrative techniques can 
improve management and thus improve enterprises’ earnings. Similarly, 
the extent to which employment labour relations in micro-enterprises 
could be recognized and regulated depends on enterprises’ ability to 
comply with regulations, which is linked to their economic success. 
These are prerequisites for improving productivity, investing in training 
and promoting labour and social protection for workers.
2.    Labour rights in informal enterprises with limited     
       ability to pay  
More than one third of wage earners in the private sector in Latin 
America are working in informal enterprises, and 68% of them have no 
written labour contract.19 This means that for most of them labour and 
social protection is not a right, because they have no recognized labour 
relationship. And informal productive units have little ability to pay in 
order to meet the obligations inherent in the labour relationship.
 There would be some movement towards regulated and protected 
employment relations if the employment relationship were recognized, 
notably with proof of the existence of unwritten contracts, such as time 
sheets and payment of regular wages registered in the accounts or 
confirmed by witnesses. This would provide workers with the necessary 
credentials to be entitled to coverage under protection schemes and 
would encourage micro-enterprises to do business on a proper basis.
 However, taking this first step already involves difficulties with 
compliance, because of the low capacity to absorb the costs associated with 
formalization of the enterprise’s workers (Tokman, 2001). In Colombia, 
76% of micro-enterprises could not pay labour costs in their entirety; 
it was estimated that, in order for them to do so, sales would have to 
double. In Peru, 85% of micro-enterprises were also not in a position to 
absorb the costs, since to do so would halve or eliminate their profits. 
However, 15% in Colombia and 49.5% in Peru were partially complying 
with certain obligations. 
19 About 30% of wage earners in the informal sector are domestic workers.           
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This is happening partly because social protection is designed 
for larger enterprises, but adjustment should not be confused with 
deregulation: being more responsive to the needs of micro-enterprises 
does not mean that existing labour conditions should be allowed to 
deteriorate. It may be possible to make improvements in response to 
demands to increase efficiency and expand coverage of the organized 
labour market.
One possibility is to design special regulatory systems for micro- 
and small enterprises, creating dual or preferential systems. This practice 
is followed in several countries, including Argentina, Brazil and Peru. 
However, this option has drawbacks for reasons of regulatory efficiency 
and as a matter of principle. It may result in fiscal and labour law evasion 
and create barriers to micro-enterprise growth by setting limits on capital 
investment. In the labour sphere, issues of principle are involved, because 
there would be differential treatment of workers before the law, depending 
on the size of the enterprise employing them. It is therefore preferable 
to have a single regulatory system (ILO, 1991), which does not preclude 
simplified taxation systems or preferential rates for credit.20 On labour 
issues too, arrangements are accepted that are better suited to the needs 
of small enterprises, especially in relation to collective bargaining.
Another type of differentiation would be to recognize that a dual 
situation exists de facto, without seeking to convert it into a de jure 
situation. This implies not applying sanctions and acknowledging that 
non-compliance results from inability to pay. Nor should it mean lack 
of oversight, but simply that inspection should be overhauled to reflect 
reality. ILO (2006) proposed an innovative strategy for monitoring 
compliance with employment law in micro- and small enterprises, based 
on the assumption that regulation will be more effective when there are 
more options for encouraging compliance, options allowing gradual 
oversight and correction of problems.
Earlier analyses (Tokman, 2008b) proposed the introduction of a state 
of preformalization which, in addition to regularizing micro-enterprises 
as productive units, would establish a compulsory minimum threshold 
on labour issues incorporating the fundamental labour rights set out in 
the 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, prohibition of forced 
labour and child labour and non-discrimination. Human rights are thus 
transferred into the labour sphere. In addition, other rights relating to 
20 In Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, special tax regimes are applied to micro-            
enterprises replacing all taxes by a single consolidated tax. This simplifies tax returns 
and, except in Paraguay, social security contributions are also included.
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working conditions would be incorporated: minimum wage, working 
hours and occupational illnesses.21
Unlike the series of labour obligations for which compliance is 
limited by enterprises’ lack of ability, this threshold should be non-
negotiable, since absolute values are involved. A threshold does not mean 
that workers in the informal sector will have access only to limited labour 
rights. On the contrary, the proposal is to recognize the need to make 
progress by improving the informal enterprises’ ability to comply and 
committing them to taking this path. Implementation should be subject 
to follow-up, promotion and oversight, taking into account the specificity 
of the subject being regulated.22 Advance commitment to compliance 
with targets would be similar to the system used for ILO supervision of 
certain international labour standards. The preformalization stage would 
cover a specific period in order to avoid being perpetuated, which would 
in fact create a dual labour system.23
3.    Measures to combat insecurity and lack of protection       
       of informal workers in formal enterprises
Insecurity and lack of protection are linked to the absence of legally 
and explicitly recognized employment relations, but also to situations 
governed by contracts other than the indefinite employment contract. 
Both situations arise both in micro-enterprises and in formal enterprises. 
However, the former occur mainly in informal enterprises and the 
latter occur mainly in formal enterprises, so that their workers consider 
themselves to be members of the informal economy. 
The indefinite contract has had to compete with new forms of 
contract resulting from labour reforms establishing greater flexibility and 
reduction of non-wage labour costs as ways of increasing competitiveness 
in more open economies. They generally do not reduce the protection of 
21 The expanded threshold was incorporated in the free trade agreements concluded by 
the United States with several Latin American countries, including Mexico, Chile, the 
Central American countries and the Dominican Republic, Peru, Panama and Colombia 
(for the last two final approval is still pending). More recently, the proposal was 
incorporated in the recommendations of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of 
the Poor (2008) and in the recommendations of the Presidential Advisory Council on 
Labour and Equity (2008) created by the President of Chile, Michelle Bachelet.
22 In Chile, the Directorate of Labour has since 2001 been applying a system of educational               
inspection to micro-enterprises, in which fines can be replaced by attendance at a 
training course on employment law, in recognition of the limitations existing in these 
enterprises as regards access to information and their inability to enlist the help of 
professional consultants.
23 The special labour regime adopted in Colombia for micro-, small and medium-size            
enterprises gradually reduces labour and tax contributions but aims at convergence 
with the general regime by the end of a four-year period. 
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workers while they are employed and are not illegal because they were 
introduced and promoted by legislative reforms. 
In Argentina in 1991 and 1995 and in Peru in 1993, broad labour 
reforms were adopted which introduced a series of atypical contractual 
arrangements with the above-mentioned goals. Non-wage labour costs 
were not significantly different in the various contractual arrangements 
(Chacaltana, 2005), which seems to indicate that labour obligations and 
protection would be maintained at levels similar to those of indefinite 
contracts. The exception is unregistered workers and those with special 
contracts designed to encourage employment of certain groups. 
Although the new forms of contract may have entailed some loss of 
protection, their chief effect has been uncertainty about the continuity of 
the current contract. This insecurity affects workers and their families, 
as well as productivity, since it reduces the incentive for learning and 
innovation. For this reason, use of these contracts should be restricted 
and the search for flexibility should focus on long-term contracts.
That is what occurred in Spain, which with its 1981 reform pioneered 
the introduction of flexibility into the labour market, without affecting 
the levels of protection of workers with permanent contracts. Twelve 
types of special contracts were introduced, which lowered dismissal costs 
and reduced social security contributions during the first two years and 
which targeted specific groups of persons under 30 and over 45 years of 
age, the long-term unemployed and persons with disabilities.
In Spain and Argentina, labour reforms changed direction in the mid-
1990s. Spain redefined the strategy by means of a tripartite agreement, 
limited the use of fixed-term contracts to collective bargaining and 
focused the search for flexibility on permanent contracts, facilitating 
dismissal with due cause and reducing the costs of dismissals. In 2006, 
a new tripartite agreement confirmed the earlier trend by promoting 
conversion of fixed-term contracts to indefinite contracts if over a 30-
month period the same worker accumulated more than 24 months 
in the same enterprise or with successive contracts in the same job. 
Benefits were also introduced for women, young people and long-
term unemployed persons who were given indefinite contracts, social 
security contributions were reduced and illegal placement of workers 
between enterprises was more clearly defined and measures taken to 
combat this practice.
In Argentina, a similar redirection of labour reforms took place 
between 1998 and 2000, limiting the use of atypical contracts, reducing 
severance pay under contracts of long duration and extending the 
probationary period. In Brazil, the 1998 reform introduced atypical 
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contracts but made them conditional on the creation of new jobs and 
allowed limits on such hiring to be set by collective bargaining.
Experience has shown the limitations of using atypical contracts 
to ensure flexibility and the effects on employment with stability and 
protection. The redirection signifies a re-assessment of the importance 
of contracts that are indefinite but adapted to reduce severance costs. 
Renewal of atypical contracts is limited to specified periods to avoid 
their de facto conversion into long-term contracts and the determination 
of limits on their use is subject to the tripartite agreement.
4.    Regulation of diffuse labour relations
A fourth area of regulation covers labour relations which for 
the purpose of this analysis will be called “diffuse”, because they are 
difficult to recognize, are disguised or remain unprotected owing to 
gaps in employment law or in compliance monitoring. In many cases, 
the obligations and rights of the parties are not clear, which may result 
in loss of protection for workers. They are becoming increasingly 
important in the context of globalization and decentralization of 
production, and there is a need to establish workers’ rights and to 
allocate responsibility for compliance with obligations among the 
various enterprises concerned.
In 2006, after a process of analysis that started in 1998, ILO approved 
Recommendation No. 198 on the Employment Relationship, which 
urges countries to clarify the law in order to guarantee protection for 
workers who perform their activity in the framework of an employment 
relationship. It also advocates determination of the existence of an 
employment relationship and drawing of a distinction between wage 
earners and self-employed persons. For this purpose, it emphasizes 
the importance of promoting methods for determining the existence 
of an employment relationship (including regular remuneration, work 
carried out according to instructions and under control, working hours, 
provision of materials and tools). It advocates the adoption of measures 
to combat disguised employment relationships and urges enactment of 
standards which are applicable to all forms of contractual arrangements, 
including those involving multiple parties, and which establish who is 
responsible for protection. It basically represents progress in the creation 
of a framework for making disguised employment relationships more 
transparent and for identifying the responsible employer in all cases, 
including subcontracting.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that in 2006 Chile adopted a law 
on subcontracting that restricts the provision of staff solely to short-term 
jobs and exceptional tasks (including replacements and occasional or 
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urgent activities). In order to ensure compliance with labour obligations, 
registration is compulsory and a financial guarantee must be provided 
to cover workers’ salaries and insurance in case of non-compliance. 
Subcontracted workers are the responsibility of the subcontractor, but 
the contracting enterprise also has labour responsibilities. The law 
transforms the existing subsidiary liability into a joint liability, meaning 
that the contracting enterprise is responsible jointly with the subcontractor 
for compliance with obligations. The contracting enterprise is entitled 
to require the subcontractor to produce certificates of compliance with 
labour obligations and to withhold the relevant amounts from pending 
payments in case of non-compliance. In this way it can transform its 
liability into a subsidiary liability.
ILO Convention No. 177 adopted in 1996 provides guidance for the 
formulation of a regulatory framework for home work. In appearance this 
type of work is an activity performed on own account or with a family 
structure. However, it often amounts to paid subordinate wage work 
that is performed not in an enterprise but for a subcontracting enterprise 
or an intermediary. Such work is performed largely by women, with 
help from family members, including children, and is not covered by 
employment law, so that there is no recognized employment relationship 
and therefore a lack of protection and bargaining power.
The Convention recommends that national policy should promote 
equality of treatment between home workers and other types of worker, 
taking into account the special characteristics of home work. Equality of 
treatment includes the right to establish or join organizations of one’s 
own choosing and to participate in the activities of such organizations 
(freedom of association), protection against discrimination, compliance 
with the minimum age for work, remuneration and protection in the 
field of occupational safety and health, social and maternity protection.24 
As noted, the minimum established rights echo the minimum proposed 
for micro-enterprises with the addition of social security and maternity 
coverage. On these latter aspects, Recommendation No. 184 concerning 
Home Work, which accompanies the Convention, specifies that these two 
requirements can be met by: extending existing social security provisions 
to home workers; adapting social security schemes to cover home 
workers; or developing special schemes or funds for home workers.
24 Two of the most notable examples of promotion of freedom of organization are found              
at the national level in India (Self Employed Women’s Association, SEWA) and at the 
global level (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing–WIEGO), 
which includes national and international organizations, academics and members 
concerned with development.
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5.    Social protection for informal workers
Provision of social protection coverage to workers employed in the 
informal sector requires a strategy ranging from expansion of coverage 
provided by existing schemes to development of new protection 
instruments such as insurance and consolidation of the resources 
contributed by the informal workers themselves. This coverage should 
include health, pensions and, since most informal workers are female, 
maternity coverage. It would be extended to workers in micro-enterprises, 
and to self-employed persons. In the case of informal workers in formal 
enterprises, responsibility for protection should be linked to enhancement 
of the labour contract and to the shared contribution with the employer.
From a systemic perspective, the right to social protection should be 
granted to all persons as citizens rather than as workers, and awarded on 
the basis of the principle of universality. This has been the major change 
in the redesigning of the traditional model in Latin America, as well as 
in supplementing the private contributory pension schemes by adding a 
solidarity pillar funded from public resources.
 In its recent report on informality (Perry and others, 2007), the 
World Bank fully supported this change for both health and pension 
coverage. As regards health, it is recognized that uncovered events 
involve significant costs to society, so that there is a case for providing 
essential direct coverage, de-linked from the labour contract and financed 
through general taxation. Similarly, when the elderly have insufficient 
income, there are social costs involved that justify support to guarantee a 
minimum income not associated with the labour contract.
Various steps in this direction are being taken in different parts of 
the world. In India, a law was recently enacted to regulate the protection 
of unorganized workers by providing them with social security, health 
coverage and welfare by means of a welfare fund financed by the 
Government and registered employers. In the Philippines, the social 
security systems and health insurance plans have increased their coverage 
through voluntary schemes open to self-employed workers.
Plurinational State of Bolivia is the only country in Latin America 
that has introduced a universal pension scheme (BONOSOL, now known 
as Renta Dignidad) and Brazil has a similar system for rural workers 
(FUNRURAL). In Chile, which pioneered the privatization of pension 
and health schemes, the system was reformed by the introduction of a 
non-contributory pillar that guarantees a solidarity pension to all citizens 
over 65 years of age.
Health has better coverage than pensions and is approaching 
universality through a combination of different schemes: social security 
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in Costa Rica, which covers contributors and non-contributors; a public 
system in Cuba and a mixed system of public institutions, social security 
and private insurance in Uruguay, Brazil and Chile, among other 
countries. Chile has expanded access to public health for all citizens by 
introducing guaranteed care for 56 groups of illnesses (Universal Access 
Plan with Explicit Guarantees - AUGE), in addition to the existing 
National Health Fund (FONASA). 
As well as guaranteeing greater security, de-linking protection 
from labour participation should create opportunities for increasing 
employment and improving business. It should help to reduce 
existing deficits but will require sound fiscal policies and, in particular, 
adequate funding of health and pension coverage. Lastly, maternity 
and child care coverage should be expanded, because of the potential 
effect on early development of children’s cognitive skills and on the 
participation of women in the labour market, particularly those from 
poor households.25
J.   Conclusions
In this analysis, the term “flexicurity” is defined as a strategy for 
combining flexibility to improve productivity and competitiveness in 
open economies and security to ensure that workers do not suffer a 
deterioration of protection or of working conditions.
The analysis of developed countries’ experience with flexicurity 
shows that it does not follow a uniform pattern but takes different forms 
depending on the country concerned. It is, however, acknowledged that 
the experiments in Denmark, Ireland, Finland and the Netherlands have 
been the most extensive and successful.
Application of this strategy in the Latin American countries provides 
a useful approach for tackling the global challenges involved in increased 
competitiveness, which requires flexibility in production and labour, and 
at the same time for providing workers with security and opportunities 
for moving to better jobs. 
As is the case in the developed countries, the diversity of situations 
found in Latin America requires not a “one size fits all” approach but 
25 However, progress can also be made in the social protection coverage of self-employed 
workers through initiatives such as those adopted in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay 
introducing simplified schemes for small contributors and, in the case of Brazil, reducing 
the compulsory contributions of self-employed workers. The single consolidated tax 
existing in Argentina and Uruguay has made it possible, for example, to achieve better 
coverage of self-employed workers than in Chile, which has the best coverage of wage 
earners (Bertranou, 2007).
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one that can be adapted to the specific requirements of each country. 
In addition, structural restrictions peculiar to the region determine the 
potential effects and feasibility of financing a strategy of this kind. The 
most important limitations are those resulting from the existence of a 
significant informal economy and from the limited fiscal capacity to 
increase earnings of this kind.
This analysis emphasizes that informality limits the spread of 
potential benefits of a strategic option such as the one described and 
examines its relevance in the Latin American countries in the light of the 
evolving concept of informality.
In general, a formalization strategy is proposed as a prerequisite for 
advancement in more integrated and cohesive economies and societies. 
This is a requirement for the development of the region in general and, in 
particular, for absorption of lessons learned from the policies pursued by 
the more developed countries. Formalization is understood to be the legal 
recognition and exercise of workers’ labour rights and entrepreneurs’ 
rights. Both activities must be legally recognized, since informality restricts 
access to labour benefits. The goal is also to enhance the empowerment 
and access to justice of potential beneficiaries, so that they can become 
active agents of their own economic and social inclusion.
The heterogeneity of the informal economy is recognized by including 
employers and workers, as well as the various types of relationship 
between them and with the regulations and institutions. For this reason, 
the strategy is organized around five pillars: productive development 
and regulation of informal activities, labour rights in informal enterprises 
with limited ability to pay, measures to combat the insecurity and lack of 
protection of informal workers in formal enterprises, regulation of diffuse 
labour relationships and, lastly, social protection for informal workers. 
The first pillar concerns capacity to do business, proposing both 
simplification of the regulatory process and adaptation of the regulations 
so as to recognize, inter alia, the right to ownership and to do business. 
The second pillar refers to workers in informal micro-enterprises whose 
labour relationship is not legally recognized because they have no labour 
contract and are therefore not entitled to any type of labour right, including 
rights to labour and social protection. It is proposed that a minimum 
level of labour rights should be established which includes fundamental 
rights in employment and working conditions (working hours, protection 
against occupational accidents and illnesses, and minimum wage). In 
view of the inability to pay of most micro-enterprises, it is difficult to 
impose a minimum level for access to a preformalization stage. What 
is proposed is a gradual progression towards equality of labour rights 
regardless of enterprise size and avoidance of their segmentation; the 
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minimum level is considered to be transitional and subject to verification 
by the relevant administrative authority.
The third pillar concerns workers with atypical contractual 
arrangements in formal enterprises. On the basis of experience with 
labour reforms geared to greater flexibility, it is suggested that there 
should be a refocusing on the indefinite labour contract ensuring stability 
but that it should be adapted to reduce dismissal costs and processing 
difficulties. At the same time, it is proposed to increase the liquidity of 
compensation and to expand unemployment insurance.
The fourth pillar relates to the situation of workers with diffuse 
employment relationships, including home workers who work or 
produce for third parties, as well as subcontracting. The diffuse character 
resulting from disguise of the labour relationship or from its legal non-
existence leads to erosion of the labour rights of those concerned and 
generates a spurious transfer of benefits in the production chain to 
the more organized sectors. The introduction of new laws designed 
to recognize the existence of these relationships and to assign shared 
responsibilities among the enterprises involved as regards compliance 
with obligations represents progress. 
The fifth pillar refers to access by informal workers to social security 
and mentions the advisability of enhancing access to health and pension 
coverage on a universal basis, in view of the existing segmentation, 
which undermines contributory benefits for a broad segment of workers 
in the informal economy. 
However, isolated measures cannot be expected to have a systemic 
effect and the main challenge considered here is how to include them in 
a strategic framework designed to promote formalization as a necessary 
instrument for economic, labour and social inclusion.
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